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INTRODUCTION
Fordham University Press’s International Humanitarian Affairs series is launched with two practical volumes, Basics of International Humanitarian Missions and Emergency Relief Operations.
The series will issue two to three books per year and will consider
various aspects of a discipline that, while in some senses is as
ancient as humankind, is nevertheless still in a stage of definition. Only in recent years has humanitarian assistance been appreciated to be a potent political and diplomatic tool, and also
recognized as big business. What began at the dawn of existence
as an individual altruistic undertaking evolved into a charitable
vocation and is now recognized as a distinct profession.
The purpose or goal of Fordham University’s Institute of International Humanitarian Affairs is to preserve the traditions and
values of this discipline while also providing a framework for appropriate training and academic analyses. The book series directly complements, and draws from, the Institute’s other
programs and teaching courses. This international humanitarian
book series is intended to provide practical volumes for use by
professionals in the field as well as by students in a wide variety
of academic departments. The multidisciplinary nature of international humanitarian relief will be obvious to any reader.
Humanitarian assistance, particularly in the midst of conflicts
and disasters, is not a field for amateurs. Good intentions are
a common but tragically inadequate substitute for well-planned,
efficiently implemented operations that, like a good sentence,
must have a beginning, a middle, and an end. Compassion and
charity are only elements in humanitarian assistance programs;
alone they are self-indulgent emotions that, for a short time, may
satisfy the donor, but will always disappoint victims in desperate
need.

xvi

INTRODUCTION

The number and severity of humanitarian crises is rapidly escalating in our post-cold war era, where the perverse stability of
East-West superpower politics can sometimes seem preferable to
the chaos that now prevails in ‘‘failed states’’ that dot the world.
Civil wars have largely replaced formal conflicts between nations.
In World War I, 90 percent of those injured or killed were military combatants, while in modern conflicts, civilians account for
over 90 percent of the victims.
International humanitarian laws, which were established to
provide rules of war, are rarely recognized and are certainly not
observed in civil wars. International laws and the Geneva Conventions were composed for an earlier era when state governments
officially represented combatants. Now childhood warriors with
AK-47s rule the roads, and clans use ethnic cleansing as a solution to borders that, according to one’s own peculiar view, had
been artificially imposed by a historical process they would never
forget nor forgive. Today there are more internally displaced persons than international refugees.
In noncomplex emergencies such as floods or earthquakes,
where a stable government exists, that government understandably expects to, and is responsible for, handling all relief activities. International assistance workers must accept the traditions
and rules of functioning sovereign nations or invite confrontation and painful rejection. Aid offered without respect for the
rights of an independent people will almost always result in
counterproductive misunderstanding, damaging both donor and
recipient.
But in complex humanitarian emergencies, security concerns
and political decisions are an intimate part of any relief response.
This volume, divided into four sections, presents some of the
basic elements that need to be considered in both natural and
man-made humanitarian crises. Companion volumes will offer
more detailed coverage of specific aspects of humanitarian assistance.

Basics of International
Humanitarian Missions

Part 1
To build a solid edifice one must have a good foundation, a basic
structure for growth and development. There are many reasons to
begin any undertaking with a careful study of history. It allows us
to appreciate the contributions of our predecessors and to offer a
perspective so frequently missing in the flow of a current crisis. A
historical approach permits us to introduce the traditions and values of our profession. And, maybe most importantly, it helps us
avoid repeating the more egregious errors of past interventions.
Only by accumulating solid data can better programs be developed. To communicate, especially in the midst of chaos, we must
carefully define our methods and goals, constructing a new and
accepted language to fit an evolving discipline. In this section, three
acknowledged masters in the field of humanitarian assistance review the history of our field, recent statistics, and its vocabulary.
Current efforts in organized international humanitarian assistance are rooted in a noble past. The ethos of our discipline, and
the codes of conduct that guide our actions, reflect the aspirations,
as well as the failures, of our forebears. Paul Grossrieder, the Director-General of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
reminds us of the evolution of humanitarian action from ancient
times to the modern day, and concludes with an assessment of the
new challenges in the twenty-first century.
The number of calamities in our ever-shrinking world seems to
inexorably expand, especially if one depends solely on television
images, the ‘‘CNN effect’’ of immediate involvement in every disaster. Reality, however, and the rational plans to deal with that reality,
depend on careful statistical analysis. Ibrahim Osman, the Director
of Monitoring and Evaluation for the International Federation of
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Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), has studied the data
on international disasters for many decades. His chapter defines the
scope of both natural and man-made disasters in the last decade of
the twentieth century.
In response to any large disaster, many players will convene, representing varying backgrounds, cultures, nations, and tongues. An
indispensable requirement for an appropriate humanitarian response is to agree on terminology, for without a common, accepted language, the efforts of disparate helpers may—in fact,
usually will—add to the disaster. Dr. S. W. A. Gunn, who has authored a multinational dictionary for disaster and relief workers,
contributes an essential chapter of common terms, and helped select the abbreviations, acronyms, and useful Web sites listed.

1

Humanitarian Action in the
Twenty-first Century:
The Danger of a Setback
Paul Grossrieder
Introduction
Humanitarian action as envisaged by Henry Dunant, the
founder of the Red Cross Movement, is both simple—it is based
on the natural human tendency to respect a fellow human—and
original—Dunant wished to apply that common sense principle
in systematic fashion, even in war.
A fleeting glance at the past will help us appreciate what was
original about humanitarian action as conceived by Dunant; why
it goes beyond good intentions or mere charity. Until September
11, 2001, there was no reason to believe that the international
community would be tempted by a simplistic view of the world to
roll back the concept of humanitarian action that was born with
the Red Cross. I do not wish to indulge in facile anachronisms,
but will retrace the development of humanitarian idea and action and highlight the challenges as well as the risks of the
twenty-first century for humanitarian action.

Ancient Greece (Fifth Century B.C.)
War had limits for only some members of humanity. The extent
to which the Greeks humanized war can only be understood in
the light of their society’s division into city-states, competition
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between which was natural and gave rise to regular conflicts in an
attempt to establish which was the best. Fighting between cities of
the same culture and the same religion was governed by unwritten rules (agrafoi nomoi). The city that lost was always at a disadvantage, but the victor had to respect limits to its conduct with
regard to captives. Those rules were not, however, a form of international law, as they applied only between Greek city-states;
whereas, there was no limit to the acts of violence that could be
carried out against the enemy in wars between Greeks and barbarians (non-Greeks).
Ancient Greece therefore witnessed the first, very partial endeavor to use rules of law to regulate certain conflicts between
Greek city-states. Whether or not those unwritten rules applied
depended not on one’s condition as a human being, but on
one’s membership in Greek civilization.

Religion and Respect for Human Beings
On the one hand, all the world’s great religions (primitive religions, Judaism, Christianity,1 Islam, the religions of the Far East)
recommend that their followers treat other human beings with
respect; on the other hand, each religion is linked to a people,
to a culture (or is imposed on others as a culture), and the notion of universality is therefore absent. In addition, violence is
often a part of religious behavior, carried out to defend a god or
a truth. In any event, it makes sense for every religion to consider
itself the best, otherwise why believe? In most past and present
conflicts, religious communities have identified with one of the
parties to the conflict. In recent years, the conflicts in the Balkans
have provided ample proof of this, but the same thing has happened in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, in Sri
Lanka, and in many other countries in conflict. It was therefore
not religions that originated and promoted the founding ideas
of humanitarian law, neither in the distant past nor in modern
times.

PAUL GROSSRIEDER
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Christianity since the Middle Ages: Love,
Compassion, Charity
Since the Middle Ages and until the twenty-first century, the notions of love, compassion, and charity, and the activities based on
them, evolved principally along two lines:
1. One tradition used love, compassion and charity to fight
the established powers. In the face of the self-assigned privileges
of the rich and powerful, men such as Francis of Assisi (twelfth
century), Joachim de Flore (fourteenth century), and, later, Giordano Bruno (sixteenth century) branded those notions as weapons in defense of the poor and the underprivileged. In some
cases, their struggles ended in social and political revolt.
2. In another tradition, represented chiefly by the institutional
church, those notions were applied only in respect of the faithful
who followed the right path. In that case, nothing took precedence over the established order; charity toward the poor was a
means of maintaining that order and a requirement for salvation,
but had no intrinsic value. It can even be said that this tradition
substituted charity for justice. Charity was the pretext for not dispensing the justice that could undermine the power of the rich
and mighty. This tradition’s purpose was to maintain and uphold
a political and social order that was unconcerned by equal rights
and used charity to contain any hint of rebellion on the part of
the lower classes. In that context, the idea of universal humanitarianism had no scope to develop.
The dichotomy between the two traditions prevailed throughout Western Christian culture until the nineteenth century and
constituted the political leitmotif of that period.

The Premises of the Modern Humanitarian Idea
A Christian Exception: St. Vincent de Paul
In the seventeenth century, St. Vincent de Paul adopted a systematic approach to poverty in France, with a view to its eradication.
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To that end, he established two structures, or religious orders:
the Daughters of Charity and the Lazarists. St. Vincent de Paul’s
approach was original in that it tackled poverty as a social phenomenon and established structures to remedy it.
Unfortunately, the system was appropriated by Louis XIV, or
more specifically his wife, Maria Teresa of Austria. St. Vincent
de Paul’s humanitarian endeavor was turned into ‘‘internment
houses’’ run by the police, spelling a sad end to a pioneering
humanitarian effort and protecting the hierarchical order of the
time.
The Concept of ‘‘Humanity’’
During that period—between the seventeenth and nineteenth
centuries—Europe awakened to the revolutionary idea of a
human being as an individual (Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, Marx,
etc.). Whereas Christian charity as it had evolved in Western societies was compatible with social inequality, the modern concept
of ‘‘humanity’’ considered every man and woman as equally
‘‘human.’’ Without a doubt, the philosophical development of
the concept of humans as individuals fostered the sociological
advent of the demand that all men and women be treated equal,
and hence the idea that any person, no matter what his social
status, was entitled to respect without discrimination.
The First ‘‘Humanitarian’’ Operations (Late Eighteenth to
Early Nineteenth Centuries)
1793: relief operation for French aristocrats forced to flee Santo
Domingo during a slave uprising;
1812: earthquake in Caracas: the United States organized assistance by boat;
1821: aid for the Greeks (only) during their war against the
Turks
Humanitarian action in time of war initially took the form of
medical services provided by the armed forces for their troops.

PAUL GROSSRIEDER
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Those who pioneered such services were Ambroise Paré (sixteenth century) and Baron Larrey (1766–1842).
The eighteenth century saw the conclusion of the first agreements between combatants for the reciprocal use of hospitals.
1743: Battle of Bethingen—agreement between the Marshall of
Noailles (France) and Lord Sain (England)
1759: Seven Years War—agreement between General de Barail
and Henry Seymour Conway
Henry Dunant and Solferino
The battle of Solferino in the Italian war of Unification (1859)
marked a decisive moment in the modern concept of humanitarianism, thanks first to Henry Dunant and, subsequently, to the
Red Cross in general and the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) in particular. Dunant and the Committee of
Five ‘‘invented’’ the principles that underpin humanitarian action to this day. They are based on three fundamental ideas:
The basic idea: a universal space, that of the victim, that respects
the neutrality of the victims of war. Henceforth, aid would not be
limited to one’s own wounded but would be extended to all the
victims. As Henry Dunant wrote in A Memory of Solferino: ‘‘The
women of Castiglione, seeing that I made no distinction between
nationalities, followed my example, showing the same kindness
to all these men whose origins were so different, and all of whom
were foreigners to them. ‘Tutti fratelli,’ they repeated feelingly’’
(ICRC, 1986).
The second original idea: those helping the victims must be part
of the same space, the space of humanity. Humanitarian agents
help all the victims as members of one humanity. To give effect
to this idea, an independent organization, untainted by any military or political commitment, was founded; it was the voice of
humanity in the midst of armed conflict. It soon came to be
called the Red Cross.
The third original idea: at a time when all man’s laws apparently
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ceased to exist when fighting broke out, Henry Dunant created a
space for a contract. Certain laws could be applied universally
even in the heat of battle. International humanitarian law was
born. In 1864, the States signed the Geneva Convention for the
protection of the war wounded, an international treaty that defined a legal space for humanitarian aid.
Thus, Henry Dunant and the Red Cross laid the foundations
of contemporary humanitarian action, which seeks to treat enemies hors de combat as equals in humanity.

Contemporary Periods of Humanitarian Action
World War I
Previously a legal and moral authority, the ICRC—and the entire
Red Cross—had now to start taking action. The First World War
was different from the wars of the nineteenth century in that it
was total. It involved countries, economies, and populations on
an unprecedented scale. The Red Cross was obliged to demonstrate that the principles and rules laid down in the law of war
were applicable.
The ICRC went from being a moral and legal authority to an
operational organization. Its main fields of action were prisoners
of war, repatriations, and tracing activities. Forty-one delegates
visited fifty-four prisoner-of-war camps. They repatriated a total
of 700,000 prisoners; 1,200 volunteers worked at the International Prisoners-of-War Agency in Basel, restoring ties between
prisoners and their families. Two million parcels were sent to
prisoners.
In 1917, the ICRC was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
The Period between the Two World Wars
The first problem was practical in nature: what was to be done with
the enormous infrastructure set up during the First World War?
The fight against tuberculosis was one of the operations under-
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taken during this period. A Red Cross poster proclaimed: ‘‘Beat
the Germans, beat tuberculosis.’’
There then arose a political problem, for after the First World
War, pacifism became a force to be reckoned with (President Wilson, Treaty of Versailles, the League of Nations, the Briand-Kellog Pact). War was to be outlawed.
In order to deal with those two problems, the Red Cross organized itself into two international institutions. At the instigation
of the President of the American Red Cross, the League of Red
Cross Societies was established; it would be responsible for peacetime activities. The ICRC would specialize in wartime operations,
and in humanitarian law and its dissemination.
During the same period, the Save the Children Fund (1919)
and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR, 1921) were also established. Both organizations would
deal with peacetime issues arising from war.
World War II
For the Red Cross, and in particular the ICRC, this war was
marked by the questions and issues posed by totalitarian regimes
(Bolshevism, Nazism).
Those regimes manipulated humanitarian aid for their own
purposes. In 1921, for example, the USSR had demanded total
control of the humanitarian assistance provided to the faminestricken population of the Ukraine. Under the pressure of public
opinion, the Western countries had caved in to its demands.
The Second World War also brought to light shortcomings in
international humanitarian law. Specifically, it became apparent
during the war in Spain (1936) that humanitarian law did not
cover non-international conflicts. Nor did it afford protection to
civilians in time of war.
Moreover, the totalitarian regimes, which rejected the international system of the League of Nations, also ignored humanitarian law.
The ICRC, for its part, strengthened by its success during the
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First World War, approached the humanitarian issues of World
War II as though they were a repetition of the first. It focused
almost exclusively on prisoners of war. Blinded by its operational
approach, concerned to safeguard its activities, the ICRC made
the tragic decision not to deal with civilians or the Holocaust.
There were, nevertheless, several heroic exceptions, the result
of initiatives taken by certain delegates in the field. The most
spectacular example was Friedrich Born, who saved an estimated
15,000 Jews in Hungary from the death camps.
The Postwar Period
After the Second World War and the horrors committed by the
Nazis, the world felt the need to do all in its power to make sure
such crimes were never again committed. In that atmosphere of
widespread remorse, numerous associations were founded to
help the populations of Europe, especially in the United States
and among the religions communities (Catholic, Protestant, Jewish): the International Rescue Committee (IRC), Catholic Relief
Services (CRS), Church World Services (CWS), the Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), CARE, Oxfam, to name but a few.
It was also during this period that most of the United Nations
specialized agencies were founded; that the Geneva Conventions
were renegotiated to include common Articles 1 and 3, and that
the Fourth Convention, on the protection of civilians, was
adopted. These new international instruments explicitly recognized that the ICRC was an ‘‘impartial humanitarian organization.’’
Finally, the Refugee Convention was adopted in 1951.
This was a heady period for humanitarianism, for society and
public opinion were eager to correct the serious mistakes of the
Second World War.
The Cold War and Humanitarian Action: The Limits Set by Ideology
The universal, independent, neutral, and impartial approach was
severely tested by the growing ideological tension and deepening
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cold war between the East and West blocs. On the one hand, the
Soviet Union did not agree to apply humanitarian law and its
principles in the countries and regions within its sphere of influence;2 on the other, the West included the law in its arsenal of
weapons against the East bloc. All this took place against a backdrop of public will to do good.
During the same period, the widespread struggle for decolonization brought humanitarian organizations face-to-face with liberation movements and the peoples under their control.
Generally speaking, the organizations belonged to one of two
schools:
• those influenced by the analyses on inequality and anti-imperialism (F. Fanon, S. Amin);
• those guided by the position of American economist W. Rostow:
that poverty fostered the spread of communism.

In the face of these global developments, of the rise and proliferation of liberation movements (the PLO, UNITA, the Sandinistas, RENAMO, etc.), how was the ICRC, the guardian of
humanitarian law, to react? How should the law and practice be
adapted to encompass these ‘‘new conflicts?’’ How could the
basic principles and rules be recognized as applying to the victims of those conflicts? How could the ICRC contact all the parties? Obtain access to all the victims? These questions were the
subject of protracted debate, and, in the end, the ICRC decided
to adapt the law to the changed situation. That adaptation in no
way signified that Henry Dunant’s humanitarian principles were
to be abandoned, but rather that their field of application was to
be enlarged. The ICRC’s decision resulted, in 1977, in the adoption of the Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions.
At the same time, the ‘‘borderless’’ movement was launched as
a different approach to the same issues. Doctors seconded to the
ICRC by France during the Biafra war, deemed the organization’s
methods poorly adapted, too rigid and legalistic, too bound up
with the authorities, and founded Médecins sans frontières (MSF)
in 1968.
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This new kind of humanitarian organization was set up to
counter the ICRC, to circumvent the constraints of humanitarian
law, which were seen as an obstacle to humanitarian action. Unfettered by diplomatic and legal considerations, MSF found it
easy to be ironical about the timid approach of the Red Cross
and the cowardice of the United Nations. It has covered interesting ground since then, for today MSF is one of the most fervent
defenders of humanitarian law and has published a highly accessible handbook, the most complete manual for humanitarian
practitioners in existence.
MSF and the organizations founded on the same model have
a number of strengths and limitations. One of MSF’s strengths is
that it is a private association conducting private operations,
which are therefore very independent and free. Its staff tends
to go on brief but intense missions, and its operational policy is
characterized by enormous flexibility.
In terms of limitations, MSF’s political choices, especially during the early years of its existence, prevented it from being impartial (for example, in Afghanistan during the Soviet period, when
MSF doctors sided with the mujaheddin). The covert nature of
certain activities precluded the development of systematic, largescale operations.
Things have changed now. MSF’s methods are much closer to
those of the ICRC, and the ICRC has followed in MSF’s footsteps
and adopted a more informal style. What remains particularly
different is the duty to bear witness, by which MSF staff are
bound, whereas ICRC delegates must follow a policy of discretion, chiefly in order to obtain access to places of detention and
prisoner-of-war camps.
The 1980s: The Proliferation of Conflicts on the Periphery:
‘‘Le Tout-urgence’’
The wars of liberation were followed by what Jean-Christophe
Rufin called conflicts on the periphery. These were waged within
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the context of a return to the Roman limes policy, in which ‘‘imperial’’ interests did not extend beyond the limits of a concentric
circle outside which war and chaos were allowed to rage. This
new form of conflict was contemporaneous with the ‘‘dissolution
of the bipolar order.’’3 The proliferation of bloody and spectacular periphery conflicts, involving little activity on the part of the
superpowers (Sri Lanka, Ethiopia, Cambodia) signaled a return
to urgency. Humanitarian agents played on the emotions and
troubled conscience of people in the West. This period of absolute urgency had its downside, as well. Were we feeding the victims or feeding war? Certain leaders, such as Mengistu in
Ethiopia in 1995, considered it judicious, for reasons of internal
politics, to foment disaster.
After the Cold War: Humanitarian Action in Spite of Everything
The fall of the Berlin Wall sparked somewhat rash predictions
that conflicts on the periphery would end and humanitarians
would be out of a job. In fact, the number of regional and local
conflicts rose (Afghanistan, Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, the
Balkans). The anarchic and chaotic nature of those conflicts
made them extremely dangerous and rendered humanitarian
work hugely complex, as it became more and more difficult to
have access to the victims for security reasons. This period was
marked by the almost total withdrawal of external political support for local wars. As a result, armed movements replaced their
political partners with economic partners and embarked on business activities, at times forming alliances with private commercial
firms. They also started to exploit territory or to plunder the population. They became incredibly diverse in nature.
In those circumstances, the plight of the civilian population
became increasingly perilous (witness the famines in southern
Sudan and Somalia). The ICRC, UNHCR, and the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) all mobilized to provide emergency aid on an unprecedented scale.
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Enter the States: The Politicization of Humanitarian Action
That situation—the proliferation of local conflicts and the growing number of victims who suffered as a result—was compounded in 1990 when the states burst on the humanitarian
scene. During the cold war, direct state intervention had been
justified by the fight against ‘‘the other side.’’ That justification
wore thin after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and when the international community decided, at the behest of the Americans, to
intervene in Kuwait, it invoked defense of the law. Those grounds
soon proved insufficient. The concept of ‘‘peacekeeping,’’ with
its humanitarian veneer, was then advanced. Most ‘‘peacekeeping’’ operations had no clear political or military objective and in
fact, troops were deployed for no purpose other than to facilitate
the arrival of relief supplies for civilians or to bring in those supplies themselves. That is what happened in 1991 in Kurdistan
(United Nations General Assembly resolution 688, 1991), and
subsequently in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda.
Those interventions were the tangible expression of the right
to intervene. They were generally not well received by those concerned, who saw in them the risk of a new form of legal domination by the north over the south, by the rich over the poor. In
practice, those so-called ‘‘humanitarian’’ interventions were not
without political ulterior motives, and were thus selective.
Those interventions also served to heighten the confusion between humanitarian endeavor and military operations. In Kurdistan, the exclusion zones remain, no one knows for how long. In
Somalia, the ambiguous mandate of the allied forces led them to
become just another belligerent and resulted in their precipitate
withdrawal. In Yugoslavia, international troops undertook humanitarian action while the population was decimated by a siege.
In Rwanda, United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was not allowed to bring in more troops and the genocide
could not be stopped. Confining the blue helmets to a humanitarian role gave rise to confusion. ‘‘How long will our governments persist in their hypocrisy?’’ Claude Malhuret wrote in Le
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Monde on August 20, 1992. ‘‘Incapable of deciding on a course
of action, which they know public opinion demands, they instead
get involved, to show that they are ’doing something,’ in humanitarian assistance that does nothing to remedy the basic problem.
How much longer will they try to make us believe that humanitarian action can take the place of political action?’’
In reality, there is a wide gap between military humanitarian
action and the principles promoted by Henry Dunant. In particular, confusion between what is military and what is humanitarian
voids the principle that the victim and the humanitarian agent
are neutral, which remains the sine qua non condition for the
existence of a humanitarian space. The principle of neutrality
cannot be implemented by soldiers, only by independent humanitarian organizations.
Post-9/11: The Risk of a Further Drift
The attacks of September 11, 2001, against the twin towers of
New York’s World Trade Center and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., naturally represent a paradigm shift in international
relations. They open a new phase in humanitarian action and
present a major challenge to international humanitarian law.
Following the attacks, the United States decided to launch a
‘‘war against terrorism’’ that, to date, has taken the form of a
war against Afghanistan and a pitiless international fight against
terrorism and terrorists.
We are therefore faced with two different phenomena, even
though they occasionally overlap. On the one hand, we have an
international war in Afghanistan in which the Geneva Conventions, in particular the Third Convention, apply. On the other
hand, another struggle of another kind is being carried out
against an international network (Al Qaeda); the American administration calls this a ‘‘war against terrorism.’’ It in no way resembles traditional warfare and raises entirely new issues for
humanitarian law.
It goes without saying that we must first affirm that humanitar-
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ian law is applicable in the international, American-Afghan conflict, and that it must be implemented as closely as possibly to the
terms of the Geneva Conventions.
Strictly speaking, however, humanitarian law is not applicable
in the ‘‘war against terrorism.’’ We are nevertheless entirely justified in wondering how to classify the situation. In principle, it is
a kind of police operation, but President Bush did call it a ‘‘war,’’
and the means employed to wage it are indeed reminiscent of
war. In addition, the parties represent a break with tradition in
that one of them is transnational and trans-state. But is that sufficient reason to remove this new kind of war from the purview
of humanitarian law, whose specific aim is to help and protect
the victims of war?
In any event, the first step is to demand compliance with the
existing provisions of humanitarian law where they are applicable
and to do everything possible to ensure that the law does not
crumble under political pressure. At the same time, the possibility to act must be ensured. Lastly, humanitarians must ponder
the new challenges and deal with them.
Today, as during the bleakest period of the cold war, there is a
real and present danger that humanitarian law will suffer a setback, its principles subordinated to political interests. We must
not allow that to happen, we must hark back to the origins of the
law and ensure that the interests of the victims reign supreme.

Conclusion
The definition of humanitarianism and its history reveal an original notion dating from the Enlightenment and Henry Dunant:
that humanity takes precedence over war, over politics, race, and
religion. The concept of humanitarianism, moreover, has been
incorporated into an international corpus of law. The principles
must at all costs be preserved so that the victims can continue to
be protected and assisted.
The twenty-first century has started with doubts about the law
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and the Geneva Conventions. Giving in to those doubts would be
an unforgivable setback for humanity. Yes, we can become more
professional; certainly, the different stages of humanitarian
endeavor, from prevention to development, can be more fully
integrated with one another. But the first requirement of humanitarianism is and will remain independence and freedom. All else
is a matter of method, logistics, and the management of security
constraints.
It would be disgraceful indeed if the twenty-first century laid
open to question the principles laid down in the nineteenth, notably that humanitarian action aims first and foremost to restore
man’s lost dignity, with no economic or strategic ulterior motives.

2

Scope of International
Humanitarian Crises
Ibrahim Osman
Introduction
This chapter analyzes general trends in humanitarian assistance for natural and technological disasters for the period from
1992 to 2001, and for complex disasters from 1994 to 2001. The
introductory section traces trends in both the number of people
affected by disasters and the humanitarian assistance disbursed.
In the first section, natural and technological disasters are examined according to the estimated number of affected people, total
flows of assistance, assistance in relation to the estimated cost,
and assistance per affected person. The analysis incorporates
both time and regional trends in the flows of humanitarian assistance. The second section applies similar analysis to complex disasters. The third section compares the trends in humanitarian
assistance for natural/technological and complex disasters, while
the fourth section provides some concluding remarks. Data collection techniques, methodology, and definitions used throughout this chapter are provided in the appendix.
Figures on the number of people affected by disasters1 appear
to be exhibiting an upward trend. In 1992, an estimated 118 million people were affected by disasters (both natural/technological and complex), while an estimated 275 million were affected
in the year 2000. These figures indicate an average annual increase in the number of people affected by disasters of approximately 11.2 percent.
Figures for humanitarian assistance for natural and technological disasters also exhibit an upward trend. At the beginning of
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Figure 2.1

Time Trend in the Number of People Affected by Disasters
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the period, 1992, an estimated value of contributions was
U.S.$235 million, compared to the end of the period (2001) estimated value of U.S.$340 million.2 Moreover, the end-of-period
value slightly exceeds the mean value of U.S.$321 million. Data
for humanitarian assistance for complex disasters reveals a downward trend, however, with an end-of-period (2001) estimated
value of contributions of U.S.$1.695 billion, compared to the
1994 estimated value of U.S.$2.131 billion and to the mean value
of U.S.$1.644 billion.

Natural and Technological Disasters
Figures on the estimated number of people affected by natural
and technological disasters appear to exhibit an upward trend,
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Figure 2.2

Humanitarian Assistance: A Time Trend
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with an estimated 79 million people affected in 1992 as opposed
to 170 million affected in 2001. Thus, the data indicates an 11.6
percent annual increase in the number of people affected by
these types of disasters.
While the estimated cost of natural and technological disasters3 rose fivefold during the period in question (with 1992 value
of U.S.$2.86 billion and 2001 value of U.S.$14.294 billion),4 humanitarian assistance rose at a much slower rate of about 45 percent (at the beginning of the period, in 1991, the estimated value
of contributions is U.S.$235 million compared to the 2001 estimated value of U.S.$339 million). Furthermore, the average annual rate of growth of the estimated cost figures is more than
eight times the average annual rate of growth of humanitarian
assistance (4.95 percent estimated average annual rate of growth
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Figure 2.3

Number of People Affected by Natural/Technological Disasters:
a Time Trend
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of assistance as opposed to 44.42 percent average annual growth
in cost).
Average annual assistance is highest for Asia (U.S.$126 million), followed by the Americas (U.S.$117 million), Africa
(U.S.$51 million), Europe (U.S.$23 million), and Oceania
(U.S.$5 million).
The highest level of assistance was recorded in 1998, and it was
primarily directed toward the Americas and Asia. The assistance
for Hurricane Mitch in Central America (October 1998) represents 21.92 percent of the total humanitarian assistance for natural and technological disasters chaptered by OCHA for the whole
1992–2001 period. Assistance for floods in China and Bangladesh (June and July of the same year) represents an additional
11.75 percent of the total recorded assistance.
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Figure 2.4

Assistance and Estimated Costs of Natural Disasters
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The highest average level of assistance per affected person is
in Europe (U.S.$76.78), followed by the Americas (U.S.$58.57),
Oceania (U.S.$48.49), Asia (U.S.$39.47), and Africa (U.S.$39.34).
Thus, the average assistance per affected person in Africa is just
above a half of European average (55.22 percent) and about twothirds of the average in the Americas (66.81 percent).
The highest average level of assistance as a percentage of estimated cost is in Africa (17.76 percent), followed by the Americas
(15.79 percent), Europe (12.18 percent), Asia (10.74 percent),
and Oceania (2.77 percent). However, figures relating to the estimates of material damage are likely to be positively related to the
level of development, since not only the potential for material
damage rises with development but also data collection techniques improve. Thus, it is very likely that the estimated costs of
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Figure 2.5

Natural Disaster Assistance Per Continent and Year
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disasters in regions of lower development are understated, while
the average level of assistance as a percentage of estimated cost
in those nations are overstated.
The highest percentage of total humanitarian assistance for
the period analyzed has been devoted to Central America (25.77
percent), South Asia (20.19 percent), East Asia (11.98 percent),
and East and Central Africa (9.59 percent).

Complex Disasters
The figures on the estimated number of people affected by complex disasters appear to be exhibiting a downward trend. In 1992,

24

SCOPE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN CRISES

Figure 2.6

Humanitarian Assistance for Natural Disasters Per Affected Person,
by Continent and Year
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39 million people were estimated affected, compared to 21 million in the year 2000.
However, the estimated needs arising from complex disasters
have been rising during the period analyzed (with the beginning
of the period value of U.S.$2.663 billion, end-of-period value of
U.S.$3.041 billion, and the mean of U.S.$2.663 billion). Nevertheless, the assistance has been falling, from U.S.$2.131 billion in
1994 to U.S.$1.695 billion in 2001 (the mean value being
U.S.$1.644 billion). The annual average growth rate of estimated
needs is 2.03 percent while the average annual growth rate of
assistance is minus 2.93 percent.
The average annual humanitarian assistance is the highest in
Africa (U.S.$804,946,930), followed by Asia (U.S.$485,394,409),
Europe (U.S.$348,281,202), and Oceania (U.S.$50,068,036).
The average humanitarian assistance per affected person for
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Figure 2.7

Assistance for Natural Disasters as a Percentage of
Estimated Cost, per Continent and Year
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complex disasters is the highest in Europe (U.S.$183.75), followed by Asia (U.S.$61.31), and Africa (U.S.$42.24). Thus, the
average humanitarian assistance per affected person in Europe
exceeds that of Africa by over four times. Furthermore, while
there appears to be an upward trend in the assistance per affected person in Europe, for Africa, that trend was positive during the period 1994 to 1996, but after that point there was a
downward slide.
Average assistance as a percentage of estimated needs covered
is highest in Europe as well (76.51 percent), followed by Africa
(63.93 percent) and Asia (59.74 percent).
The highest percentage of total humanitarian assistance for
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Figure 2.8

Breakdown of Humanitarian Assistance for Natural and
Technological Disasters, by Regions
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complex disasters during the period in question was given to the
regions of East and Central Africa (36.25 percent), Europe
(29.01 percent), North Africa (8.43 percent), and East Asia (8.15
percent).

Natural and Technological Disasters
and Complex Disasters
A Comparison of the Trends
For the comparison of the humanitarian assistance for complex
and natural disasters, we will use data for the period 1994 to
2001, as the figures for complex disasters are not available prior
to 1994. The total assistance for complex disasters during the
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Figure 2.9

Number of People Affected by Complex Disasters: a Time Trend
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period examined was U.S.$13.159 billion, while the total assistance for natural disasters during the same period was U.S.$2.905
billion. Thus, the assistance for complex disasters exceeded assistance for natural disasters more than four and a half times
(452.85 percent). During the period, the estimated cost of natural disasters exceeded that of complex disasters more than seven
times (U.S.$155.347 billion for natural versus U.S.$21.308 billion
for complex disasters).
Average assistance per affected person for complex disasters
was U.S.$93.92, compared to U.S.$53.24 for natural disasters.
Hence, the average assistance per affected person for natural disasters is estimated at 57.08 percent of that for complex ones.
Average assistance as a percentage estimated cost is projected
to be at 11.85 percent for natural disasters, while the 66.28 per-
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Figure 2.10

Assistance and Estimated Costs of Complex Disasters
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cent of needs arising from complex disasters are estimated to be
covered by humanitarian assistance.5

Conclusion
Humanitarian assistance for complex disasters exceeds assistance
for natural/technological disasters for every category examined—total flows, assistance as a percentage of estimated cost/
need, and assistance per affected person—and for every region.
The highest percentage of total humanitarian assistance for natural/technological disasters has been devoted to Central America,
while the highest percentage of total assistance for complex disas-
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Figure 2.11

Assistance for Complex Disasters, by Continent and Year
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ters went to East and Central Africa and Europe. The highest
average level of assistance for natural/technological disasters per
affected person has been recorded in Europe (U.S.$76.78) while
the lowest was in Africa (U.S.$39.34). Figures for average level of
assistance per affected person for complex disasters exhibit a similar pattern, with the highest observed in Europe (U.S.$183.75)
and the lowest in the Americas (U.S.$22.55).6 The highest average level of assistance as a percentage of estimated cost/need
was recorded in Africa for natural/technological disasters and in
Europe for complex disasters; however, as mentioned previously,
estimated cost figures most probably have a downward bias in the
case of countries with a lower level of development, in which case
the average level of assistance as a percentage of estimated cost
would exhibit an upward bias for those countries.
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Figure 2.12

Assistance Per Affected Person for Complex Disasters,
by Continent and Year
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Appendix
I. Data and Methodology
Data has been assembled primarily from two sources—EM-DAT,
a comprehensive disaster database compiled by the Center for
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), and the Financial Tracking System (FTS) launched by the Organization for
Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) on ReliefWeb, the United Nations humanitarian Web site. EM-DAT contains core data on the occurrence and the effect of chaptered
disasters, both natural and conflict in origin, compiled from various sources, including UN agencies, NGOs, insurance companies, research institutes, and press agencies. Figures on
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Figure 2.13

Assistance for Complex Disasters as a Percentage of Needs Covered,
by Continent and Year
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humanitarian assistance found on FTS are collected by OCHA
from UN agencies, donor governments, and NGOs. More details
on the data collection process are available on the respective
Web sites. As this chapter tracks trends in humanitarian assistance, financial data was necessary, and only disasters for which
humanitarian response has been chaptered by OCHA have been
included in the analysis.
The exception is the analysis of total number of people affected by disasters. These figures have been taken from EM-DAT
entirely.
It should be noted that data on the effects of natural and complex disasters is sketchy at best as there are no accepted standards
or even definitions, and they could potentially differ greatly between sources. The figures should thus be regarded as indicative.
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Figure 2.14
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All figures have been transformed into 1996 U.S. dollars.
Countries of disaster occurrence have been classified according
to the continent and region. For complex disasters, figures that
have been used for humanitarian assistance are total assistance
that has been available within a given year, which might include
carryover funds. There is a possibility that figures for percentage
of needs covered by humanitarian assistance for complex disasters exhibit an upward bias, as surplus in one project does not
necessarily cover the shortfall in another. However, as this chapter deals with the flows of disaster relief and not potential inefficiencies in its disbursement, percentage of needs covered was
calculated as the ratio of total assistance available to the estimated needs.
II. Definitions7
A disaster is defined as a situation or event that overwhelms local
capacity, necessitating a request at the national or international
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Figure 2.15

Average Assistance Per Affected Person, by Continent
and Disaster Type
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level for external assistance. In order for a disaster to be entered
in EM-DAT, at least one of the following criteria has to be fulfilled:
•
•
•
•

Ten or more people chaptered are killed
One hundred people chaptered are affected
A call for international assistance; and/or
A declaration of a state of emergency divided into following
types:
—Natural and Technological Disasters. In this category are included avalanches/landslides; droughts and famines; extreme
temperatures; floods; forest fires; windstorms; insect infestations; waves/surges; earthquakes; volcanic eruptions; industrial and transport accidents.
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—Complex Disasters. A complex emergency is defined as ‘‘a humanitarian crisis in a country, region, or society where there
is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from
internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of
any single agency and/or the ongoing United Nations country program’’ (Inter-Agency Standing Committee [IASC], December 1994).

Such ‘‘complex emergencies’’ are typically characterized by:
• Extensive violence and loss of life; massive displacements of people; widespread damage to societies and economies
• The need for large-scale, multi-faceted humanitarian assistance
• The hindrance or prevention of humanitarian assistance by political and military constraints
• Significant security risks for humanitarian relief workers in some
areas

3

The Language of Disasters:
A Brief Terminology of Disaster
Management and
Humanitarian Action
S. W. A. Gunn, M.D.
If the tower of Babel was a language disaster, disaster itself has
a language. Whether act of God or act of man, disaster often calls
for multinational assistance. The many governments, agencies,
professions, and individuals from different parts of the world,
representing different languages, specialties, religions, and cultures, yet all imbued with a humanitarian spirit of providing succor to the helpless, converge on the stricken land to help the
victims, who are themselves of different language and background.
Communication among these different people and a certain
understanding of the technical, administrative, and operational
terminology of the many disciplines involved become paramount
if the inherent difficulties of the disaster are not to be compounded by an overlay of communications disaster. In what often
is a multidisciplinary operation, the physician has to understand
the transport engineer, the meteorologist must be able to converse with the administrator, the volunteer with the EMS nurse,
the planner with the journalist, the sanitarian with the nutritionist, the expatriate donor with the local government official, and
the multitude of individuals whose normal life has been suddenly
shattered by the earthquake, war, flood, refugee exodus, or the
reactor accident.
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If such understanding is essential in the field, it is becoming
equally necessary away from the site of action: in planning boardrooms, lecture halls, statistical tables, press centers, and medical
schools where disaster preparedness and humanitarian response
increasingly are receiving attention. Indeed, it is heartening to
notice that after many years of unplanned, ad hoc responses, disaster planning is becoming more and more conceptual and systematized and, with this trend, disaster medicine gradually is
becoming a specialized field, within a broader humanitarian vision.
All professions, techniques, and organized activities generate
their own language, their specific terminology, and disastrology
is no exception. Because it is relatively new and multisectoral in
nature, its language is broadly based on evolving. In this chapter,
I shall offer a small selection of terms to show its concepts, scope,
organization, and operation. I have intentionally chosen terms
that are predominantly outside the medical field, but which the
emergency practitioner or prehospital nurse will encounter in
the course of his or her disaster mission and will use in humanitarian work.

Disasters: A Classification
Disaster: The result of a vast ecological breakdown in the relations
between man and his environment; a serious and sudden event
(or slow, as in drought) on such a scale that demands exceed
available resources and the stricken community needs extraordinary efforts to cope with the situation, often with outside help or
international aid.
Natural disaster: A sudden major upheaval of nature, causing
extensive destruction, death and suffering among the stricken
community, and which is not due to man’s action. However, (a)
some natural disasters can be of slow origin, e.g., drought; and
(b) a seemingly natural disaster can be caused or aggravated by

S. W. A. GUNN, M.D.

37

man’s action, e.g., desertification through excessive land use and
deforestation.
Man-made disaster: A disaster caused not by natural phenomena
but by man’s or society’s action, involuntary or voluntary, sudden
or slow, directly or indirectly, with grave consequences to the
population and the environment. Examples: technological disaster, toxicological disaster, environmental pollution, desertification, conflict, refugees, epidemics, fires.
Complex disaster/Complex emergency: A major disaster or complicated emergency situation affecting large civilian populations,
which is further aggravated by intense political and/or military
interference, including war and civil strife, resulting in serious
food shortages, epidemics, population displacements, pauperization, loss of human liberties, and significant increase in mortality,
rendering the management of the situation very complex.
Man-conceived disaster: Distinct from man-made disaster, manconceived refers to disastrous actions like genocide, death
camps, ethnic cleansing, forced disappearance, pauperization,
torture, and other acts against humanity that are obscenely conceived, cold-bloodedly planned, and indecently perpetrated with
impunity by evil rulers, dictators, terrorists, or kleptocrats with
the aim of inflicting maximum suffering, death, and destruction,
in full violation of personal, social, and cultural rights of humanity. While the response to man-made disasters is scientific, humanitarian, and managerial, the response to man-conceived
disasters must be through the International Criminal Court.
Disaster preparedness: The aggregate of measures to be taken in
view of disasters, consisting of plans and action programs designed to minimize the loss of life and damage, to organize and
facilitate effective rescue and relief, and to rehabilitate after disaster. Preparedness requires the necessary legislation and means
to cope with disaster or similar emergency situations. It also is
concerned with forecasting and warning, the education and
training of the public, organization, and management—
including plans, training of personnel, the stockpiling of supplies, and ensuring the needed funds and other resources.
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Disaster management: The study and collaborative application by
the various pertinent disciplines and governmental authorities of
decision-making processes, management techniques, and resource utilization, to the entire process and different phases of a
disaster, from prevention and preparedness to planning, immediate response, damage reduction, rehabilitation, reconstruction,
and development.
Health: The state of complete physical, mental, and social well
being, and not merely the absence of disaster or infirmity. Also,
the state of an individual or a community free from debilitating
conditions, demonstrating a reasonable resistance to diseases,
and living in a salubrious environment.
Humanitarian medicine: While all medical intervention to reduce a person’s sickness and suffering is in essence humanitarian, humanitarian medicine goes beyond the usual therapeutic
act and promotes, provides, teaches, supports, and delivers people’s health as a human right, in conformity with the ethics of
Hippocratic teaching, the principles of the World Health Organization, the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Red Cross Conventions and other
covenants and practices that ensure the most humane and best
possible level of care, without any discrimination or consideration of material gain.
International health: The study and systematic comparison of the
multiple and variable factors that influence the health of human
populations in different countries and different environments,
and the resulting measures that need to be taken for its improvement.
Disaster medicine: The study and collaborative application of various health specialties—e.g., pediatrics, epidemiology, communicable diseases, nutrition, public health, emergency surgery,
military medicine, community care, social medicine, international health—to the prevention, immediate response, humanitarian care, and rehabilitation of the health problems arising
from disaster, in cooperation with other non-medical disciplines
involved in disaster management.
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Concepts and Management
Catastrophe theory: A mathematical and philosophical theory to explain and define transitional continuity whereby a disaster represents a brutal dynamic change in the forces present in natural,
physical, or social phenomena.
Hazard: The probability of the occurrence of a disaster caused
by a natural phenomenon (earthquake, cyclone), by failure of
man-made sources of energy (nuclear reactor, industrial explosion), or uncontrolled human activity (overgrazing, heavy traffic,
conflict). Some authors use the term in a broader sense, including vulnerability, elements at risk, and the consequences of risk.
Risk: The lives lost, persons injured, damage to property, and
disruption of economic activity due to a particular hazard. Risk
is the product of hazard and vulnerability.
Acceptable risk: The eventual loss and agreed conditions or degree of human, material, and economic damage that a country
or community is willing to accept as tolerable rather than provide
the necessary finances and resources to reduce such a risk.
Mitigation: Separate and aggregate measures taken prior to,
during, or following a disaster with the view to reducing the severity of the human and material damage caused by it.
Vulnerability: The degree of loss from a potentially damaging
phenomenon expressed in a scale from zero to 100 percent.
Assessment: Survey of a real or potential disaster to estimate the
actual or expected damages and to make recommendations for
preparedness, mitigation, and relief action.
Bioterrorism: Planning, threatening, using, or spreading of contagious disease organisms or toxins, e.g., botulism, anthrax,
smallpox, or other viruses, as a terrorist tool or weapon.
Conventional arms: Arms or forces pertaining to a nation’s nonnuclear, non-biological, non-chemical weapons, such as guns,
tanks, battleships, aircraft, troops, etc. The opposite of arms/
weapons of mass destruction.
Crimes against humanity: Crimes concerning the international
community as a whole, committed in widespread and/or system-
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atic manner, and/or on a massive scale, and/or on specified
grounds, in war or peacetime. They include murder; genocide;
extermination; enslavement; rape, sexual abuse, or forced prostitution; deportation; persecution on political, racial, national,
ethnic, cultural, religious grounds; enforced disappearances;
other inhumane acts of physical or mental injury; detention, imprisonment, or deprivation of liberty in violation of international
law. Such crimes are punishable by the International Criminal
Court.
Deportation: The unlawful and forcible transfer of a person,
group, or population from its normal habitat; the forced transfer
of children of a group to another group. This is considered a
crime against humanity.
Disappearance/Forced disappearance: The arrest, abduction,
forced detention, and cutting off communication of persons
against their will, by or without the approval of the state or of
a political organization, accompanied by refusal of the latter to
acknowledge that abduction has taken place and denial of information on the fate of those abducted, thereby placing them outside the protection of the law. This is considered a crime against
humanity.
Disarmament: The process of and regulations concerning the
reduction of a military establishment to levels defined by international agreement.
Disaster epidemiology: The medical discipline, now extended to
other fields, that studies the influence of such factors as life style,
biological constitution, and other personal and social determinants on the incidence and distribution of disease, both under
normal circumstances and in markedly changed disaster situations.
Embargo: An order forbidding certain activities, often accompanied with certain penalties or sanctions in case of non-compliance. Article 41, chapter 7 of the UN Charter provides for
embargoes on a country that may pose a threat to peace, a breakdown of peace, or an act of aggression. Humanitarian goods such
as food and medicine may be exempted.
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Environmental pollution: Unfavorable changes and degradation
of one or more aspects or elements of the environment by noxious biological, industrial, chemical, or radioactive wastes, from
debris of man-made, especially non-biodegradable, products and
from mismanagement and inconsiderate use of ecological resources.
Ethnic cleansing: New term for an age-old illegal and decidedly
unclean policy with the aim of removing, through hatred, intimidation, deportation, killing, genocide, or any other form of
force, certain groups or minorities within the country, in order
to homogenize the national population, acquire land, pamper to
extremist pride, and ensure control.
Genocide: Acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.
Guerrilla warfare: Literally ‘‘small war,’’ which takes on a different meaning or interpretation according to whether it is justified
or unjustified, a struggle for independence, liberation, resistance, or insurrection, destruction or subjugation. International
humanitarian law, the Geneva Conventions, and United Nations
instruments have difficulty in dealing with such situations.
Human rights: The inalienable rights of every human being,
based on the recognition by all of the inherent dignity and equality of each person, as codified and guaranteed by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and other international instruments.
Incident/Accident: Although different in meaning and consequences, these two terms are often used interchangeably in
emergency management. Incident is a sudden, unexpected occurrence that happens by chance and is usually without very serious consequences. Accident is also a sudden, unforeseen event,
but more serious, usually with some resulting damage, injury, or
death.
Internally displaced person(s) (IDPs): Persons or groups of persons
who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes
or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in
order to avoid, the effects of armed conflict, situations of general-
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ized violence of human rights, or natural or man-made disasters,
and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state
border. According to established principles, these persons have
the right to seek safety in another part of the country, to leave
their country, to seek asylum in another country, and the right
to be protected against forcible return or unsafe resettlement.
But these are not refugees in the juridical sense.
Measures of effectiveness: In assessment techniques, the qualitative and quantitative criteria used to predict or correlate the
value or measure of an organization or a system, such as disaster
management. Such measures must be appropriate, measurable,
sensitive, timely, cost effective, and meaningful.
North-South: A theoretical division of the globe into north, representing the developed, more affluent, technologically advanced, financially rich, healthy, educated, and stable countries;
and south, with developing, poor, indebted, technologically retarded countries where mortality is high, health levels low, and
education deficient.
Post-traumatic stress disorder: Delayed or protracted reaction to
an exceptionally strong stressful event of catastrophic dimension,
which can cause pervasive distress in almost any person, but more
marked in some, following a natural or man-made disaster, combat, violent death, torture, rape, terrorism, etc. The onset may
follow the trauma within a few weeks or at most six months. Typical symptoms include ‘‘re-living’’ or ‘‘flashbacks’’ of the event,
‘‘numbness’’ and detachment, fearful reminiscences.
Prisoner of conscience: Person imprisoned solely because of his/
her political or religious beliefs, gender, or racial ethnic origin
who has neither used nor advocated violence.
Prisoner of war: A member of the armed forces of a party to
conflict; all members of armed groups and units that are under
a command responsible to that party, and who have been caught
and made prisoner by the opposing party in the conflict. Prisoners of war have rights and responsibilities defined by the Geneva
Conventions. Guerillas also benefit from POW provisions.
Refugee: A person who is outside his country of origin and who,
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due to well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling
to avail himself of that country’s protection. Different official categories of refugees include: Convention refugee, de facto refugee, de jure refugee, mandate refugee, Protocol refugee,
recognized refugee, refugee sur place, statutory refugee, environmental refugee.
The condition of being a refugee and refugee camps constitute a disaster. The problem comes under the jurisdiction of the
United Nations High Commissioner for refugees.
Resettlement: Relocation and more or less orderly settlement,
for temporary or permanent habitation, of refugees and other
persons displaced from their usual place of residence.
Right to intervene: By international law, every state has absolute
sovereignty over its national territory and its internal affairs, and
no outside interference is tolerated. In view, however, of certain
unacceptable injustices and totalitarian acts carried out by dictatorial regimes, in 1991, UN Resolution 688 introduced the
concept of ‘‘right to intervene’’ on humanitarian grounds. Subsequent decisions have further codified the concept of the right to
intervene, while some even extend this to a duty to intervene.
Sustainable development: Development based on decisions, processes, and actions that meet the present needs without creating
undue burden on society or the environment, and without undermining the ability of coming generations to meet their own
needs in the future.
Terrorism/Terrorist: Tem referring to various kinds of illegal acts
of violence, such as bombing, setting fire, abducting, intimidating, killing, and other forms of illegal actions in order to create
terror, panic, or submission among the public, state, or individuals. Intolerant regimes tend to accuse opposition actions as terrorism.
War crimes: During hostilities, crimes committed in breach of
established customs and principles of international law or the
laws of war. They include: (a) grave breaches of the four Geneva
Conventions and their Additional Protocols, such as willful killing, unnecessarily excessive destruction; (b) other serious viola-
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tions of the laws and customs applicable to international armed
conflicts, such as targeting civilians, pillaging; (c) violation of laws
concerning armed conflicts of not an international character,
such as cruelty against those not taking part in the conflict; (d)
other serious violations of laws in non-international conflicts,
such as attacks on peaceful buildings. War crimes are considered
as crimes against humanity.
Weapons of mass destruction: Offensive weapons whose destructive capability is derived from nuclear, chemical, or biological
sources. Sometimes referred to as ABC: atomic, biological, chemical. Their use is prohibited by the UN and other international
conventions. They are the opposite of conventional weapons or
arms.

Laws and Organizations
Bilateral Cooperation: Technical cooperation or assistance by a
donor country to a recipient country, through direct agreement
between the two governments, without the UN or any other intermediary.
Geneva Conventions: The body of international agreements consisting of four Conventions (1949) and two Additional Protocols
(1977) concerning the humanitarian treatment of victims of
armed conflict, and put under the responsibility of the International Committee of the Red Cross. The first Convention regulates the care of the wounded and sick soldiers on the battlefield.
The second is about the care of the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked in naval warfare. The third regulates the treatment of
prisoners of war. The fourth is about the protection of civilians in
time of war. Additional Protocols 1 and 2 ensure more humane
considerations not only in international conflicts but also in national strife, such as the treatment of guerrilla fighters.
World Health Organization (WHO): The health arm of the United
Nations aiming at ‘‘the attainment by all peoples of the highest
possible level of health.’’ The WHO coordinates efforts to raise
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health levels worldwide and promotes the development of primary health. Besides multiple public health programs and actions, it is engaged in disaster preparedness and relief both at
its headquarters and in Geneva, Switzerland, and at six regional
offices, and it coordinates the health sector of the UN involvement in major emergencies. The organization has compiled the
Emergency Health Kit.
United Nations: The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) mobilizes, directs, and coordinates the emergency humanitarian activities of the various UN agencies and
other organizations. It has established the International Disaster
Management Information Network (UNIENET), operates the
OCHA warehouse in Pisa (Italy), and publishes studies on disaster relief and preparedness. In disasters and emergencies, OCHA
dispatches field officers to the stricken site.
(Office of the) High Commissioner for Human Rights: The United
Nations’s central point for all human rights questions. Leads and
stimulates human rights issues, responds to serious violations of
human rights, investigates reports on their breaches, promotes
human rights and strengthens national action in their favor, ensures that UN decisions on human rights are implemented, and
the articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are
respected.
Biological Weapons Convention: United Nations Convention on
the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and their
Destruction, signed in 1972.
Red Cross: Red Cross, or International Red Cross, general terms
used for one or all the components of the worldwide organization active in humanitarian work. The official name is The
International Red Cross Movement, which comprises three components: (1) International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
acts mainly in conflict disasters as neutral intermediary in hostilities and for the protection of war victims. Guardian of the Geneva
Conventions; (2) International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies (IFRC), worldwide federation of the National
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Societies, active in non-conflict disasters and natural calamities;
(3) The individual National Red Cross or Red Crescent Society
of every country.

Summary
These are a few of some two thousand terms (see Multilingual
Dictionary of Disaster Medicine and International Relief ) that have
been tested over many years in the field, in training programs,
and briefing sessions, and are established as the standard terminology in disaster management and humanitarian service.
It is the author’s conviction that in the difficult emergency situations of multilingual and multidisciplinary disaster action, the
use of a commonly agreed vocabulary transforms a potential disaster of language into a commonly-understood language of disasters and lessens the Babelian confusion that often risks to
hamper the most well-meaning, humanitarian, disaster response.

Part 2
As international humanitarian assistance grew at the end of the
twentieth century, it became increasingly clear that mere sympathy
and good will were inadequate responses. Complex emergencies
required the involvement of many different disciplines. But there
were no accepted training standards for the new breed of international humanitarian worker, and academia did not offer adequate
courses or recognition for a new profession.
The development of the International Diploma in Humanitarian
Assistance (IDHA) is offered as an example of an appropriate university-based training program, one properly rooted in the experience
of a wide variety of specialists in humanitarian assistance. The IDHA
is offered by Fordham University, the University of Geneva, and the
Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland under the direction of the Center for International Health and Cooperation. The IDHA has become
a standard training curriculum. It is now accepted by the UN, the
International Red Cross, and major nongovernmental organizations.
The chapter by the editor covers the essentials of the program.
All the contributors to the International Humanitarian Affairs
book series are faculty members of the IDHA program. All were
chosen because of their unique knowledge, unquestioned authority, and practical field experience in humanitarian crises that follow
both natural disasters and armed conflicts.
The fundamental importance in a humanitarian crisis of effective
teamwork—as opposed to individual efforts—is now fully accepted.
But how does one build a team? Early in the IDHA course there is a
strong emphasis on developing a cohesive and effective group.
Pamela Lupton-Bowers, Chief of Training at the IFRC, details the
team-building techniques she uses in the IDHA.

4

Training for Humanitarian
Assistance
Kevin M. Cahill, M.D.
International humanitarian assistance is a professional discipline appropriately influenced, as are the professions of medicine or law, by the loftiest ideals of civilized society. To help one’s
fellow human beings alleviate hunger and pain, give succor to
the starving and homeless, unite ruptured families, and rebuild
destroyed societies are the noble goals of humanitarian assistance.
But the sheer scope and extent of the human calamities that
follow conflicts and disasters make individual efforts in such situations touching but ineffectual. Unless humanitarian assistance
is carefully planned, coordinated, and delivered, with understanding and sensitivity, it often produces more harm and pain
to victims and fragile communities; it also endangers and frustrates the very donors who wish to help.
One of the reasons for so much failure in the attempt to do
good is a lack of training in the fundamentals of humanitarian
assistance. Good will, or the desire to share in human tragedy, is
simply not an adequate foundation. If timely and effective help
is to be delivered, all participants must develop a common language, and this depends, to a great degree, on a universally accepted, basic standard of training.
Assistance workers must understand how complex humanitarian crises develop, what their potential roles are, and what skills
are required when, as strangers, they become involved in traumatized communities where the normal supportive services of society have collapsed and entire populations become vulnerable
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dependents. Those who presume to offer help in such situations,
who accept the privilege of providing life-saving aid, must be
taught to appreciate the early warning signs of impending disasters so that prevention as well as reaction becomes part of their
approach. They must learn from previous catastrophes, no two
of which are identical, how to devise the most efficient, rapid,
and flexible response to each challenge.
There are basic tenets, however, common to all disaster relief
efforts. One must learn to be vigilant against the known dangers
of inappropriate aid, to preserve, even in the midst of chaos,
equanimity, humility, and respect that are the hallmarks of true
professionals in every discipline. Humanitarian workers must
learn to develop, and utilize, accurate tools to measure the extent
of needs, and to evaluate the efficacy of aid programs. Only with
a universally accepted vocabulary can they coordinate their efforts with other international agencies and especially with local
authorities and leaders. They must properly plan programs so
they can eventually depart and end their support without adding
insult to existing injury.
Many factors mandate a change in the way humanitarian assistance workers should be trained. International relief efforts are
now ‘‘big business’’ with profound diplomatic, military, political,
and economic implications. Billions of dollars are spent annually
on humanitarian assistance and the level is likely to rise in the
twenty-first century. Yet until recently, there were no widely
agreed upon training programs to certify the multiple actors in
this critical discipline.
The International Diploma in Humanitarian Assistance
(IDHA) is a product of the loss of innocence that followed the
Somalia debacle in the early 1990s. It reflects a profound new
appreciation of the dangers aid workers face and can create. My
interest in the levels of training offered by different agencies was
sharpened when I was asked to care for a young woman who had
just been raped in Somalia in 1992. She had been sent into anarchy, armed with a pleasant morning’s orientation program, and
was led to believe that, somehow, if she caressed the starving ba-
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bies, the problems of Somalia would be solved. No one told her
that when societies collapse, people rob and murder and rape.
As I further investigated various training programs for international humanitarian workers, I discovered that even the largest
international aid organizations offered mainly in-house courses
of differing durations and quality. None offered a university diploma that could become part of a person’s educational resume,
a very useful credential as humanitarian workers change jobs
and, often, organizations. The IDHA offered by the Center for
International Health and Cooperation (CIHC), Fordham University, the University of Geneva, and the Royal College of Surgeons
in Ireland filled that essential need. In the past five years, over
400 candidates have completed the program, received the IDHA,
and now lead humanitarian missions and relief operations in
every part of the world.
Young volunteers, as well as seasoned professionals, now frequently move from local and international relief organizations to
national governmental services to the agencies and divisions of
the United Nations, and back and forth. This movement of skills
and personnel among organizations is both desirable and inevitable; it promotes cross-fertilization and should be encouraged.
However, this very mobility makes it imperative that there be a
common foundation, an acceptable basic minimum standard of
training. Brief orientation courses for humanitarian volunteers
are obviously inadequate. There is a definite role for year-long
Master’s degree training programs for the committed professional, but they are hardly suitable for preparing large numbers
of people urgently needed to serve in humanitarian crises, particularly in conflicts and disasters. Just as one would not consider
sending a soldier into battle without basic military training, so
also one must insist upon an adequate level of preparedness before permitting any involvement in complex humanitarian emergencies.
The CIHC developed a widely accepted curriculum that offers
the necessary practical, thorough grounding in the fundamentals
required for international humanitarian assistance. The IDHA

52

TRAINING FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

course was devised after extensive consultation with colleagues
from leading agencies involved in humanitarian work: the
United Nations, the International Committee, and Federation,
of the Red Cross, multiple governmental and nongovernmental
organizations, and university-based experts.
An indispensable ingredient in making the IDHA program
unique was the involvement of academia. It was critical that prestigious universities acknowledge practical humanitarian assistance training as a legitimate scholarly discipline worthy of an
International Diploma. A careful, thoughtful curriculum, based
on solid field experience, as well as academic analyses and research studies, could now replace the vague, emotion-laden ideological approach that characterized so many previous training
programs.
Humanitarian crises cry out for an immediate response. The
affected communities have obvious basic needs that must be met.
Acute emergencies frequently become chronic situations that require a response capable of evolving from life-saving aid to rehabilitation and development; an adequate training curriculum
must consider all these phases. Humanitarian crises can often be
predicted and may be preventable, or their impact minimized,
with appropriate foresight and planning.
Social, cultural, political, and economic forces influence crises
and one must learn to appreciate, evaluate, and utilize these and
other critical factors such as the local levels of health, education,
and existing social service traditions. Health concerns in humanitarian crises are not limited to the control of communicable diseases or the obvious need to provide food, water, shelter, and
emergency medical care in the midst of chaos. One must also be
aware of the severe psychological stresses that result from and
follow torture, rape, and displacement from the security of family
and neighborhood.
Thus, a training course designed to prepare for an appropriate
‘‘humanitarian response’’ must have its foundation in a multidisciplinary approach involving and integrating personnel from a
variety of backgrounds, including health, mental health, logistics,
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management, engineering, agriculture, communications, education, conflict resolution, advocacy, international humanitarian
and human rights law, economics, politics, and diplomacy.
The IDHA course is purposefully intensive. It was constructed
to simulate a humanitarian crisis, with long days of hard work
and the forced intimacy of shared meals and dormitory accommodations. For twelve to fourteen hours a day, five and a half
days a week for a full month, candidates participate in seminars
and meetings, absorbing and discussing the views of an expert
faculty, all of whom have had extensive experience in conflicts
and disasters.
UN agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
working under personnel pressures in the field, can afford to
assign candidates for training programs for relatively short periods in order not to disrupt their own operations. This was another practical reason we limited the IDHA to a month’s
duration, yet managed to provide over 200 hours of solid lectures
and seminars to satisfy academic needs. Theory must be welded
with experience if one is to train people for real crises. Since
most IDHA candidates already had the opportunity to work in
field operations, they bring their own insights and attitudes, and
much of the learning comes from candidate interaction in debate and mock scenario exercises. A remarkable cadre of men
and women who have lived through the hells of Somalia and
Rwanda, of Liberia, Bosnia, and Chechnya, Afghanistan and
Timor, have joined both as candidates and faculty for the IDHA
courses.
In complex humanitarian emergencies, it is often difficult to
identify any single paramount need. Throughout, the IDHA
course fosters an appreciation of the myriad facets in humanitarian crises. The program encourages those who intend to provide
help to do so with respect for the basic rights and dignity of those
affected by such crises. The course, and the diploma, promote
cooperation and dialogue among the critical triad: the international, governmental, and nongovernmental agencies on which
international humanitarian assistance depends.
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The IDHA program is rooted in an academic structure, which
can establish and maintain standards, support research, evaluate
interventions, and identify examples of good practice. The evolving discipline of humanitarian assistance must develop an essential institutional memory that should enable operating agencies
to avoid the recurrent egregious failures and errors of earlier
programs. Candidates are provided with basic textbooks, such as
the International Committee of the Red Cross’s Handbook on War
and Public Health, my own A Framework for Survival: Health, Human
Rights and Humanitarian Assistance in Conflicts and Disasters, and a
CIHC-sponsored CD-ROM that has, on a single disc, over 1,000
fundamental documents on international law, the Geneva Conventions, et al.
The IDHA curriculum approaches humanitarian assistance by
devoting the first week to disaster preparedness; identifying those
economic and political forces that make nations vulnerable to
collapse. The second week considers the many aspects of an
emergency relief response. The third week is spent defining the
steps necessary to rehabilitate fractured societies. In the fourth
week, candidates reflect on personal protection, security, hostage
situations, and how to deal with journalists from different media.
Candidates learn how to devise appropriate exit strategies and,
where possible, to develop a program that assures the critical
transition from emergency relief to local development.
The faculty has steadily adapted our curriculum and teaching
approach in response to the comments of IDHA graduates. For
example, we have learned that there must be a balance between
scheduled classroom lectures and protected time in the evenings
for group discussions. Some discussions are introduced by keynote guest speakers. Topics may be chosen either from table 4.1,
or students may suggest titles that they are particularly keen to
discuss.
An important aspect of the IDHA program is to promote an
approach of cooperation and teamwork rather than competition
and individualism. On the first day of the course, the candidates
are divided into syndicates of eight to ten persons each, chosen

Table 4.1

IDHA Discussion Topics
Week 3

Week 4

1. Humanitarian assistance—the
price of international political
complacency and inertia
2. Is the international community obliged to respond to
each and every crisis?
3. Why is there a mismatch between need and provision of
humanitarian assistance?
4. For regional problems, can
there be regional solutions?
5. In the UN and its agencies—
are there mechanisms of accountability and do they
function?
6. Is misappropriation and misuse of donor funds and resources inevitable?
7. Preventive diplomacy—
cohesion through coercion?
8. Is asylum seeking a lost cause?

1. Is an integrated multidisciplinary response an impossible
deal?
2. Who should be responsible
for independent research and
evaluation in acute and
chronic crises?
3. Central Africa—what would
have happened if the world
had done nothing?
4. Competition or cooperation:
How can aid organizations
optimize their effectiveness?
5. Should refugees be kept in
camps?
6. Should professional registration be mandatory in emergency situations?
7. Define the problems that
must be expected because of
existing political borders in
the provision of humanitarian
assistance?

1. Donor-driven humanitarian
assistance—do funds meet
needs or needs meet fund?
2. The aftermath of ethnic conflict—oblivion, justice, or revenge?
3. Can the international community negotiate with key
players if they have ‘‘blood
on their hands’’?
4. Child soldiers—what is the
long-term impact on development?
5. Is there a need for harmonization of refugee procedures
and legislation? Can this be
met?
6. Forced repatriation—how
do we respond? How should
we respond? How can we respond?
7. Humanitarian assistance
through partnership with
host governments and services—rhetoric and reality
8. How can we optimize opportunities for training of
staff in countries afflicted by
humanitarian crises?
9. Humanitarian action in situations of conflict—relief for
victims or sustenance for
perpetrators?
10. Interaction between expatriates and local staff

1. Institutional amnesia—inertia
or impotence? To what extent
do they exacerbate humanitarian crises?
2. Advocacy and neutrality—a
dilemma for international
agencies, Red Cross and Red
Crescent, and NGOs
3. Humanitarian assistance—
always positive?
4. How can we reconcile national security and human
rights?
5. Is distortion of reality acceptable in the interests of advocacy?
6. Is the military logistic machine
the best response to a humanitarian crisis?
7. Is breach of national sovereignty justifiable in the interest of humanitarian action?
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so that candidates with different backgrounds and skills are
forced to work closely together, as they would, in reality, during
a humanitarian crisis. Each syndicate is assigned to one of the
core tutors. There are usually five to six syndicates per course
and an equal number of highly experienced resident tutors who
carefully guide the candidates throughout.
Each syndicate chooses a chairperson and rapporteur, and the
views of individual meetings are then discussed in weekly gathering involving the entire class and tutors.
As should be expected in an academic program under the auspices of three major universities, there is a persistent focus
throughout the month-long IDHA on specificity, exact definitions, assessments, methods of quantifications, and measurements of effectiveness. Without these tools, only words and
emotions prevail. It is easy to stress the need for training, but
it is equally essential to recognize the obstacles to learning, the
inherent prejudices of institutions and individuals even in times
of great humanitarian need. In the IDHA lectures and seminars
on politics, political will (or the lack thereof ), basic human
rights, ethical issues, and codes of conduct are recognized as integral parts of the humanitarian puzzle and must be addressed,
and debated, in an academic setting.
Regardless of the candidate’s background or aspirations, the
IDHA curriculum is based on the premise that all humanitarian
assistance workers must understand how political, as well as climatic and agricultural, forces might influence a crisis, and how
essential, for example, basic logistics are in every undertaking.
Adequate supplies, appropriate and thorough planning, and efficient application of resources are obviously preferable to emotional, haphazard attempts to quell a crisis.
Throughout the course, there is an emphasis on those most
affected in humanitarian crises: women and, especially, children,
too often the victims of preventable disease, too often lost or orphaned, frequently traumatized by seeing the violent deaths of
family, even being forced themselves into conflict. Lecturers
train the IDHA candidates in the best techniques to help reunite
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families lost in a massive flood of refugees, to help victims come
to terms with the stress of national or clan collapse, personal injury, and family loss.
The IDHA curriculum also emphasizes the important role, and
limitations, of the military during a humanitarian crisis. There is
a continuous effort to promote coordination among the multiple
actors that influence a humanitarian crisis. Individuals and organizations, each with their own viewpoints, interests, and even
selfish agendas, must be encouraged, or even forced, to cooperate if overwhelming problems are to be resolved.
Finally, the IDHA course encourages all candidates to understand the bases of financial accounting, fundraising and dealing
with donor fatigue, and to appreciate the scope and complexity
of international assistance. How to assure adequate funding for
humanitarian efforts, how to eliminate the wasteful, and demeaning, ‘‘begging bowl’’ approach to each crisis, and how to divide a
finite fiscal pie so that all parts of the humanitarian triad can
continue to contribute, are essential topics for discussion. The
role of the media—for good or for ill—is also studied. In Rwanda
and the former Yugoslavia, for example, the perverse use of the
radio helped promote, even justify, horrible genocidal acts. Yet
without media attention—the ‘‘CNN factor’’—international
leaders can, and do, conveniently ignore obvious famine and oppression.
All IDHA candidates are assessed throughout the course by
weekly exams, tutorial reviews, and, in the final week, by written,
oral, mock scenario situation, and syndicate presentation tests to
satisfy the academic criteria required for a university diploma.
Failures occur especially in candidates with poor attendance records or an attitude that prevents participation as a team
member.
The signators of the IDHA diploma are the President of Fordham University in New York, the Rector of the University of Geneva in Switzerland, the Chief Executive of the Royal College of
Surgeons in Ireland, and the President and Director of the Center for International Health and Cooperation. Several universi-
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ties, including the University of Geneva, now offer up to a 40
percent credit toward a Master’s degree to any candidate who
has successfully completed the IDHA. The IDHA has been afforded full Copyright Protection by both the United States Patent
Office and the European Union.
Further information on the curriculum and application process can be obtained from the following Web sites: http://www
.cihc.org, http://www.idha.ch, and http://www.fordham.edu.

IDHA Course Objectives
1. To provide volunteers and professionals from a wide variety of
backgrounds with a comprehensive insight into the needs of
refugees and internally displaced people in acute and chronic
settings and equip them with the awareness, understanding,
and skills that are essential for effective service in a humanitarian crisis
2. To enable humanitarian workers to function effectively, both as
individuals and members of a team, in acute and chronic situations of conflict and disaster
3. To promote cooperation and dialogue between international,
governmental, or nongovernmental agencies involved in humanitarian action (assistance and protection)
4. To evaluate interventions and identify examples of good practice
5. To examine ways in which humanitarian crisis may be anticipated and prevented

5

Teamwork in Humanitarian
Missions
Pamela Lupton-Bowers
The Importance of Teamwork in an Emergency Operation
The importance of teamwork cannot be overemphasized in
a humanitarian assistance operation. Groups of widely different
people must work together at all levels: international technical
support staff of many different disciplines must work with community groups responding to the immediate humanitarian imperative of saving lives and of organizing the logistics and
distribution of aid. Then the interagency and government
‘‘teams’’ must orchestrate the whole event. When effective teamwork exists, people speak of uplifting experiences and of achievements beyond their expectations. They speak of a synergy that
occurs in well-functioning teams that allows them to achieve
more than the individuals themselves could have achieved. They
speak of the experience as being life changing and rejuvenating.
When teams work well together, things are in synch, ideas flow,
people are clear about what has to be done, they communicate
openly with one another, they are comfortable with decisions,
and they work in complementary harmony. An atmosphere of
fairness and inclusivity reigns and team members respect and
support one another. There is a sense of personal as well as team
fulfillment and, most importantly, teams are effective.
Organizations in all disciplines favor more and more a work
model based on teams. It’s a model that favors cooperation, inclusiveness in problem solving, information-sharing, and collabo-
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rative action. Companies and organizations that promote and
invest in teamwork generally agree that:
• Teams improve communication. They gather and share information as an essential part of their work.
• Teams achieve results that ordinary functional groups can’t: a
‘‘product’’ in today’s world is the result of a ‘‘process’’ of integrated events. There is too much to know for one person or one
discipline. The combination of knowledge and ability can result
in superior outcomes. A cross-functional team invariably knows
more than a pyramid hierarchy ever can.
• Teams are more creative and more efficient at solving problems.
Well-balanced and complementary teams combine multiple perspectives and create more innovative solutions.
• Teams achieve higher quality decisions. The essence of good
decision-making is good leadership and appropriate process; in
effective teams, both are shared.
• Teams increase quality and services. They understand purpose
and goal and have the interpersonal skills to manage relationships.
• Teams mean improved processes. Effective teams are not hampered by bureaucracy; they identify obstacles and redesign processes to remove them, speeding up responses.
• Teams motivate and develop their members. Teams allow people
with different kinds of knowledge, opinion, and approaches to
work together. They learn together and grow together. Participation in such cross-functional teams strengthens and develops individuals and helps build the organization.

These results are no less desirable for a humanitarian mission
than they are for a corporate business. Not all humanitarian relief workers share the belief that this model of teamwork is appropriate in a disaster relief situation. Some would argue that the
conditions are unique and that the theories and practice of collaborative teamwork are not applicable. Others assume that the
group dynamics involved will occur naturally without conscious
effort to establish or maintain them.
We don’t have time to deal with that. We are there to do a job;
everyone knows what they have to do and they just get on with

PAMELA LUPTON-BOWERS

61

it. (Emergency relief unit leader deployed in several operations,
Bosnia, Burundi, 19981)

This attitude is propagated, whether consciously or unconsciously, in disaster response training when topics such as
interpersonal relations, stress management, and cross-cultural relations and teamwork are often relegated to minor positions in a
technically full curriculum. It is not uncommon to see a module
on teamwork awarded a slot of forty-five to ninety minutes in a
one- or two-week program. This is totally inadequate for developing behaviors that ultimately can make the difference between
success and failure of an operation.
The opinion expressed by the relief worker above might be
considered, at first glance, to be admirable and one motivated by
a clear commitment and drive to respond to the often-overwhelming humanitarian imperative. In the first hours and days
of an emergency response, time is of the essence; the priority is
saving lives, ensuring protection and sustenance and reducing
the vulnerability of the people involved. But it ignores the reality
that humanitarian relief teams are not different from any other
team in that they are composed of different people with different
perspectives, and they have a nasty habit of behaving like human
beings, in that they have conflicting ways of thinking and doing
things. Moreover, it ignores the fact that the relief team is not a
hermetically sealed unit able to operate in isolation. They must
operate with other actors, including not only other agencies, but
also local communities and the beneficiaries themselves. More
and more relief workers are reporting that while they are competent in their functional expertise, they are unprepared for and
overwhelmed by the ambiguous and confusing situations on the
ground, which they complain ‘‘get in the way of doing the job.’’
Unfortunately, under these conditions, relief managers, coordinators, and team leaders too often resort to command type or
authoritarian leadership. Even when they ‘‘know better,’’ the
high stress of a disaster situation causes people to fall back upon
preferred, comfortable behaviors. It’s not difficult to see why
when we look at the background of disaster organization. Histori-
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cally, the dominant planning model for disaster response has
been command and control, based on the ‘‘military model’’2 of
emergency planning. This model is characterized by the assumptions of ‘‘chaos,’’ which can only be eliminated by taking control.
These assumptions lead to an organizational structure modeled
on military structures. The assumptions being that ‘‘emergencies
create a significant disjunction in social life which requires extraordinary measures to be put back in place’’ and that the
‘‘problems’’ are found in the ‘‘weaknesses’’ of individuals and
social structures and that emergency planning should be directed at establishing control.
The belief is that a situation is suddenly so drastically different
than ‘‘normal’’ time, that decision-making and authority need to
be centralized, with precise planning and meticulous attention
to detail. There is also the underlying presumption that spontaneous and unplanned behavior is dysfunctional, misdirected,
and harmful. Communication lines are created ‘‘top down’’ with
the belief that those at the top know what to do, and orders are
issued at the expense of gathering information. The implications
of this command and control model are that people cannot be
trusted to obtain correct information, and that victims are passive
and cannot help themselves. It is a paternalistic view of victims
who need authorities to be decision-makers.
In such an organizational approach, the management style
and team dynamic are naturally influenced and manifest as typical of command and control leadership. This in turn will influence the preparation of teams and leaders and determine the
profile and competence of both. Admittedly, there will be some
occasions when authoritarian management is perfectly adequate;
too often though, this adopted style becomes habitual in circumstances and situations where it is no longer appropriate. And this
can result in breakdowns between the actors and the very populations they seek to aid.
Several factors lead to the conclusion that different working
models in emergency relief are needed.
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Lack of Respect Regarding the Local Population
Local agencies and staff liken traditional authoritarian style to
imperialism and neo-colonialism; they are insulted by it, and the
beneficiaries themselves tell us that it is not appreciated. It neither respects their wishes, their capabilities, nor their status. It
simply doesn’t recognize the capacity of the local population to
contribute to the relief operation.
In a series of journalistic interviews with victims of disasters, the
American Red Cross discovered that authoritarian leadership was
tolerated in the early minutes and hours of a disaster when lives
and property were at risk. However, this type of management style
was quickly considered inappropriate and unacceptable, and victims reported expecting to play a more involved role in their care
and in the decisions being made about them. (Disaster Response
Manager, Washington, D.C., U.S.A., 1999)

More Complex Environment
Disasters are becoming less routine and more expanding and
emerging. There are a greater variety of vulnerable populations
extending across sections of society and involving all levels, rich
and poor. The stakeholders involved can include war lords, local
and international media, military, armed guards as well as local
communities, churches, and agencies. This demands a more sophisticated response and one that is able to respond to all the
different actors.
Longevity and Permanence of Complex Emergencies
Both are increasingly distinctive features of relief operations, and
agencies are seeking new models of operation that can cope with
the crisis within the emergency and that include principles of
‘‘operationality in turbulence.’’3 The situation in Gujerat is a perfect example of this. What started in January 2001 as an emergency response to a major earthquake evolved into long-term
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relief as reconstruction was hampered by the magnitude of the
disaster, and has since had periods of renewed crisis as a result of
the community disturbances and violence fourteen months later.
The Demand for a Higher-Caliber Humanitarian Worker
Large scale complex situations requiring an international response are dependent more and more on relief workers who are
highly educated, skilled, and experienced. Gone are the beliefs
that a technical relief worker need simply to follow clearly defined standard operating procedures to be able to function successfully in the pre-defined disaster situation. The whole playing
field has less clearly defined parameters, which creates more unstable and changing situations. Relief workers need to be able to
tolerate the flexibility and ambiguity of the arena in which they
work. The technically professional relief worker cannot be considered truly professional unless he or she can effectively operate
in a multidiscipline, multinational, multicultural team of workers. Naturally, such professionals resent authoritarian leadership
for being overbearing and restrictive.
Sustainability and Continuity of Their Own Staff and Organization
The humanitarian relief field suffers a high turnover of staff. On
the one hand, this is not too surprising as many relief workers
approach the work as temporary or occasional. However, it poses
threats to organizations if they lack professional career relief
workers able to strategically manage their organizations and to
be able to build on institutional memory and learning. Poor team
leadership and interpersonal relations contribute to this drain of
talent. While humanitarian organizations are cognizant of the
risks to staff in conflict situations, more so as a result of the tragic
deaths in recent years of humanitarian workers in Tchechnya,
East Timor, Tanzania, and the current situation in the Middle
East, there seems to be a reluctance to recognize the stress suffered by staff in day-to-day operations. The stress created by a
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dysfunctional working environment can have serious impact on
the health of the humanitarian worker. We know this to be true
from research in the general work environment; it is exacerbated
many fold by the conditions in which the humanitarian relief
workers find themselves. There is also the warriors’ code of, ‘‘it’s
part of the job, we can handle it,’’ which often denies workers
access to debriefing psychologists, and this can contribute to accumulative stress syndrome and can cause serious and long-term
effects on the humanitarian worker. The consequence of inappropriate management and poor interpersonal relations with supervisors and colleagues is a major contributing factor to this
stress. In debriefing sessions, psychologists report that of the
number of humanitarian workers deciding to leave the profession, a very high proportion cite unsatisfactory relations with
managers or colleagues as a contributing reason.
I went straight out to Macedonia; I didn’t have time for a briefing.
I didn’t see my manager for several weeks. I went out as a driver
and ended up coordinating a team. I had no experience for that.
I had no support. I don’t think I did a good job. I am completely
burned out. I don’t think I’ll be going back. (First-time Danish
relief worker returning from Macedonia, 2000)

An Alternative Team-Based Model
Clearly a more sophisticated operational model is called for.
Such a model needs to be based on:
• key characteristics of inclusiveness, coordination, and cooperation;
• the assumption that the capacity of the individual and social
structure are not necessarily reduced;
• the reality that teams will include local community personnel:
agencies, NGO’s beneficiaries;
• the recognition that the most effective problem-solving and
planning will include the local society in a participative process;
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• the enhancement of coordination by common planning and rehearsal activities;
• the understanding that the core of emergency planning should
be toward building mechanisms, techniques, and facilities that
promote inter-organizational coordination and common decision-making.

The characteristics of such a model clearly demand a more
cooperative and inclusive approach that match those of effective
cross-functional, cross-discipline, and multicultural teamwork.
An inherent assumption of this approach must be that the competencies of individual relief workers and, particularly, team
leaders must include skills in facilitating these processes. Among
some disaster relief workers there is still a reluctance, even embarrassment, on the part of humanitarian agencies to give credit
to this kind of training and preparation, but as we have seen, the
consequences for not doing so are serious. On the other hand,
there are real advantages in getting this right.
1. The overall success of the operation. Just as an organization’s values and beliefs influence the actions and ethics of its
people, so, too, does the structure, processes, and management
style. By extension, both will influence the functioning of its
teams on the ground and the overall perceived success of the
organization.
2. Improved relationships and image with beneficiaries and
local communities. A new profile4 of beneficiaries ‘‘articulate
communities of people used to power themselves,’’ responds to
relief personnel who provide prompt and effective services in a
fair, respectful, and compassionate manner.5 They reject the traditional and essentially patronizing dynamic of the agency-beneficiary relationship that legitimizes an authoritative approach.
3. Improved potential for creating opportunities for capacity
building. One of the great challenges of the relief operation is to
exploit opportunities to share knowledge and capacity wherever
possible and no matter how minimal. Skills associated with participative teamwork (facilitation, listening, participative decisionmaking, mediation, coaching, and guiding) are more relevant
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for transferring know-how and building the capacities of the local
communities and individuals.
4. Well being of their own staff and the strengthening of their
organizations. Good team and interpersonal relations contribute
to raising people’s abilities to cope with stress. Stress is a common
factor in the humanitarian world. Regardless of the presence or
absence of conflict, the human tragedy associated with all disasters, the absence of family, friends, and the traditional support
network, added to unfamiliar climate and conditions all contribute to increased anxiety and stress for any humanitarian worker.
However, when humanitarian workers benefit from good leadership support, collaborative efforts on the part of colleagues, respect and recognition for his/her contribution, then the stress of
the mission can be considerably reduced.
In Abidjan when the violence was at its worst, the team spirit and
relationship with our colleagues in other agencies was so good that
we were able to handle the worst situations with a sense of humor
and without being totally stressed. It would have been impossible
to have survived without it. (Health coordinator, Congo, Brazzaville, 1999)

Building the Team
The International Diploma for Humanitarian Assistance (IDHA)
program models its approach on the emergency relief situation.
Groups of strangers are placed together within the first hours of
arriving. They are organized into syndicate groups and expected
to operate immediately as productive ‘‘teams.’’ The majority of
them do; a few do not. What is it that binds them? What helps to
build the team? What prevents them and causes their failure?
These are questions that are explored within the first day of the
program, because when team formation is hampered, the entire
outcome can be jeopardized.
A major contributing factor to whether a team is well functioning or dysfunctional is the underlying values and beliefs that mo-
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tivate an individual to engage in humanitarian work, and will
influence decision-making and relationships with colleagues and,
especially, host communities and victims. Values and beliefs are
fundamentally what humanitarian organizations are about. Religious organizations particularly, CARITAS, Lutheran World Service, World Vision, etc., have a clear mission to disseminate those
values. Unfortunately, we can’t rely on an agreed moral basis for
modern humanitarianism; the principles guiding humanitarian
agencies vary, sometimes quite widely, as we have seen in the case
of Médecins sans frontières and the International Committee of the
Red Cross. The entire humanitarian field is rife with the paradoxes of altruism.6 Impartiality, long considered an essential of
humanitarianism, was questioned during the Rwanda operations
and in Bosnia. For many the concept of the ‘‘deserving poor’’ no
longer held true, and many of the aid workers suffered from the
deception. The ideology of an organization can be so strong that
it will influence its organizational structure, resulting in a ‘‘missionary configuration.’’7 This will naturally affect its style of operation, the profile of its workers, and its modus operandi. All this
is to say that it is naı̈ve to rely on only cognitive and behavioral
approaches to establishing an effective team. Motives will influence the intensity with which individuals engage in the relief activity, and also determine how long they will persist faced with
the attendant emotional stress and fatigue. The responsibility of
the team leader is for the success of the operation and the well
being of his or her team. The challenge is both to understand
individual strengths and limitations and to consciously work
toward common ground if the team is to jointly tackle the challenges ahead of it.
The teams in IDHA programs that form ‘‘naturally’’ display
characteristics that are also evident in well-performing field
teams.
Motivation—There is an immediate and agreed identification
with the group and a common desire to succeed. More will be
said about motivation and its challenge for the team leader later.
Rapport—There are conscious and overt efforts to seek com-
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mon ground: experiences, place of birth, work locations, previous humanitarian experience, professional background, etc.
And, less overtly but just as inexorably, searching out those who
share beliefs and values.
Building rapport means being on the same wavelength as the
other person, speaking their language, being completely in tune
with the other person. Bandler and Grinder,8 the authors of
neuro-linguistic programming (NLP), discovered early in their
work on the communication excellence of several notable therapists that, in order to communicate well, high levels of rapport
had to be established. Their research also noted that when we
are not in rapport, we continue to communicate; however, the
messages we are sending may not be what we are intending. It is
this fundamental of interpersonal communication that is at the
heart of many of the problems of the team. Diversity can be both
an opportunity for team strength; yet, at the same time, it can
increase the potential for disjunction due to the misunderstanding of unintentional nonverbal signals (body language, gestures,
expressions, tone of voice, etc.).
Neuro-Linguistic Programming is the study of human excellence. NLP is the observation of excellent communication skills
and the description of them as models of behavior. It can be a
powerful and practical approach to personal change.
Neuro refers to our nervous system, the mental pathways of
our five senses by which we see, hear, feel, taste, and smell.
Linguistic refers to our ability to use language, and how specific words or phrases mirror our mental worlds. Linguistic refers
to our ‘‘silent language’’ of postures, gestures, habits that reveal
our thinking styles, beliefs, and more.
Programming is borrowed from computer science to suggest
that our thoughts, feelings, and actions are habitual programs
that can be changed by upgrading our ‘‘mental software.’’
(Adapted from Andreas, Faulkner, et al. (1994))
Miscommunication can be exacerbated further by the customs
and cultural mores rife in a multinational team, and by the fact
of the team itself operating in a foreign environment. Culture,
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the combination of shared experiences, beliefs, and history, gives
people their sense of self-worth, value, and world outlook. It is
quite obvious to see that people who share a culture will find that
rapport can be created immediately and subconsciously. We’ve
all experienced that situation when we simply ‘‘click’’ with another person. We describe a ‘‘chemistry’’ that allows us to ‘‘be on
the same wavelength’’ and to understand better what they are
saying, and even what they may be thinking. This level of rapport
can occur at a first meeting. You may discover that you have
much in common: country of origin, place of birth, schooling or
earlier work experience. You may have traveled to the same
places, enjoy the same food, like the same music, read the same
books, and share the same opinions.
This certainly doesn’t mean to say that in order for good teamwork to occur everyone has to be the same. Far from it. Theories
of team are founded on the opposite opinion: that the most effective teams are those that are composed of complementary
members. Groupthink is just as potentially dangerous as conflict.
But it does tell us that adding the cultural dimension to all other
differences adds even more complexity to the challenge of creating effective teamwork.
Since returning from the training, I am realizing more and more
each day that the most important part of my job is establishing and
maintaining good interpersonal relationships with my team and
my counterparts in the region. When we do this, we can achieve
almost impossible goals. (Humanitarian worker in Kazakhstan,
2001)

Although motivation and rapport give the group a good start,
this process alone does not guarantee success. Group dynamic
begins to dissolve and relationships fragment when processes
such as appropriate procedures, relevant leadership, effective
communication, and decision-making are not clarified. Also evident in effective teams is that members are willing to balance
their own needs and expectations with those of the team and of
other team members. They are able to some extent to suppress
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their personal needs for the greater good or for the development
and support of a particular colleague. Individual team members
recognize that even with superior intelligence or experience, the
potential output of their efforts could not exceed that of the
team in the given time frame or the circumstances. There can be
no teamwork when individuals are simply out to prove themselves or to outshine their colleagues. ‘‘Prima donnas’’ don’t do
well in teams. Unfortunately, there are quite a few ‘‘prima donnas’’ in the relief world.
Male aid workers can be fiercely competitive and seem to gain
greater pleasure from proving themselves (including the ability to
devise theories and analysis) than helping those in need. (Tony
Vaux, 2001, ‘‘The Selfish Altruist. Relief Work in Famine and
War.’’)

The approach to achieve effective teamwork expressed in this
chapter is founded on two basic truisms:
1. Teamwork is essentially all about understanding and working
with people.
2. The outcome of team building exercises, apart from the direct
goal of ensuring team achievements, must be to increase the
individual’s competence as a team worker. That is, the skills
that they learn must be transferable.

With this in mind the approach considers:
• How people think. This has to do with cognitive preferences.
• How people act—the way they manifest these preferences in the
way that they behave and do things.
• How self-aware they are of their cognitive and behavioral preferences.
• How well they recognize the differences in other team members.
• How willing they are to adapt to different thinking and behavioral preferences.
• How competent they are in behavioral flexibility. Do they have
the skills and ability to act differently?

The outcome of the approach is to enhance team members’
emotional intelligence. This involves improving interpersonal re-
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lationships and ensuring that team members acquire skills that
permit them to operate successfully in other interpersonal and
team situations. This intelligence includes the following:
• Know-what: the knowledge of what things should be done to
allow a good team to work, i.e., goal setting, operating procedures, participative decision-making, etc.
• Know-how: the skills to be able to implement these actions
• Know-when: the judgment to know when things should happen
and in what situation
• Know-who: the maturity to match different communication approaches and styles with different people’s preferences and
comfort levels

How People Think; How People Act
Cognitive differences have to do with how people perceive and
assimilate data, make decisions, solve problems, and relate to
people. The most widely recognized cognitive differences are
those associated with right-brain/left-brain dominance. This distinction provides a useful impression about the radically different ways of thinking observed in people; although it’s more
metaphoric than physiological. Recent research reveals little current neuroscientific evidence for the phenomena;9 yet, the popular psychology right brain/left brain distinction is readily
accepted by many people.
Recent research tells us that evidence for hemisphere dominance and specialization is not as evident as was once believed. It
appears that both hemispheres contribute to the holistic processing of faculties. Nor is one more important than the other. But
in Western culture, the faculties associated with the left do take a
more dominant position in our lives. We place less value and
emphasis on those associated with the right. The highest material
awards go to the logical rational thinkers; intuitive thought, spatial, and artistic creative processes are less appreciated. Whether
neurological or culturally founded, this appears to be true.
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Table 5.1

Left

Right



Logic



Recognition of patterns



Reason



Recognition of faces



Mathematics



Rhythm



Language



Visual images and depth



Reading



Creativity



Writing



Parallel processing



Linear thinking



Synthesis



Serial crossing



Analysis

When people assimilate information differently, they think
about things differently. The way they think about things will naturally influence the way that they act. Some people ‘‘see’’ internal visions, but need to interact with others in order to ‘‘think’’
through problems. Others may ‘‘hear’’ their ideas, and prefer
to reflect independently before presenting them to anyone else.
Some people need to interact externally with their environment.
These extroverts are likely to interrupt others, talk out loud,
dominate meetings, and may overly influence decisions. In contrast, introverted types, by their non-expression, are underrepresented in meetings and often express frustration with their
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inability to influence. Analytical, logical types base their decisions
on the empirical facts and evidence available, while more intuitive types rely on feelings, beliefs, and opinion. Abstract thinkers
like to assimilate their information from a variety of sources and
use divergent thinking patterns to evolve creative solutions; while
more practical individuals prefer to have hands-on, experiential
information with which to solve immediate pragmatic problems.
The first thing to emphasize is that these approaches relate to
preferences and not to competencies—that is, a person’s skills
and abilities. People are able to operate in other ways, and often
learn different behaviors than their preferential ones. However,
it is also a fact that in an emergency situation, people resort to
their most comfortable, preferred styles of behavior. The challenge for the team and the team leader is to build on these differences for the benefit of the team and not to allow them to create
conflict between members. When differences are not understood, they are seen to be personal rather than professional. For
instance, the ‘‘big picture’’ person requesting feedback on a report expects to get comments about the overall thesis and global
view and is confused, even irate, to receive detailed comments
about format, spelling, and punctuation errors. He assumes such
‘‘nit-picking’’ was done purposefully to insult and impose oneupmanship. Personality and work preference differences can be
the cause of major dysfunction in a team.
The best and most objective way to assess differences is
through specific diagnostic tools. Such tools can provide a more
objective and detailed description of a person’s preferences than
the most observant manager. Many tools exist on the market:
• The Team Management Systems Index (TMS) examines work
preferences and team role
• The Belbin Team Type Inventory (BELBIN) examines role preferences when working in a team
• The Myers Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) is a personality inventory designed to help people understand themselves and their
behaviors
• The Occupational Personality Questionnaire (OPQ) indicates
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relevant personality characteristics across a wide spectrum of occupations

None of these measure ability in a specific area of work. They
are mostly designed to encourage individuals to become more
self-aware and to help them explore aspects of managing relationships and behavior. Most of them agree on several basic
points:
• Preferences are neither good nor bad. They are simply different,
and one or another may be more appropriate in certain situations than in others.
• Preferences emerge early and most stay with us throughout our
lives, although certain experiences can persuade us to adapt and
change. For instance, getting the opportunity to do something
different and then receiving positive feedback about our abilities can cause us to modify our preference with regard to that
behavior.
• Preferences are not rigid. Most of us have access to a variety of
approaches, but find ourselves particularly attached to one or
two key preferred ways.
• Preferences are not prescriptive of behavior, but descriptions of
how individuals assess their own behavior.

The key to achieving good interpersonal working relationships
is to raise awareness of the individual team members about their
particular preferential styles. Initial team activities should focus
on helping people to increase their understanding of how they
operate, and the conditions in which they prefer to work. In an
emergency relief situation, it is essential for team members to
recognize differences early so that they can move quickly to
being productive. It is vital for the team leader to understand the
different styles of the team as well as his/her own. This is doubly
important since adaptation of behavior can only occur with selfrecognition, empathy for others, and a genuine motivation for
change. Also true is that when people identify their own working
styles, they also gain insight into the styles of others.
The team can use this information in a variety of ways to build
team effectiveness:
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• Creating team balance. A balanced team, in which all preferential styles are represented, tend to allocate work naturally among
themselves. When this is not the case, leaders need to attend to
the imbalance and identify ways of compensating for it. A team
without any divergent thinkers may want to find one from outside of the team to give a different perspective to their creative
problem solving.
• Matching work to work preferences. Detailed analysis of financial data is not the favorite task of everyone. Team leaders
should match the task to the person who not only has the skills,
but also enjoys doing it.
• Designing processes to capture everyone’s contribution. This involves, among other things, information gathering from all relevant sources, managing the input of the talkative members, and
creating space for the more reflective ones, ensuring that a period of innovative and divergent discussion precedes the convergent decision making and action planning.
• Tailoring communication. Recognizing different styles and
matching the communication style to the receiver rather than
the sender.
• Legitimizing honest constructive feedback. When the team recognizes the appropriateness of different behaviors, it is easier to
convey when behavior is inappropriate or unhelpful.

The advantage of such tools is that they provide a language
that depersonalizes behavior and reduces the threat of interpersonal conflict. People can disagree with the behavior and not
with the person. Take the case, for example, of a desk officer in
Geneva who was having difficulties relating to a field manager in
his region. The field manager, in describing his decisions in a
particularly sensitive area of the Balkans, would say things like,
‘‘Trust me. I have a feeling about this. I just know it will work.’’
The desk officer, a highly practical, analytical decision-maker, was
completely unable to understand or respect decision making that
was not founded on clear, logical evidence and empirical facts.
The conflict between the two was almost at the point of no return
until each completed the TMS profile and understood their radically different approaches to decision making. They had other
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preferences in common: they were both extroverts and they both
preferred a structured way of organizing. Their major differences
were in how they assimilated information—one in a creative, divergent way and the other in a more pragmatic, convergent
way—and in their decision-making. Once they understood these
differences, they were able to depersonalize them and recognize
their respective strengths. They also saw the validity and expertise
in both ways of working, and they were able to establish a professionally successful relationship for the following two years.
The key to using such profiles is to understand that they are
not prescriptive, but descriptive of the responses that the individual has provided at that particular point in time. Most psychometric tests rely on self-reporting; the behavior assumed may not
correspond with what others observe. An invaluable complement
to self-assessed questionnaires is feedback from others about
their perception of the described behavior and their observation
of actual behavior. The professional, nonjudgmental language
employed in psychometric tests can help the team to provide
constructive feedback.
In the absence of professional tools, a few simple questions can
help groups to discuss their cognitive and behavioral preferences:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Which type of people do you like to work with?
Which people do you have difficulty working with?
How do you make decisions?
How do you think through problems?
How do you create solutions?
How do you organize your work?
How do you decide what to do next?

Having people discuss their responses to these simple questions can provide a wealth of information about how they are
likely to relate to people and to work.
Forming the Team
The discussion generated from the questions above is an essential part of forming the group dynamics that result in good team-
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work. Good teamwork can naturally occur when people learn
more about one another over time and are willing to be more
open. But in an emergency situation, time is a precious commodity, and teams, after the immediate and almost automatic first
hours and days of a response, must work quickly at establishing
an effective working unit. The way to do this is to establish consciously standard operating behaviors. Relief workers are familiar
with standard operating procedures. Standard operating behaviors are close cousins, and are the explicitly identified behaviors
that a group agrees to perform by and to be measured against.
They are essential if the team is going to be successful in working
together. Standard operating behaviors are the essence of what
psychologist B. W. Tuckman10 called the forming of the team.
Tuckman identified four stages of team formation through observing team progress. His resulting model of forming, storming,
norming, and performing is commonly used in teamwork training. The terminology added below has been adapted and is more
acceptable to multinational groups, which sometimes balk at the
over-reliance on Western models and at jargon which is often
impossible to translate. This does nothing to deter from the usefulness of the model.
Forming/Orientation
This phase involves getting to know one another—searching for
understanding about purpose, goal, roles and responsibilities,
turf. It is the stage of gathering information, analyzing, getting
people on board. Learning about one another’s skills—although
sometimes surreptitiously or tacitly. It can also involve posturing
by some and withdrawn observation by others. Forming can be a
dangerous time; first impressions are made and sometimes never
changed; alliances are created; power bases are sought. A major
threat to team building is that some teams want to pole vault
straight to performing with little concern or perceived value in
the forming, storming, or norming. Unfortunately, there are no
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shortcuts to team building. Whether the team likes it or not, recognizes it or not, they need to orient themselves within in order
to go through the stages.
Storming/Dissatisfaction
This period is identified by clashes of personalities, preferences,
and work styles. There may be differences in interpretations, understanding of roles, etc. Competition and power-plays will be
evident. There may be withdrawal, disengagement, resistance.
The atmosphere is stressful, and the emotional energy of members of the team is spent on surviving the threatening team climate and trying to agree about the team goal and objectives.
Storming is a necessary evil. It sometimes comes unexpectedly
upon a team that thinks it knows itself, or in which the majority
of team members have worked together before. Storming can
reoccur with any subtle change of the team; the loss of a person,
the addition of a person. Team leaders can help the team get
through storming. It requires good leadership skills and an effective process for the exchange of opinion, ideas, and conflict. If
such behavior is ignored during these early stages, it will come
back to haunt the team. In the confined world of humanitarian
aid, the team you failed to mature during this disaster may well
be the one you will have to deal in the next one. Getting through
this stage also requires some coaching on the part of the team
leader. We have seen in the case of emergency disaster leaders
that the typical profile does not predispose them toward the
kinds of skills this requires. In some teams, another person takes
on this nurturing role more naturally, and a mature leader will
allow this to happen. The most important thing is that the team
achieves a norming phase so that it can perform optimally. The
team will respect the leader more if this occurs. If the team continues to storm, the leader, justly or otherwise, will become the
focal point of their dissatisfaction and blame for the lack of coalescing.
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Norming/Resolution
This stage occurs when understanding has been achieved about
conflicts and misunderstandings. Agreements have been made
about working culture, processes, decision-making, and team
members have accepted or assimilated to the style of the team
leader. Depending on the depth of the dissatisfaction, resolution
may involve serious repair work on the part of the team leader
and/or the team members, and may require the help of an outside facilitator. During this stage tensions will subside and defenses will be lowered. Team balance and complementarity will
occur as one team member’s strength will compensate for another’s weakness. During this stage, it is essential to maintain some
friction, but it needs to be ‘‘creative abrasion.’’11 Creative abrasion is the intentional conflict of differing ideas that is essential
to creative problem solving and for avoiding groupthink.
Performing/Production
This phase can occur when more emotional energy is being expended on the work than on surviving the team climate. The
team has common objectives; members understand and agree on
work culture; appropriate and effective communication networks
are established; decision-making methods are agreed upon and
respected. In short, everyone is performing and the team is results-focused. Performing can also be a period of great personal
growth for the individuals of the team. There can be playful teasing, increased self-confidence, openness, and the honesty of constructive feedback. In the strongest teams, humor permits an
almost painful honesty that allows the team to move quickly
through dissension toward the successful achievement of its
goals.
The disaster operation in its entirety can be described using
Tuckman’s stages:
• Initiation and mobilization: the phase during the ‘‘crisis or
event’’ is forming and storming
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• Integration: the early post ‘‘event’’ is the norming stage
• Production: the post-event phase is the performing stage

And just as in the case of the team, if the operation fails in
the first two phases, it cannot hope to be maximally effective in
production.
The result of the team failing to progress through the forming,
storming, and norming stages is that the team members expend
much of their emotional energy on surviving the internal climate
instead of on the work to be done. When individuals are in a
stressed state, they have reduced emotional strength for colleagues or beneficiaries. Team members become depressed and
disillusioned. In the emergency relief situation, stress leads to
more conflict, errors of judgment, lack of communication, collaboration, and the break down between individuals. It also results in the breakdown of individuals. Team members seek
emotional support outside of the team. They resort to drink,
sometimes to drugs, and to questionable and unsuitable sexual
partners. This scenario is dangerous, not only for the individual,
but also for the rest of the team. Such behavior brings disrepute
to the organization and can cause serious security issues for all
concerned.

Establishing Standard Operating Behaviors
Typically the problem of a team failing to establish good teamwork is not a lack of ‘‘know-what.’’ The problem, or more accurately the solution, to establishing an environment of effective
teamwork is ‘‘know-how,’’ that is, the ‘‘acting of the knowledge.’’
Humanitarian relief workers are intelligent, knowledgeable individuals. Most of them had already experienced, at minimum,
basic training in teamwork, and they are aware of the fundamental theory. Most of them are equally cynical, and do not simply
accept a prescriptive list that purports to set out the operating
behaviors for the mission. Another the contributing factor to dysfunctional teams is the assumption that because people know
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something, they will implement it. Simply providing a list to people will not ensure that their behavior will match it. The teams
themselves should decide on their common standard behaviors.
In this way, their lists reflect their experiences, and respect their
understanding and beliefs about effective team performance.
Generating such a list is actually quite a simple process. The
team is asked to describe what, in their experience, are the key
factors that have contributed to good teamwork. Notice that this
is a behavioral question based on experience and not a cognitive
question based on belief or intellectual opinion.
For an international emergency team, this preparation can be
done on a plane or in a waiting lounge. With larger groups, it
naturally will require more facilitation and space. When your
group is multicultural, the normal behaviors of the culture must
be considered. Some team members from less open and individualistic cultures may need a little more support to contribute, but
most individuals, whether they are from Bosnia or Tanzania, welcome the opportunity to shape the environment in which they
must work when they are given the opportunity of doing so. The
value of establishing operating behaviors is that much of the destructful conduct associated with storming can be reduced, or at
least given legitimate process. The team has a chance to overcome
hostility, overzealousness, intimidation, polarization, blaming, formation of ‘‘cliques,’’ resistance, and unwillingness to compromise.
The following few techniques can help the team leader:
1. Encourage team members to relate to a specific and concrete past experience. This should be a pragmatic exercise, not a
competition in theoretical knowledge. You know when people
are speaking from experience; they use the past tense to describe
events. When people are theorizing, they use conditional tenses,
such as ‘‘should do,’’ and the present, ‘‘good team work is. . . .’’
The list typically includes12 good communication; respect for culture, differences, gender, linguistic level, time, experience, qualification; total contribution of everyone in the team; active
listening; openness and frankness; common courtesy; common
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goals and objectives; clear roles and responsibilities; leadership;
good process; good decision-making.
2. Have individuals work independently for the first few minutes, asking them to write down their contribution. The whole
point of this exercise is that people operate differently. And without process to manage input, the differences will begin to
emerge and influence the dynamics of a group immediately.
Preference and confidence in speaking out is a major distinction
between Western expatriates and local team members. The more
extroverted members of the team will immediately speak up and
share their thoughts. Uncontrolled extroverts will take up a disproportionate amount of team talk and may well overly influence
decisions. Permitting the time and space for individual reflection
ensures that everyone has the chance to contribute.
3. Accept people’s input verbatim. Write up what they say, exactly as they say it, unchallenged and unchanged. It is important
that people feel that their input is being recorded accurately and
is not being interpreted or misinterpreted by someone else.
4. Make sure you get everyone’s input, especially the more introverted members of the team. When this is handled in an honest, genuine, and equitable fashion, it is amazing how much local
experts will contribute.
5. Read and agree on the understanding of all recorded items
This is great opportunity for the team leader and the team to
begin to discover one another’s preferences, as together they explore more precise meanings for the outputs collected, and they
struggle for common interpretation and understanding.
6. Decide which behaviors are the most appropriate and commonly accepted ones for the team.
The benefit of this first step is to make expectations explicit.
Teams are usually pleased that there is a great deal of common
agreement about these key factors. The step of clarifying understanding is crucially important to the forming stage. Team members need to probe and ask one another what each of these terms
mean to them. What is ‘‘respecting differences’’? What does
everyone mean by that? How do we do that? How do we manifest
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it in our day-to-day relationships? Once the team begins to get
clarity and understanding, it can work toward an agreement of
more precise behavior. This may sound like a lengthy ordeal, and
many emergency relief workers may be shuddering at the prospect of ‘‘wasting’’ such time. Obviously, a team would not be undergoing such self-reflection when lives are at risk, when search
and rescue is ongoing, or when bodies are still being recovered.
But as we have seen that teams are engaged together long after
the immediate response is over; disaster relief has a habit of continuing long after the initial emergency. Once the initial crisis is
over, however, teams need to pay attention to their well being
and operation. The process actually takes only a little time. Much
of it can be carried out in the normal working procedure of the
team. This particular exercise can be done in as little as thirty
minutes for groups of five to ten. Larger groups of twenty to
thirty will take about an hour to allow everyone to contribute
and to analyze and to get broad agreement about the common
behaviors. Admittedly, it may take a little longer than issuing direct orders. But the fact is that such team process is an investment that pays off in the reduction of time spent in future
misunderstandings and conflict more associated with storming.
The characteristics or key factors associated with good teamwork can be categorized and presented in a standard three-component model.
What: Common Goals and Objectives
The ‘‘what’’ gives the team its purpose and legitimacy. It describes what the team has to do, what must it achieve:
• The common goal has to be agreed upon and accepted by all. It
should be in line with the organizational mission and agree with
other stakeholders and partners.
• Individual objectives develop out of this common goal. They are
allocated fairly according to specific technical ability, skills, competencies, and capacity of each of the members. They should
also take into consideration, where possible, individual style and
preferences.
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Figure 5.1

Three-Component Model for Describing Effective Teamwork

What
Task
Common goal
and objectives

Teamwork
Who

People
Competencies
and preferences

Processes
Communication
and decision making

How

Who: People
This is concerned with the individual profile of each team member and how they are able to contribute. For optimal performance, teams must:
• Respect individual differences, cultures, preferential work styles
• Be aware of and put to use people’s potential. There are many
general activities that need to be accomplished in a team, above
and beyond the individual technical contributions. It is impor-
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tant for the team to know who are the accomplished negotiators,
report writers, counselors, organizers, budget handlers, etc.
• Be empowered to achieve within their respective roles and as
representatives of the team. Appropriate autonomy must be permitted and encouraged if the team is to operate optimally
• Have a leader skilled in adopting appropriate leadership style
• Last but certainly not least, pay attention to informal relationships. How will it celebrate success, how will it commiserate, how
will it maintain energy and enthusiasm, how will it deal with
stress?

How: Processes
These describe ‘‘how’’ the team will operate and describe how
each member will contribute and participate. They need to include agreed upon procedures for:
Participation. How they will communicate with one another,
with the team leader, with other teams and with external partners? How they will share information, status updates, and changing intelligence? How they will provide feedback to line
managers, to external agencies as well as to one another?
Decision-making. There are different methods of decisionmaking, some are more appropriate than others. A key factor in
the effective working of mature teams of professionals is that they
have input into decision-making. This is referred to as participative decision-making (discussed below). This doesn’t necessarily
mean that everyone gets to make the decision, but that everyone’s opinion is heard before the decision is made.
Contribution and performance. The team should agree upon
the level of quality that they all aspire to meet. It is also valuable
to make explicit and agree on the values and competencies that
describe the way the team will operate. How will it deal with
strong and weak personalities?
Progress. How will achievement be monitored and evaluated?
How will your progress be measured?
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Feedback
It might be assumed that once standard operating behaviors have
been established, team members will be able to moderate their
behavior to match the agreed culture. Behavioral flexibility involves both the motivation and the ability to adapt. Inextricably
linked with success in teamwork is the assumption that individuals are agreeable to change and that change involves learning
new skills. Clear operating behaviors, and an atmosphere that
encourages discussion and sharing of expectations, are necessary
for members to be able to give and take timely, honest, and constructive feedback. To be most effective, feedback should be:
• Ongoing, so that it is a regular and natural part of the working
style
• Specific, so that detailed examples are given of what happened
and the impact it had. It’s not enough to say, ‘‘Good job.’’ You
need to explain why you felt it was a good job, so that the person
knows what to continue doing
• Immediate, so that the person relates the feedback directly to
the behavior or incident
• Both positive and negative, so that feedback isn’t associated with
being reprimanded
• Two-way, so that it is legitimate and accepted that all members
of the team, including the team leader, are open to feedback
• Work related, and directed at the behavior and not at the person. Always think about what the person did or said that you are
responding to, rather than what you think the person is
• Helpful and constructive, so that the intention of your feedback
is to help the person improve the behavior so they perform better, more effectively, more efficiently, or more diplomatically
next time.
• Given privately, in most situations. Allow the person the opportunity to reflect or respond and to save face. People are generally
less likely to accept feedback if they feel threatened, challenged,
or humiliated.

Feedback can be given one to one, and can also be engineered
into the processes to be solicited from the team as a whole. The
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following set of questions has been used by teams to gauge their
satisfaction of the teamwork and of each individual’s contribution. As with generating operating behaviors, it is helpful to have
team members first reflect and respond to these questions independently and discuss them afterwards as team. Some or all of
the questions can be used formally or informally to discuss the
team’s progress and performance.
Individual and Team Assessment
1. In what ways are you happy with the team’s achievement?
Why?
2. In what ways did the results meet your expectation? Why?
3. Did everyone contribute to the task? Who did not? How would
the result have been improved with this contribution?
4. Was everyone’s contribution sought?
5. How would you describe your contribution?
6. In future joint activities, would you want to modify your behavior? In what way?
7. Who led the process?
8. Was this a unanimous decision?
9. Was everyone happy with this decision?
10. In what ways was the leadership successful?
11. Did you have all necessary information? Whose input might
have contributed to the success?
12. During meetings, did any members of the team talk more than
any others?
13. How would you describe this ‘‘talk’’? Be precise; was it informative, helpful, persuasive, assertive, unhelpful?
14. Did this influence the outcome of the team? How could you
engineer more balanced input?
15. If you were an outside consultant, what advice would you give
your team?

Based on this discussion, the team might revisit their operating
behaviors and question their relevance. They might revise the
behaviors to respond to the question: What are the optimum
conditions and team dynamics essential for the success of our
team?
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A word of caution about feedback in emergency situations.
People are often in a highly charged emotional state in the early
phases of an emergency. They may be sleep deprived and
stressed. In such situations, feedback will not be welcome and
will frequently be taken as negative criticism. In the case of volunteers, feedback perceived in this way can reduce the relief workforce. Immediate feedback is difficult to give and more difficult
to take in crisis situations. This is another reason for establishing
standard operating behaviors or agreeing to common language
to describe behaviors. The personal insult can be reduced when
the person’s behavior is being compared to standards already accepted. Another consideration is that feedback given to relief
workers must also be aligned with the culture and values of the
organization.

The Role of the Team Leader
The role of the team leader is to help the team progress through
the stages of ‘‘forming’’ through to ‘‘performing,’’ with the minimum of time spent in ‘‘storming’’ and the most efficient processes to assure the ‘‘norming’’ of the team. He or she achieves
this by helping the team to clarify the key points of the team work
model. Most teams will identify good leadership as a key criterion
for success; however, in mature teams, it is acceptable for a person other than the team leader to take on some of the roles such
as coaching and conflict resolution, if that person has superior
skills in this area, the team accepts their role, and the ‘‘official’’
team leader is comfortable with that situation. This will not be an
easy role for many relief team leaders to accept. Many of them
are much more comfortable dealing with the analytical, practical,
rational, and pragmatic issues of the situation. ‘‘Technical talk is
specially comforting because it gives a feeling of solidity when all
else is sliding into death.’’13
But the team can not be allowed to slide into death. And it is
the role of the team leader to ensure that the team forms strongly
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enough to be able to withstand the stresses that it inevitably will
be called on to deal with. The team leader can help the team
through the forming and storming stages by helping clarify the
various components of teamwork: the ‘‘who,’’ the ‘‘what,’’ and
the ‘‘how.’’ The team leader needs to:
• Get to know the individual members of the team, their strengths
and their preferred style of working, and also to assure that team
members get to know one another. The team leader must understand people’s strengths and limitations. He or she needs to listen to and communicate with people in order to recognize how
far they can be pushed and when they are approaching their
danger zone.
• Be available and responsive to people’s problems and be ready
to counsel. He or she also needs to recognize the gaps and overlaps in work preferences, ensuring team balance and identifying
opportunities for individual growth.
• Help encourage respect and trust among the team.
• Ensure understanding of the team’s purpose and goal, and help
the team to interpret the goals into achievable targets while encouraging them to reach their potential. Oversee the allocation
of work to ensure achievement of the task and set examples for
high quality achievements, both in task and relationships.
• Help the team to establish the processes that will permit them
to communicate effectively, share ideas, make decisions, and
deal with individuals who undermine the effectiveness of the
team.

Leadership Styles
How, when, and with whom they use these skills is another part
of the mosaic of team leadership. Based on experience, most
managers express, and experts agree, that there are different
leadership styles appropriate to different situations and different
people. The most effective leaders exhibit a degree of flexibility
that enables them to adapt their behavior to the changing and
contradictory demands made on them. This ability is not evident
or easily achieved by all managers. Take, for example, the East
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European surgeon who could not be shifted from his position
that the team leader held an authoritarian position that was not
to be questioned. It was his job, he determined, to make the decisions for the team. He claimed that without such clear hierarchical leadership, anarchy would result. Of course he has a point,
from the perspective of his profession (and we might even assume his cultural background). I’m sure most of us would agree
that we would prefer the surgical team not to be debating and
suggesting alternative interventions in the midst of a procedure,
especially on our own person. There are times when undisputed
leadership, and authoritarian control and command, are appropriate and necessary.
But consider the following example of a former military colleague, who recalled that as a commander of a patrol boat on the
rivers of Vietnam, the only time he resorted to command and
control leadership was when his ship was under fire, or in the
vicinity of snipers. In those situations he did not expect it to be
questioned or debated. Another trainer colleague, formerly of
the Marine Corps of Engineers, admitted to numerous situations
in which other members of his platoon were more qualified to
lead than he himself. His role was to delegate leadership to the
right person at the appropriate time.
I have witnessed teams both in training scenarios and in the
field pushed to high levels of success by a driven, controlling
leader. While the teams might initially express pride at their accomplishments, they also express reluctance, even fear, of being
a permanent member of this individual’s team. The new humanitarian worker is an independent, highly qualified, intelligent individual. In some cases, humanitarian workers will defer to a wellknown and respected team leader, accepting a more authoritarian control. However, for the most part, uniquely task-focused
team leaders who strive for immediate results at the expense of
ignoring the emotional climate of the team do so at the risk of
eventual burn out, disillusionment, and even break down of the
team. This situation occurs even in short-term, transitory missions. Three weeks can be purgatory if the team spirit and envi-
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ronment is particularly unhealthy. The team then may go
through a final, terminal stage of ‘‘mourning.’’
An extremely useful model for understanding and developing
flexible leadership behavior is the Hersey and Blanchard Situational Leadership model.14 In determining the best style to fit
in any situation, there are four factors that must be taken into
consideration:
• The leader: his or her preferred style of operating and personal
characteristics
• The team: their preferred working, communication, and relationship styles
• The task: its objectives and constraints and parameters, technologies available
• The environment: the organizational values and beliefs, the organizational structure and culture, the external factors, the host
country culture, political, economical, etc.

A real strength in leading emergency teams is to be able to
match leadership behavior appropriately to the task and the vastly different people involved.
Situational Management or ‘‘Best Fit’’ Approach. Two of the fundamental distinctions used to describe managerial style are preferences for attention to people and relations, and attention to the
task. And we’ve seen above that some people have preferences
for behavior that is more task-oriented and others that are more
people-oriented.
Task behavior is the extent to which leaders are likely to organize and define team members’ roles, and to explain what activities each is to do and when, where, and how the tasks are to be
accomplished. Task behavior is characterized by endeavoring to
establish well-defined patterns of organization, channels of communication, and ways of getting jobs accomplished.
Relationship behavior is the extent to which leaders are likely
to maintain personal relationships between themselves and members of the team by opening up channels of communication, pro-
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viding socio-emotional support, active listening, ‘‘psychological
stroking,’’ and through facilitating behavior.
Leadership in this model involves varying combinations of attention to the task and relationship. Each quadrant in the model
above describes a different leadership style.
High task, low relationship is associated with a ‘‘telling’’ communication and management style. The team leader gives specific instructions and closely supervises performance.
High task, high relationship is associated with a ‘‘selling’’ communication style in which the team leader explains decisions and
provides an opportunity for clarification.
High relationship, low task is associated with a ‘‘participating’’
Figure 5.2
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communication and management style in which the team leader
shares ideas and encourages participation in decision-making.
Low relationship, low task is associated with a ‘‘delegating’’
style in which the team leader turns over responsibility for decisions and implementation to the team member.
The major factor in choosing the appropriate style is the
‘‘readiness level’’ of the team member. Readiness is determined
or defined by the individual’s ability to perform the task in terms
of their capacity and previous experience (skill), and by the individual’s perceived motivation for the task defined by their selfconfidence and willingness to accept responsibility (will).
The distinctions are laid out on the model below, where it is
clear that leadership styles S1, S2, S3, and S4 from Figure 5.2 are
matched to the readiness levels of the team member as identified
as R1, R2, R3, and R4.
Occasionally, team leaders in both relief and development situations only half jokingly assert that level 4 people should be the
only ones sent out to the field. The reality is that no one is consistently at readiness level 4 in all situations. Even an individual who
is generally described as a R4 performer will find him or herself
faced with tasks never before performed and for which they have
reduced confidence about their own abilities. It’s important to
Figure 5.3
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understand that the readiness label is not associated to the individual, but to their ability to perform a given task in a given situation.
The effectiveness of a leadership style is contingent on the situation in which it is used. And the style that a team leader adopts
with a person will change according to the individual and circumstances. The style adopted must also be culturally sensitive. What
works in Scandinavia may look weak and ineffective in Mexico.
If we go back to our Eastern European surgeon, one could
assume that he would be an effective leader of a surgical relief
unit where clear decisions and triage would mean life or death
for victims. Without doubt, he would make valuable contributions in this role. However, he may not experience the same success in a more general leadership role. He would face difficulties
in embracing the empowerment of his team or of sharing leadership. There are many disaster managers who are literally in their
element in an emergency situation, and operate during the initial stages as well as you could expect anyone to operate. They
are certainly the people I would want to have in charge if I were
involved. But keep these people around too long and their style
of management is neither appropriate nor appreciated by the
teams on the ground. Blanchard calls these people ‘‘slot in managers.’’15 Their style of directive management is ideal when people need strong leadership, but once you have competent people
in place, or the emergency situation has subsided, the lack of
flexibility in this type of leader can be abrasive, stifling, and demotivating. Additionally, to ask those managers to adopt a different style would be counterproductive. An organization would do
best to use them in environments and for tasks that fit their style.
This is not necessarily a problem for the leadership of relief
teams as long as:
1. The individual team leaders show mature self-awareness of their
preferred style and the impact it will likely have on the team
dynamics and team leadership
2. The managers concerned have some behaviorable flexibility
and are able to adapt their leadership style to differing circumstances and people, or
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3. Their organizations recognize their specific and limited skills
and deploy them in appropriate situations for a specific amount
of time, as in the Blanchard ‘‘Slot in Manager’’ concept

Figure 5.4 presents some of the external context factors
that humanitarian workers recognize as relevant to identifying
the contingencies and successful adoption of the situational
model.
Communication Skills for Team and Team Leader. Essential to the
ability of team leaders to successfully adopt a ‘‘best fit’’ approach
to leadership is good communication skills. The most important
of these is the ability to listen well, that is, to listen honestly, respectfully, and effectively. This means not thinking of other
Figure 5.4
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things at the same time, or handling other tasks (shuffling papers
or checking your e-mail), or developing a rebuttal, or simply waiting for your turn to speak. The presupposition to good listening
skills is that the listener is wise enough to recognize that there is
value in what others have to say, and has the requisite skills involved in effectively doing so. The most eloquent presentation of
listening I have ever seen is that encompassed in the Chinese
pictograph meaning to listen. Students of communication skills
could save themselves a semester’s study by putting into practice
the Chinese understanding of listening.
However, since knowing isn’t doing, the art of listening, or ‘‘active listening’’ popularized by Carl Rodgers, fortunately can be
deconstructed to a set of skills that can be learned by daily practice. People who want to be effective leaders and competent managers must begin practicing these skills every day. Listening to
others and to one’s self is part of the building blocks of self-discipline.16
• Listen for the content of the message. Make an effort to hear
precisely what is being said.
• Listen for the feelings of the speaker. Try to perceive the speaker’s feelings about what is being said through the way the message is delivered.
Figure 5.5
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• Respond to the feelings of the speaker. Demonstrate to the
speaker that you recognize and understand the feelings being
expressed.
• Note the speaker’s cues, both verbal and non-verbal. Attempt to
identify mixed messages and contradicting messages the speaker
may be expressing.
• Reflect back to the speaker what you think you are hearing. Restate to the speaker in your own words what you think the
speaker said. Allow the speaker to respond to further clarify the
message being sent.

The second most important skill for collaborative and cooperative leadership is that of being able to ask questions. Good leadership is the art of asking questions, not the science of providing
answers. Effective leaders able to facilitate the leadership described here must have an arsenal of questioning techniques as
part of their repertoire of skills. They must know the difference
between different types of questions, and employ them judiciously, appropriately, and effectively.
Different types of questions:
• Closed questions: those that typically elicit a ‘‘Yes’’ or ‘‘No’’ response. For example, ‘‘Did it rain yesterday?’’ or requests a specific piece of information, ‘‘What time did it stop raining?’’
• Open questions: those that open the door to information gathering and opinion. For example, ‘‘What happened?’’ ‘‘How does
it work?’’ ‘‘How should we solve this?’’
• Probing questions: different types of questions that can be used
to probe into a topic deeper. They allow you to focus on learning
more about specifics, such as people (‘‘Who exactly was present
at the meeting?’’), or actions (‘‘What exactly was done then?’’),
or locations (‘‘Where precisely did the second aftershock
occur?’’).
• Leading questions: like all techniques of communication, questioning can be used honestly or manipulatively. Leading questions can help a person to move in a particular direction; that is,
away from a problem toward a solution (‘‘Wouldn’t it be good if
we could start thinking about how to solve this now?’’). But this
can lead to presumption (‘‘Isn’t it when you’re in a stressful
situation that you miss details?’’).
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The value of skillful questioning cannot be overestimated for
the effective leader in adopting an inclusive and cooperative
model of leadership. Without doubt, it’s a complex balance of
many variables. It requires a lot of discretion on the part of the
team leader to be sufficiently flexible to meet the needs of the
team and each of its members. The rewards, however, are huge
when the team leader and the team get it right. And the potential
for motivating teams beyond what they themselves thought possible is an exhilarating challenge.
Motivation of Individuals. Like all the topics discussed in this chapter, motivation is an extremely complex field in which years of
research and volumes of texts17 have been written. What is presented below is a kernel of certain considered fundamentals and
the paradoxes that they present the team leader.
Theories of motivation suggest that most of us are continually
seeking to increase our self-esteem and to enhance the concept
we have of ourselves. We do this by searching for psychological
success, which we experience if:
•
•
•
•

We set a challenging goal for ourselves.
We determine our own methods of achieving that goal.
The goal is relevant to our self-concept.
We achieve the goal.

For the leader of a team, it is enough to remember these key
points about the motivation of individuals:
People like targets. Without something to aim for, work is just
a job. The targets that people aim for should be ones that they
themselves have accepted and, therefore, own as theirs. Wherever possible, the targets should be the sort that people can see
for themselves, so they are not dependent on the views of others.
Targets should be relatively short-term, less than six months, or
else they are too far off to be real.
People like to feel good. When people feel good about themselves, they work better. People feel good when they succeed; that
is, they meet their targets and are praised by people they respect.
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It is easier to raise someone’s standards by raising their targets
and praising achievement than by criticizing them for their
faults.
People are different. Different people want different things
out of their lives and their work. Try to discover what people
intrinsically believe is their relationship with the organization
(their psychological contract) if you can; it may not be what you
think it is.
As a team leader this leaves you with a set of paradoxes:
The motivation of the team cannot be ignored. It must be a
high priority for both the team leader and the team members
themselves. In disaster relief situations particularly, all team
members must do what they can to encourage a positive climate
in the team and to reduce the negative stress to a minimum.
They must all, specifically the team leader, be aware of any
changes in behavior among team members that might be indicative of stress,18 and be prepared to deal with that either themselves or by seeking professional assistance.
Decision-Making. Two major factors that contribute to poor decision-making in crisis conditions are ‘‘groupthink’’ and the personality type of the decision-maker in response to the stress.
Groupthink19 is defined as being characterized by high cohesiveness and concurrence seeking and a striving for unanimity that
overrides motivations to realistically appraise alternative courses
of action. These in-group pressures lead to a deterioration of
mental efficiency, reality testing, and normal judgment.
Contributing factors to groupthink include:
1. Internal or organizational
—insulation of the group
—lack of tradition of impartial management
—lack of norms for procedures
—homogeneity of members
2. External or situational
—high stress from outside threats
—low hope of solutions better than the leader’s
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Table 5.2


Don't tell people what to aim for; it's



Do emphasize that they must work out

better if they work out their goals for

some precise goals against which they can

themselves.

measure success or progress.



Don't shout at people who make



Do insist that they learn from their

mistakes; paradoxically, it will make them

mistakes and they set new goals for next

try less hard.

time; forgive the sinner but condemn the sin.



Don't assume that everyone is like you;

they may be there for quite other reasons.



Do encourage people to be explicit

about their psychological contract, what
they expect to give and get from their work.



Don't give only negative feedback; it



Do find every excuse to praise work

either will diminish people's self-concept or

well done; stroking is good for the ego, and

their view of you.

a good ego makes a good contract.



Don't trade promises for good work; it



Do make sure that people know when

creates only dependent pigeons, and you

their work is good; create obvious signs of

will get locked into never-ending promises.

success/progress that people can read for
themselves.
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—fear to differ with the leader
—low self-esteem temporarily induced by recent failures, excessive difficulties in current decision-making, moral dilemmas,
alternatives that violate ethical standards.

Factors affecting or characterizing impaired decision-making
in crisis include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Short termism and lack of vision
Over-desire for immediate action
Procrastination as a result of search for more information
Rigid cognitive preferences and reluctance for new information
Low tolerance for ambiguity and uncertainty
Low tolerance for complexity and deliberate reduction of the
range of options
Bias toward favorable factors, and rejection of opposing factors
Over-reliance on past actions and decisions
A tendency to seek familiar patterns, mental models, and scripts
Diminished creativity
Reduction of opposing views to personal opinions
Lack of self-awareness and psychological motivations

It is clear that many of the factors above are symptomatic of
the authoritarian and controlling leadership style.
The second factor that contributes to poor decision-making
in crisis conditions is the personality style of the team leader or
decision-maker.20 Three leader personality types based on cognitive affective and interpersonal differences are frequently found
in the ranks of leaders: the ‘‘compulsive personality,’’ the ‘‘narcissistic personality,’’ and the ‘‘paranoid personality.’’ Paranoid
personalities are found much less frequently, but extreme reactions of paranoid individuals under stress can have catastrophic
consequences. It is not suggested that the humanitarian sector is
littered with individuals who might be professionally identified as
having serious personality disorders. Indeed, in many situations
it is difficult to identify specific personality styles because healthy
individuals have a capacity to call upon a broad array of psychological coping mechanisms or ego defenses rather than be limited to such a narrow defense as in the case of personality
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disorder. It’s relatively easy to see in the descriptions below, personality styles that we have all seen and may even recognize in
ourselves. Each type has a characteristic cognitive style that
influences the quality of decision-making in crisis when exaggerated coping mechanisms are sometimes mobilized. Unfortunately for many in the humanitarian world, crisis becomes a way
of life for even the most mundane of actions and activities. That
level of crisis begins to justify the unacceptable leadership behavior described below.
The Compulsive Personality. Common in successful leaders. The
core features of this type are organizational ability, attention to
detail, and emphasis on rational process. They show a dominance of thinking over feeling and a need to keep strong
feelings—such as anxiety and anger—under control. Crises, however, do not easily lend themselves to such orderly thought processes, and the compulsive leaders’ logical preoccupation with
detail may lead to their inability to see the ‘‘big picture’’ and
nudge them toward indecisiveness. Under pressure to decide
with incomplete information, and an inordinate fear of making
a mistake, the compulsive decision-maker can become paralyzed
and racked with doubt. Team members become providers of information but are excluded from the decision-making process.
This paralysis can be avoided if there is a standard operating procedure for which the situation might fit, but will result in serious
consequences when a unique situation is forced into a type it
does not fit.
The Narcissistic Personality. Post claims that the upper levels of
government and industry would be depleted if they were stripped
of individuals with narcissistic personality features. While fullblown narcissistic characteristics could not sustain effective leadership positions, individuals with significant personality traits
can, under pressure, resemble full-blown personality disorder.
Narcissistic individuals are characterized by extreme self-centeredness, egocentricity, and self-absorption. They have a need
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for constant reassurance, self worth, and admiration. They are
insensitive to the needs of others and have a tendency to exploit.
They expect others to do what they want while regularly ignoring
their rights and needs. Primary loyalty is for themselves, and they
surround themselves with people who are uncritical and who
protect them from discontent and criticism. In this way, the
leader can be totally out of touch with reality. The narcissist will
say things for effect, which will not necessarily reflect core beliefs.
As a result, he may change judgments rapidly and reverse positions without qualm of conscience. Narcissists tend to overestimate the probability of success and this over-optimism can
contribute to groupthink. They also attempt to use situations to
enhance or protect their own reputation.
The Paranoid Personality. The essential feature of paranoid personality is pervasive and long-standing suspiciousness and mistrust of people. The paranoid is always expecting plots and
enemies. This derives in part for the exaggerated need for autonomy. Paranoids are hypersensitive and easily slighted; they continually search for clues to confirm their suspicions and reject
evidence to the contrary. The paranoid has predetermined conclusions. They are unwilling to compromise and fail to see the
total context of a situation. They become hostile, defensive, and
stubborn and any attempt to reassure them will likely result in
anger. People tread lightly and carefully around the paranoid,
walking on the proverbial eggshells. The psychologically healthy
paranoid is able to abandon suspicions when confronted with
new facts.
It is important to note that stress does not necessarily adversely
affect performance, and that it is rare to come across people suffering from full-blown psychological personality disorder. But research shows that high stress can push individuals with these
tendencies toward behavior that is difficult to distinguish at times
from the full-blown case. This seems to be true particularly the
case in people who are experiencing a situation for the first
time.21
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Both individuals and teams need to predetermine how they
will cope with stress and how they will handle decision-making.
Some people think they are coping well when they are actually
just getting used to stress. Managing existing stress is not the
same as dealing with the causes. Some humanitarian workers
choose denial, others become workaholics; but this is frequently
a preoccupation with the activity of work rather than the results.
And then there are the typical and well-known, well-used shortterm solutions like caffeine, cigarettes, alcohol, tranquilizers, and
the wide range of prescription and nonprescription drugs.
Methods of Decision-Making.22 Although current fashion occasionally underscores one or another of these approaches, there is no
right or wrong way to decide an issue. The important thing is
that the team decides in advance what decision-making method
will be used. There should be no surprises. If members are apprised of the process, decision making can be a success. Even
autocratic methods require the consent and blessing of all. Table
5.3 is a brief description of decision-making methods and the
advantages and disadvantages of their use.

Conclusion
I hope the point has been made that there are serious consequences to poor teamwork and interpersonal relations in humanitarian relief work. Dysfunctional teams and below-optimum
team relations put people, resources, and the success of the operation at risk. In terms of cost-effectiveness, organizations have to
question the true impact of sub-optimal teamwork, both on the
individual humanitarian worker and the overall success of an operation or program. The debate about appropriate team leadership style has to be reviewed in the light of the changing face of
the humanitarian worker, the increasingly complex environment
in which relief operations are staged, the expectations of the
changing profile of the beneficiary, and the more equitable rela-
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Table 5.3
CONSENSUS
Everyone airs their opinions. Discussion continues till you get an outcome. Compromise
must be used so that everyone agrees with and commits to the outcome.
Advantages

Disadvantages

y Innovative, creative, high-quality

y Takes a lot of time and psychological

decision;

energy;

y Elicits commitment to implement;

y Time pressure must be minimal;

y Uses resources of all members;

y Can’t respond to emergencies.

y Enhances future decision-making;
y Useful for serious, important complex
decisions.
MAJORITY
Democracy in action. Team votes, majority wins.
Advantages

Disadvantages

y Simple;

y Often leaves alienated minority;

y Used when time is limited;

y Time bomb for future team effectiveness;

y When decision is not so important, or

y Important minority talents can be

when 100% commitment is not essential;
y Closes discussion on issues not too
important for the team.

ignored;
y Commitment to decision is only partial;
y Benefits of full team interaction may be
lost.

MINORITY
Usually takes the form of a subcommittee that makes recommendations for action.
Advantages

Disadvantages

y Used when everyone cannot get together;

y Does not use all team talents;
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Table 5.3 (continued)
y When time is an issue;

y Does not build broad commitment;

y When only a few members have

y Unresolved conflict and controversy

expertise or experience;
y When not every member needs to have

may damage future team effectiveness;
y Not much benefit from team interaction.

100% commitment.

AVERAGING
The epitome of compromise—haggle, bargain, cajole, and negotiate an intentional middle
position. Letting members with the greatest expertise make the decision is almost always
better than a group average.
Advantages

Disadvantages

y Extreme positions cancel each other out; y Usually no one is happy with the result
y Better than “authority rule without

except the moderates.

discussion.”

EXPERT
Find or hire experts; listen to what they say and follow their recommendations.
Advantages

Disadvantages

y Useful when one person is obviously

y Determining the “expert”;

more superior than other members of

y Over-reliance on an individual;

the team;

y Resentment or disagreement may result in

y Useful when others accept expert and no
need to bring others on board.

sabotage and deterioration of team
effectiveness;
y Knowledge and skills of other team
members are not used.
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Table 5.3 (continued)
AUTHORITY RULE WITHOUT DISCUSSION
No room for discussion; predetermined decisions are handed down from higher authority.
Advantages

Disadvantages

y Applies more to administrative needs;

y One person cannot be the authority for

y Useful for simple, routine decisions;
y When team members lack the skills or
information;

everything;
y Advantages of team interaction are lost;
y Zero team commitment on meaningful

y When the team members expect the
team leader to make decisions (in some

issues;
y May result in sabotage, resistance, and

cultures).

deterioration of team effectiveness;
y Resources of rest of team are unused.

AUTHORITY RULE WITH DISCUSSION
Known as Participative Decision-Making. Contrary to some understanding, does not
involve abdication of responsibility.
Advantages

Disadvantages

y Gains commitment from all team

y Requires good communication skills on

members;
y Develops lively discussion on issues
employing skills and knowledge of all
team members;
y Is clear on who is ultimately
accountable for the decision of the team.

the part of all team members;
y Requires a leader willing to make
decisions.
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tionships expected of the humanitarian organizations by the host
communities and governments.
When a team gets this challenge right they can survive almost
any situation, regardless of the conditions or even the sensitive
security in which they operate. The results of research in disasters
are that many things take time to go wrong. Team leaders have
the opportunity to make sure that the team does not go wrong
and that it is sufficiently healthy and ready to cope with the onslaught of challenges it must face. The challenges should be external to the team, and they can meet them in cooperation and
with collaboration.
Mature leaders must recognize that they do not have the expertise in all circumstances, and that the best they can do for the
outcome and for the team itself is to have confidence in the team
members and their ability to share the leadership of the team.
Gone are the days of the omnipotent manager—if ever there was
such a beast. Humanitarian organizations in development and
capacity building struggle with implementing change in organizations that are petrified by hierarchical and authoritative structures where young, able members of the societies are prevented
from rising because of the fear of competition from senior leaders. Yet how often do international relief groups emulate those
same conditions as models? If we are espousing empowerment,
sharing leadership, collaboration, and inclusivity, we must model
these behaviors in our own leadership. We must also find ways of
breaking the glass ceiling for local staff in contributing to humanitarian work, where too often the fact of being the expat delegate brings with it assumptions of hierarchy and power.
Robert Maddux23 identifies ‘‘Ten Unforgivable Mistakes’’ for
the organization and the team leader in creating the team:
1. Failure to develop and maintain basic management and leadership skills
2. Permitting poor employee selection and techniques
3. Failure to discuss expectations or establish goals that have
been mutually set
4. Inattention to the training and development needs of team
leaders
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5. Failure to advocate, support, and nurture team-building activities
6. Preventing the involvement of team members in any activity
where they could make a contribution
7. Failure to provide and receive feedback from the team
8. Allowing conflict and competition to get out of control, or
trying to eliminate it altogether
9. Depending on someone else to recognize and reward the
team and its members
10. Failure to send players who have not responded to coaching
back to the B team

For effective and successful teamwork in relief operations, humanitarian organizations and individuals must ensure that they
make none of these mistakes.

Part 3
Among the most important basics in humanitarian missions are the
rules of law, of engagement, and of the rights of the victims. International humanitarian law has been codified to protect people in
conflict as well as in peace. Refugees, the internally displaced, and
especially the most vulnerable, women and children, have fundamental rights that are not negotiable by the powerful over the
weak.
The rules of law, international conventions, and codes of conduct
are considered by the highly respected legal scholar, Michel Veuthey. As help arrives in a conflict situation, various players compete,
sometimes with the best of intentions, in organizing and delivering
aid. H. Roy Williams, the President of the Center for Humanitarian
Cooperation and former head of the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster
Relief, considers how the multiple nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) that respond to a humanitarian crisis relate to host governments, donors, international organizations, local NGOs, military,
and press, as well as to the afflicted population.

6

Humanitarian Ethical and
Legal Standards
Michel Veuthey
In a globalized and, nevertheless, chaotic world, there is a renewed need for ethical and legal standards,1 especially regarding
the fundamental guarantees of human dignity in today’s armed
conflicts.
International instruments of human rights and of international humanitarian law are not the only sources providing these
fundamental guarantees.2 International law is only one of the
many sources of humanitarian standards. Legal mechanisms
alone are insufficient to provide for an effective protection of
fundamental human values.
There are many different approaches (such as spiritual, political, legal, and organizational) to the promotion of respect for
fundamental human values in today’s conflicts. Historical considerations, including spiritual and ethnic research,3 could also be
among the remedies for today’s impasses.
We shall deal with the topic of ‘‘Humanitarian Ethical and
Legal Standards’’ along the following lines:
1. Origins and Development
—Spiritual Origin of Humanitarian Standards
—Proliferation and Universality of Standards
—Multiplication of Legal Mechanisms
2. Today’s Impasse
—Denial of Respect (Human Dignity)
—Denial of Justice
—Denial of Forgiveness and Reconciliation
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3. Toward a Renaissance of Fundamental Humanitarian Values
—Research Roots
—Re-anchor in All Civilizations
—Reaffirm Universality of Fundamental Values
—Reinforce Existing Mechanisms
—Reinvent Remedies
—Re-activate the Network of Humanity
—Rebuild Public Conscience

Origins and Development
Spiritual Origin of Humanitarian Standards
Limiting Violence in War in Order to Ensure the Survival of the Group.
Each civilization has formed islands of humanity inside which
certain rules limited violence by imposing restraints on the use
of force and an obligation of solidarity toward victims.
These religion-based rules were of two types:
1. A taboo by which it was forbidden to attack women and
children, to destroy temples or sacred places, to kill priests or
people in religious orders, as well as women, children, and elderly people belonging to the group. In the West, the Peace of
God (Pax Dei)4 and the Truce of God (Treuga Dei)5 were such
rules. The Pax Dei was a conciliar movement that began in southern France in the late tenth century and spread to most of Western Europe over the following century, surviving in some form
until at least the thirteenth century. It combined lay and ecclesiastical legislation regulating warfare and establishing a social
peace in the Middle Ages. By the 1040s, the Truce of God became the center of legislative action and aimed at restricting controlling feuds and private warfare by declaring Thursday through
Sunday days of peace. The Truce led to the emergence of public
institutions for the control of violence. The Catholic Church
tried to mitigate in some way the horrors of warfare in the Second Lateran Council (1139), forbidding the use of crossbow as
‘‘deadly and odious to God.’’ The Third Lateran Church Council
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Figure 6.1

HUMANITARIAN LAW

Survival of humankind

(1179) prohibited the enslavement of Christian prisoners of war.
Others similar rules can be found in every religion. Some of
these rules were more generous in so-called primitive civilizations
than in today’s international law.
2. The Golden Rule, which is found in several civilizations, not
only in Judeo-Christian ones, and which can be resumed thus: So,
whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so to them.6
These rules were set to ensure the survival of a group, and
forbade behaviors that would have permanently endangered the
group7. Indigenous people of all continents have aimed to avoid
excesses that would turn conflicts into collective suicides. Customs
of Melanesians,8 Inuit,9 and Nilotic peoples;10 Buddhism,11 Hinduism,12 Taoism,13 Confucianism,14 and Bushido15 in Asia; Juda-
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ism,16 Christianity,17 and Islam18 in the Middle East; customary
humanitarian law in Africa;19 and mutual restrictions imposed by
chivalry and military honor20 in Europe contain examples of
rules of ‘‘Life-Affirmative Societies,’’ in which the main emphasis
of ideals, customs, and institutions is the preservation and growth
of life in all its forms.21
All these rules were aimed at precluding excesses that would
turn clashes into anarchy and hence make peace more difficult
to achieve. Thus, in article 6 of his Perpetual Peace, Kant wrote:
‘‘No State shall, during war, permit such acts of hostility which
would make mutual confidence in the subsequent peace impossible.’’22
These barriers to violence and the notion of responsibility for
others were valid, for the most part, only inside the group. Only
on rare occasions were bridges allowed to be built between those
islands of humanity, sometimes through individual acts of generosity.
Recognizing the Human Dignity of Every Human Being. Francisco de
Vitoria (1480–1546), a member of the Dominican Order, is often
considered the founder of Western international law. He believed in jus gentium, a universally valid ‘‘law of nations’’ established on the basis of natural law. Living at the time of the
conquest of the Americas, Vitoria developed his teaching partly
in the context of his discussions on the appropriate treatment of
the native peoples of the New World.
Supported by Vitoria, Bartholomew de Las Casas (1474–1566)
devoted himself to the defense of the Indians, against the ruthless exploitation and ferocious cruelty that they suffered under
the Spanish conquerors.23
Building Bridges Among Civilizations. St. Francis of Assisi tried to
open a dialogue between Christians and Muslims in 1219.24 All of
the world’s great religious traditions today emphasize the intrinsic value of each individual human life, and in recent decades,
religious communities have recognized their vital role in express-
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ing moral outrage and taking actions to curb the types of inhumanity that people have, time and again, inflicted upon one
another over the last century. Religious communities are, without
question, the largest and best-organized civil institutions in the
world today, claiming the allegiance of billions of believers and
bridging the divides of race, class, and nationality.25
In the year 2000, the new millennium afforded an opportunity
to bring to the United Nations a Millennium World Peace Summit of Religious and Spiritual Leaders, which sought to coordinate religious and spiritual leadership as a driving force for
building tolerance, fostering peace, and encouraging interreligious dialogue among all regions of the world.26
2001 was proclaimed by the United Nations as ‘‘Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations.’’ After the September 11 attacks, the
United Nations Secretary-General stressed the need to reaffirm
the rule of law, on the international as well as the national levels.
Kofi Annan also denied the inevitability of a ‘‘clash of civilizations,’’ and reasserted ‘‘our common humanity and the values
that we share.’’27 His report to the General Assembly28 and the
book Crossing the Divide, as well as the ‘‘Salzburg reflections’’29
and the ‘‘Declaration of Athens’’ (‘‘The heritage of ancient civilizations: Implications for the modern world’’)30 should be only
the beginning of a much-needed dialogue based on equality and
mutual respect.
Proliferation and Universality of Standards
International Humanitarian Law (IHL). International humanitarian law is usually defined as the set of principles and rules restricting the use of violence in armed conflicts, both to spare the
persons not (or no longer) directly engaged in hostilities
(wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of the armed forces,
prisoners of war, and civilians), and to limit the use of methods
and means of warfare that causes superfluous injury (or excessive
suffering, as in the case of dumdum bullets or with gas warfare31),
or severe damage to the natural environment, or betrayal of an
adversary’s confidence in agreed-upon obligations (‘‘perfidy’’).
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The principle of the limitation of armed violence is reflected,
in contemporary written law, in the Saint Petersburg Declaration
of 1868,32 as well as in Article 22 of the Hague Regulations of
1907,33 which stipulates that: ‘‘The right of belligerents to adopt
means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.’’ This text is taken
up again, slightly reworded, in paragraph 1 of Article 35 (‘‘Basic
rules’’) of Protocol 1 of 1977: ‘‘In any armed conflict, the right
of the Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.’’
The terminology used to refer to international treaties may
vary (‘‘humanitarian law,’’34 ‘‘international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts,’’35 ‘‘laws of war,’’36 ‘‘law of Geneva,’’37
‘‘Red Cross Conventions,’’ ‘‘law of The Hague,’’38 ‘‘human rights
in armed conflicts’’39), but all seek the same objective—namely,
to limit the use of violence in war.
Contemporary international humanitarian law is the moving
balance between two dynamic forces: the requirements of humanity
and military necessity.40 It is also the sum of tragic real-life experiences that need not be repeated: military wounded and shipwrecked—and the humanitarian personnel taking care of
them—must be rescued and respected; prisoners of war must be
humanely treated and released at the end of active hostilities;
and civilians not be killed nor harmed.
Each stage of the codification of international humanitarian
law was the result of a post-war shock wave in public opinion and
governments, a collective painful process of learning. These codifications occurred as follows:
• The battle of Solferino (1859)41 between Austrian and French
armies was the impetus for the First Convention, in 1864, protecting military wounded on land
• The naval battle of Tsushima (1905) between Japanese and Russian fleets prompted adjustment of the Convention on war at
sea, in 1907, extending protection to military shipwrecked
• World War I brought about the two 1929 Conventions, including
much broader protection for prisoners of war
• World War II led to the four 1949 Conventions,42 an extensive
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regulation of the treatment of civilians in occupied territories
and internment, and decolonization
• The Vietnam War preceded the two 1977 Additional Protocols,43
which brought written rules for the protection of civilian persons and objects against hostilities
• A worldwide campaign by governments, United Nations agencies, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and NGOs in
a full partnership that stressed the human suffering and socioeconomic costs caused by anti-personnel mines and resulted on
the total ban on anti-personnel landmines signed in Ottawa on
December 4, 1997

Universality of International Humanitarian Law. The four 1949 Geneva Conventions are universally ratified. The two Additional
Protocols are widely ratified, but still lack ratification by the U.S.
and some other countries.
The 1907 Hague Regulations, which establish laws for conducting war on land, are considered part of international customary
law since the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg declared on October 1, 1946, addressing both signatories and nonsignatories, that they were declaratory of the laws and customs of
war.44
Humanitarian law has evolved from a law protecting only certain categories of individuals (from medieval knights to today’s
prisoners of war) to a set of provisions ensuring fundamental
human rights guaranteeing the survival of civilian populations in
wartime.
The International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia45 and for Rwanda46 broke down the distinction between international and non-international armed conflicts regarding the
prosecution of war crimes.47
Humanitarian rules and principles are to be respected in all
circumstances. This is especially important today, in the case of
‘‘collapsed states,’’48 ‘‘postmodern wars,’’49 and anarchic conflicts.50 According to the ICRC’s Commentary to the 1949 Conventions: ‘‘The words ‘in all circumstances’ in Common Article 1
of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions refer to all situations in
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which the Convention has to be applied, and these are defined
in Article 2. It is clear, therefore, that the application of the Convention does not depend on whether the conflict is just or unjust.
Whether or not it is a war of aggression, prisoners of war belonging to either party are entitled to the protection afforded by the
Convention.’’51
The First Geneva Convention of 1864 had only twelve articles.
The four 1949 Geneva Conventions and their two Additional Protocols of 1977 count more than four hundred and fifty provisions. One article summarizes international humanitarian law:
Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. (See the
Appendixes for the full text of Common Article 3.)
The International Court of Justice (ICJ), in the Nicaragua case,
considered Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
as ‘‘elementary considerations of humanity’’ binding all:
The Court considers that the rules stated in Article 3, which is
common to the four Geneva Conventions, applying to armed conflicts of a non-international character, should be applied. The
United States is under an obligation to ‘‘respect’’ the Conventions
and even to ‘‘ensure respect’’ for them, and thus not to encourage
persons or groups engaged in the conflict in Nicaragua to act in
violation of the provisions of Article 3. This obligation derives from
the general principles of humanitarian law to which the Conventions merely give specific expression.52

Human Rights. The Preamble of the United Nations Charter
states the determination of Member States ‘‘to reaffirm faith in
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the
human person, in the equal rights of men and women, and of
nations large and small.’’ Article 1, paragraph 3 defines one of
the purposes of the UN as: ‘‘To achieve international co-operation in solving internal problems of an economic, social, cultural,
or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.’’ World
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Table 6.1 The Law of Geneva
1. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (First Convention of
August 12, 1949)
2. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Second Convention of August 12, 1949)
3. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
(Third Convention of August 12, 1949)
4. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War (Fourth Convention of August 12, 1949)
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(First Protocol)
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Second Protocol)

War II and regional conflicts prompted the drafting of the
United Nations instruments on human rights, disarmament, prohibition of terrorism and mercenaries, protection of the environment,53 and of the rights of children.54
While instruments of international humanitarian law are normally applicable during armed conflicts, human rights treaties
are based on a peacetime approach, yet their scope often overlaps, especially in regard to the fundamental guarantees they embody.
The universality of humanitarian standards can also be seen
with human rights instruments:55
• The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (See the Appendixes for the full text of the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.)
• The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide
• Both 1966 Covenants (International Covenant on Civil and Po-
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litical Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights)
• The 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
• The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child.

The universality56 and indivisibility57 of human rights was reaffirmed by the UN International Conference in Tehran in 196858
and by the World Conference of Human Rights in Vienna in
1993.59
The Advisory Opinion of the ICJ on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, of May 28, 1951, confirmed that the prohibition of
genocide is part of customary international law.60
The following regional instruments complement the UN instruments:
• The 1950 Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Council of Europe, signed in Rome;
• The 1969 Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, San
Jose de Costa Rica;
• The 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights;
• The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
signed and proclaimed by the Presidents of the European Parliament, the Council, and the Commission at the European Council meeting in Nice on December 7, 2000.61

Two regional instruments prohibit torture:
• The 1985 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish
Torture;
• The 1987 European Convention for the Prevention of Torture
and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

In addition to the first two ‘‘human rights generations’’ (civil
and political/economic and social), new human rights—a third
generation of ‘‘Solidarity Human Rights’’62 are under consideration at the United Nations and at regional fora, among which
are:
• the right to development,
• the right to a healthy environment,63
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• the human right to peace,
• the human right to health, and
• the right to food.

The ‘‘Declaration on the Right to Development’’ was adopted
by the United Nations General Assembly in 1986.64 The item has
been regularly debated at the General Assembly since then.65
The ‘‘Human Right to Peace’’ was hailed by Federico Mayor,
Director-General of UNESCO, as ‘‘a prerequisite for the exercise
of all human rights and duties.’’66
The ‘‘Human Right to Health’’ is proclaimed in the World
Health Organization’s Constitution, as well as in Article 25 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and in the 1988 Protocol of San Salvador.67 The Secretary-General of the United Nations submitted a report to the fifty-eighth session of the
Commission on Human Rights on ‘‘Access to medication in the
context of pandemics such as HIV/AIDS.’’68
As for the Right to Food, the Preamble to the FAO Constitution sets ‘‘ensuring humanity’s freedom from hunger’’ as one of
its basic purposes. The World Food Summit in November 1996
reaffirmed the right of everyone to have access to safe and nutritious food, consistent with the right to adequate food and the
fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger, and gave
a specific mandate to the High Commissioner for Human Rights
to better define the rights related to food and propose ways to
implement and realize them.69 The General Assembly70 and the
Commission on Human Rights regularly examine this item. In
September 2000, the Commission on Human Rights appointed a
Special Rapporteur on the right to food.71
‘‘Soft Law’’ Standards. Treaty law is not the only source of humanitarian standards. ‘‘Soft law’’ is also a source of humanitarian standards. One example is the adoption, by the International
Conference of the Red Cross in Vienna in 1965, of the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross/Crescent—humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity,
universality.
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Table 6.2 UN Instruments
Charter of the United Nations, adopted June 26, 1945
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
adopted December 9, 1948
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, signed July 28, 1951
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature January
31, 1967
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted December
16, 1966
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, adopted
December 16, 1966
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, adopted December 10, 1984
Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted November 20, 1989
Regional Instruments
1. Africa
Charter of the Organization of African Unity, adopted May 25, 1963
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of the Refugee Problems in
Africa, adopted September 10, 1969
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted June 27, 1981
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, adopted July
1990
2. Americas
Charter of the Organization of American States, signed 1948
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, signed May 2,
1948
American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San Jose), signed November 22, 1969
Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, signed December 9, 1985
Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in
the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San
Salvador), adopted November 17, 1988 (not yet in force)
3. Europe
Statute of the Council of Europe, adopted May 5, 1949
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed November 4, 1950
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, signed November 26, 1987
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Table 6.3 Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross/Crescent
HUMANITY
The Red Cross, born of a desire to bring assistance without discrimination
to the wounded on the battlefield, endeavors—in its international and national capacity—to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may
be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect
for the human being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation, and lasting peace among all peoples.
IMPARTIALITY
It makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class, or
political opinions. It endeavors only to relieve suffering, giving priority to
the most urgent cases of distress.
NEUTRALITY
In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Red Cross may not
take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political,
racial, religious, or ideological nature.
INDEPENDENCE
The Red Cross is independent. The National Societies, while auxiliaries in
the humanitarian services of their governments and subject to the laws of
their respective countries, must always maintain their autonomy so that
they may be able at all times to act in accordance with Red Cross principles.
VOLUNTARY SERVICE
The Red Cross is a voluntary relief organization not prompted in any manner by desire for gain.
UNITY
There can be only one Red Cross Society in any one country. It must be
open to all. It must carry on its humanitarian work throughout its territory.
UNIVERSALITY
The Red Cross is a worldwide institution in which all Societies have equal
status and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each other.
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Solidarity and compassion have always been widely expressed
in both words and deeds in the most diverse cultures.72 The Fundamental Principles are the result of a century of experience.
Proclaimed in 1965, they bind together the National Red Cross
and Red Crescent Societies, the International Committee of the
Red Cross, and the International Federation of Red Cross and
Red Crescent Societies.73 They were imitated in many ways. The
principle of neutrality has even become one of the core principles of organizations such as Médecins sans frontières.
The ‘‘MSF Charter’’74 also mentions the principles of impartiality, nondiscrimination, independence, and voluntary service.
It stresses the right to humanitarian assistance.
Beyond institutional rivalries or humanitarian policy-making,
such principles could certainly help humanitarian organizations
in coping with constantly changing challenges.
Neutrality of the ICRC—or of MSF—has a different meaning
from the neutrality of Switzerland or Sweden. It should be understood as the capacity of being available to everyone for service,
the ability to assist and protect victims without discrimination, a
tool not a virtue, enhancing the security of humanitarian workers
and the sustainability of their action, more important in its perception by all actors than in actual practice, closely linked also to
funding and access to victims.
Table 6.4 The MSF Charter
Médecins sans frontières, also known as Doctors Without Borders or MSF,
offers assistance to populations in distress, victims of natural or man-made
disasters, and victims of armed conflict, without discrimination and irrespective of race, religion, creed, or political affiliation.
MSF observes strict neutrality and impartiality in the name of universal
medical ethics and the right to humanitarian assistance, and demands full
and unhindered freedom in the exercise of its functions.
MSF volunteers undertake to observe their professional code of ethics
and to maintain complete independence from all political, economic, and
religious powers.
Volunteers are aware of the risks and dangers of the missions they undertake and have no right to compensation for themselves or their beneficiaries other than that which MSF is able to afford them.
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In order to promote the complementarities of diverse humanitarian organizations, the implementation of the principle of neutrality could be interpreted in various nuances according to the
needs of each individual situation.75
Other ‘‘soft law’’ texts could be mentioned as ethical standards, such as:
• The Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials,76 adopted
by the United Nations General Assembly in 1979;
• The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, developed and
agreed upon by eight of the world’s largest disaster response
agencies in the summer of 1994;77
• The Sphere Project;78
• The Universal Declaration Of Human Responsibilities, proposed by the InterAction Council in 1997;79
• The People in Aid ‘‘Best Practices’’;80
• The Humanitarian Accountability Project;81
• Guidelines adopted by ecumenical aid agencies82 and individual
agencies such as the ‘‘Caritas International’s Guiding Values and
Principles’’83 and World Vision’s Core Values.84

Professional ethics (Military,85 Police,86 Medical,87 Media88) also
strive for universality.
In 1999, the Secretary-General of the United Nations proposed
the ‘‘Global Compact’’ to create a dialogue between business and
civil society along nine fundamental principles, drawn from the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Labor
Organization’s (ILO) Fundamental Principles on Rights at Work,
and the Rio Principles on Environment and Development.89
Multiplication of Legal Mechanisms
The proliferation of standards is matched by the multiplication
of implementation mechanisms for international humanitarian
law or for human rights instruments or for both.
International Humanitarian Law Mechanisms. The mechanisms provided for in the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the protection of
war victims are:
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1. The States Party, which undertake to ‘‘respect and ensure
respect’’ for the Conventions ‘‘in all circumstances.’’90 ‘‘Respect’’
clearly refers to the individual obligation to apply it in good faith
from the moment that it enters into force.91 ‘‘To ensure respect,’’
according to the ICRC Commentary to the 1949 Conventions,
‘‘demands in fact that the States which are Parties to it should
not be content merely to apply its provisions themselves, but
should do everything in their power to ensure that it is respected
universally.’’92 This collective responsibility to implement international humanitarian rules93 often takes the form of bilateral or
multilateral measures by States Party. Leaving aside the exceptional meeting provided for in Article 7 of Protocol 1 of 1977,94
States Party to international humanitarian law treaties have used
bilateral or multilateral meetings at the United Nations, the NonAligned Movement (NAM), regional organizations (OAS, OAU,
OSCE, the European Parliament, the Council of Europe), as well
as the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), to manifest their concern that humanitarian law should be respected.95 ‘‘In all circumstances’’ means in time of armed conflict as well as in time of
peace, taking preventive steps, in the form of training96 or evaluation,97 and prosecution.98
2. The Protecting Power,99 which was widely used in Europe
during WW II100 and much less therafter.101 Additional Protocol
1 defines the Protecting Power in international humanitarian law
as ‘‘a neutral or other State not a Party to the conflict which has
been designated by a Party to the conflict and accepted by the
adverse Party and has agreed to carry out the functions assigned
to a Protecting Power under the Conventions and this Protocol.’’102 The role of the Protecting Power is to maintain the liaison between two States at war, to bring relief assistance to the
victims, and protection to prisoners of war and civilian internees.
3. The ICRC, which received mandates from the international
community in the 1949 Geneva Conventions to:
• Visit and interview prisoners of war103 and civilian internees;104
• Provide relief to the population of occupied territories;105
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• Search for missing persons and to forward family messages to
prisoners of war106 and civilians;107
• Offer its good offices to facilitate the institution of hospital
zones108 and safety zones;109
• Receive applications from protected persons;110
• Offer its services in other situations111 and especially in time of
non-international armed conflicts.112

The First 1977 Additional Protocol adds two mechanisms of
implementation:
• The United Nations, ‘‘in situations of serious violations of the
Conventions or of this Protocol’’ (Article 89 of Protocol 1)
• The optional ‘‘International Fact-Finding Commission’’ (Article
90 of Protocol 1)113

To this day, none of these provisions (Articles 89 and 90 of
Protocol 1) have been invoked.
The implementation mechanisms of international criminal
law114 was significantly developed as the United Nations Security
Council established the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals
for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda,115 and with the sixtieth ratification of 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court116 on April 11, and its entry into force on July 1, 2002.
This is a milestone in the international community’s fight to end
impunity for war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.
The International Criminal Court will be able to punish war
criminals and perpetrators of genocide or crimes against humanity in cases where national criminal justice systems are unable or
unwilling to do so. It is vital for the Court’s effective functioning
that the States Parties rapidly adopt comprehensive implementing legislation in order to be able to cooperate with the Court.117
Human Rights Mechanisms. Increasingly, human rights mechanisms, at the international, regional, and national level, deal with
human rights as well as with international humanitarian law issues.
• The United Nations General Assembly (Third Committee), the
Commission on Human Rights, the Sub-Commission on the Pro-
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Figure 6.2
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motion and Protection of Human Rights, the Human Rights
Committee
• For the Americas: the Organization of American States Commission on Human Rights and the Human Rights Court
• For Africa: the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights, under the aegis of the OAU. The Commission was established in 1987 in Banjul, The Gambia. The Commission comprises eleven officials, each from a different country. They serve
for renewable six-year terms, which governments cannot cut
short. They also elect their own president and vice-president,
and determine their own operational rules. The African Commission’s role is more wide-ranging than that of its European
counterpart, which is confined to handling complaints. Its mis-
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sions also include promotion of human and people’s rights and
interpreting the Charter. The Commission may also develop and
set out principles and rules for use by African lawmakers, and
cooperate with other African or international institutions involved in rights issues. In 1998, the OAU adopted a Protocol on
the Establishment of the African Court on Human and People’s
Rights, which is not yet in force
• In Europe: the European Commission, the European Court, the
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, all under the
aegis of the Council of Europe,118 as well as the relevant organs
of OSCE119 and the European Union120

Informal Mechanisms. In addition to the formal mechanisms of implementation of international humanitarian law and human
rights, there is an increasing role for informal mechanisms at the
international as on the national level:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

good offices,121
media, (local, regional, and international),122
NGOs such as Human Rights Watch123 or Amnesty International,
engaging non-State actors124 to abide by humanitarian rules and
principles,125
civil society,126
ad hoc independent monitors, agreed upon by all parties,127
private diplomacy, including private economy (multinational as
well as local),
spiritual leaders,128 including mediators such as the Sant’Egidio
Community.129

Today’s Impasse
International Humanitarian Law finds itself in a deadlock today,
despite the development of basic rules such as the 1977 Additional
Protocols, whose Twenty-fifth Anniversary is being celebrated in
2002; the development of implementation mechanisms, such as
the ad hoc Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda;
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and the possibility of an International Criminal Court. This deadlock may well lead us to the point where, with the fragmentation
of humanitarian law, new islands of humanity will appear at the
very moment that we think we have attained universality of humanitarian law and human rights.
Denial of Respect (Human Dignity)
In spite of starting with two peace conferences (The Hague, 1899
and 1907) and two attempts of establishing global intergovernmental security systems, the twentieth century was characterized
by prolonged and extraordinarily devastating wars,130 a century
where the terms genocide131 and ethnic cleansing were coined.
The impact of conflict on human lives, economic development
and the environment has been devastating.132 Today’s conflicts
(in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Burundi, Chechnya, Colombia, the
Congo, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, to name just a
few) provide a powerful illustration of the absolute necessity of
protecting and bringing aid to war victims and, at the same time,
the extreme difficulty of conducting humanitarian operations in
a context of anarchy.
Peace, justice and development are linked as the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations reaffirmed for Africa:
‘‘Since 1970, more than thirty wars have been fought in Africa, the
vast majority of them intra-state in origin. In 1996 alone, fourteen
of the fifty-three countries of Africa were afflicted by armed conflicts, accounting for more than half of all war-related deaths
worldwide, and resulting in more than 8 million refugees, returnees, and displaced persons. The consequences of those conflicts
have seriously undermined Africa’s efforts to ensure long-term stability, prosperity, and peace for its peoples.’’133

Unattended poverty leads to conflict. Unpunished crimes call
for revenge. In Rwanda, the great needs are justice and cash, in
that order.134
With so many tragedies happening today, one is struck by a
feeling of predictability, the social equivalent of Greek tragedy,
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the feeling of a time bomb just waiting for the right moment to
be detonated.135
Collapsed states bring entire populations back to the Stone
Age, the only difference being modern weaponry. The new phenomena of the destruction of social fabric; the complete disappearance of any form of authority, except that of the gun; the
denial of basic values; and the increasing chaos and anarchy are
making conflicts more complex, the suffering of civilians ever
more cruel, humanitarian workers and the international community more helpless.136
In the words of the psychotherapist Viktor Frankl, an Auschwitz survivor: ‘‘Since Auschwitz, we know what man is capable of.
And since Hiroshima, we know what is at stake.’’137
Denial of Justice
Should justice for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
crimes of genocide be victors’ justice, token justice, or selective
justice? Despite the establishment by the Security Council of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR), and despite the entry into force in April 2002 of the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), most
States Party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the protection
of war victims make no meaningful use of the universal jurisdiction for crimes of war and grave breaches provided for by the
1949 Geneva Conventions. Important governments have yet to
ratify the Rome Statute and enact national legislation.
For too many years, deserved attention was only exclusively
given to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in
Europe, while genocide was denied in Rwanda and elsewhere.
Will there ever be a prosecution of the génocidaires in Cambodia?
Virtually on the eve of the Milosevic trial in The Hague, the
United Nations announced it could no longer be a party to the
creation of a war crimes tribunal in Cambodia. After spending
nearly five years in negotiation with Cambodian officials over a
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court that would try the surviving senior leaders of the Khmer
Rouge, a genocidal communist regime responsible for the death
of more than 1.5 million of its own people between 1975 and
1979, the UN concluded that officials in Phnom Penh did not
and would not meet the basic standards for a fair trial.
One key matter of dispute involved the Cambodian government’s attempts to preserve amnesty deals it worked out for key
Khmer Rouge leaders.138
The prosecution of criminals of war and against humanity is
still lacking in Cambodia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, as well as in
Guatemala. National courts only too rarely see cases of torts and
liability for violations of humanitarian law and human rights.139
Denial of Forgiveness and Reconciliation
The ethics deficit140 is not only in the denial of the fundamental
dignity of others or in the denial of justice for too many victims
of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. It is also
to be seen in the excessive emphasis on an impossible justice,
and on the denial of forgiveness and reconciliation.
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(TRC)141 was set up by the Government of National Unity to help
deal with what happened under apartheid. The conflict during
this period resulted in violence and human rights abuses from
all sides. No section of society escaped the abuses.142 The TRC
was the result of a compromise settlement between one side asking for a Nuremberg-like trial143 and the other side for a blanket
amnesty. It was an original combination of African tradition
(‘‘ubuntu’’) and Christian sacramental approach (‘‘penance’’).144
The Chairman of the TRC, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, in his
foreword of the Final Report, quotes Judge Marvin Frankel:
A nation divided during a repressive regime does not emerge suddenly united when the time of repression has passed. The human
rights criminals are fellow citizens, living alongside everyone else,
and they may be very powerful and dangerous. If the army and
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police have been the agencies of terror, the soldiers and the cops
aren’t going to turn overnight into paragons of respect for human
rights. Their numbers and their expert management of deadly
weapons remain significant facts of life . . . The soldiers and police
may be biding their time, waiting and conspiring to return to
power. They may be seeking to keep or win sympathizers in the
population at large. If they are treated too harshly—or if the net
of punishment is cast too widely—there may be a backlash that
plays into their hands. But their victims cannot simply forgive and
forget.145

Less elaborate approaches of ‘‘Truth and Reconciliation Commissions’’ have been considered and experimented as tools of
mending societies torn apart by war in Argentina, Bolivia, Bosnia,
Brazil, Chad, Chile, East Timor, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Germany,
Guatemala, Honduras, Northern Ireland, Morocco,146 Paraguay,
Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Sierra Leone,147 Uruguay, Zimbabwe.148 It certainly is a painful process,149 and a healing one,
which should not be exceptional150

Toward a Renaissance of Fundamental
Humanitarian Values
Research Roots
Renaissance literally means rebirth, renewal, return to the
source. We need to research the roots of fundamental values in
all civilizations in order to move beyond the superficial universality of legal instruments, too often perceived as imposed by Western powers, and poorly implemented in too many cases.
As the ICRC survey conducted in 1999 for the fiftieth anniversary of the 1949 Geneva Conventions demonstrated, the local
spiritual values are often the only efficient, convincing factor,
with which motivate the compliance with humanitarian rules in
warfare.151
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Re-anchor in All Civilizations
The whole idea of compassion is based on a keen awareness of the interdependence of all these living beings,
which are all part of one another and all involved in
one another.
Thomas Merton

Without losing the universality attained by the 1949 Geneva Conventions—and in especially Common Article 3—we need to reanchor them in all civilizations in a new awareness of belonging,
empowerment and interdependence, a renewed commitment to
common humanity (humanité commune), and for the respect of
common values (patrimoine commun de l’humanité) and objects indispensable to the survival of humankind such as water, food supplies, public health structures, cultural and spiritual treasures.
Reaffirm Universality of Fundamental Values
We need to underline the common values, to move beyond the
twentieth century celebrations of the fiftieth anniversary of the
UN Charter, of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, of the 1951 Convention on Refugees, etc., to reaffirm the universality of fundamental values.
There are divergences of opinion between American and European allies (on the death penalty, for example). There are differences of emphasis between civil and political rights on one
hand and social and economic rights on the other. There are
also differences of importance of individual and group rights.152
We therefore need to reaffirm a common core of human values, in discovering what makes them universal beyond cultural
differences:
•
•
•
•
•

The right to life
The right to personal security and religious freedom
The right to family life
The right to health care, adequate nutrition, and shelter
The principle of nondiscrimination
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• The prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment153

Reinforce Existing Mechanisms
The international community of States Party to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions should reaffirm their collective responsibility according to Article 1, common to all four Conventions and to Additional Protocol 1. According to this provision, ‘‘The High
Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect
for this Convention in all circumstances.’’ Should measures154 be
limited to diplomacy, adoption of resolutions, or rather the use
of sanctions155 and peace-enforcement operations in order to
stop genocide and arrest war criminals? A number of Security
Council resolutions, including those on anarchic conflicts, call
upon all parties to respect international humanitarian law and
reaffirm that those responsible for breaches thereof should be
held individually accountable.
According to Article 89 of Protocol 1, ‘‘In situations of serious
violations or the Conventions or of this Protocol, the High Contracting Parties undertake to act jointly or individually, in cooperation with the United Nations and in conformity with the United
Nations Charter.’’ This is a quite important provision, allowing
for creativity and flexibility, as needed.
The involvement of the UN in the implementation of IHL took
many forms including denunciations of violations of IHL in resolutions by the Security Council or the General Assembly (regarding ‘‘human rights violations in territories occupied by Israel,’’
but also in Afghanistan, in El Salvador, in Guatemala, in the IraqIran conflict, in the Gulf War, and even the dispatching of a mission to Iraq and Iran in 1985 to investigate conditions under
which prisoners of war were being held, and, since 1992, in the
former Yugoslavia156).
Ending the impunity of perpetrators of atrocities is a major
challenge.157
The most important step taken by the UN in this context is the
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establishment of international criminal tribunals such as ‘‘The
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia.’’ The Security Council established it in May 1993158 for serious violations
committed there since 1991. The Tribunal has competence on
the following offenses: grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions,159 violations of the laws and customs of war,160 genocide,161
and crimes against humanity.162
‘‘The International Tribunal for Rwanda’’ was established by
the Security Council in 1994. This is the first time that an international criminal tribunal has been established with respect to an
essentially non-international conflict.
Those ad hoc Tribunals will need adequate resources and political support.163 Their existence does not do away with the requirement in the 1949 Geneva Conventions for all States Party to
see to the punishment of grave breaches wherever they occur, be
it by government officials or warlords.164
The International Criminal Court needs to be supported. It is
only one part of a system that would end impunity to the perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and torture. Such a system could certainly contribute to deter people
contemplating such crimes, to allow victims to obtain justice, and
to support reconciliation efforts. States Party to the Geneva Conventions have been increasingly aware of their responsibility to
respect international humanitarian law not only as individual
States but also collectively. The awareness of their collective responsibility is a more recent phenomenon, resulting from the
combined pressure of public opinion, the ICRC, and various
human rights NGOs,165 bilaterally or before United Nations bodies. This collective responsibility not only pertains to the enforcement of humanitarian rules, it is contributing to national stability
and international security, preventing disorderly movements of
populations, uprooting of displaced persons and refugees, and
the spreading of uncontrolled violence around the world.166
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Reinvent Remedies
We need to be more creative in applying remedies167 to promote
the respect of fundamental values in all situations.
Some remedies might include:
1. The reaffirmation of fundamental humanitarian rules, customs, and principles in a simple, easy to understand form, and
translation into local languages;
2. Training of arms bearers (military, police, private security
groups) in fundamental restraints of violence and essential humanitarian principles;168
3. Conducting international, regional, and local public opinion
campaigns to promote fundamental humanitarian values169
and counter hate campaigns;
4. Mobilization of public role models (such as artists or athletes)
in close contact with local traditions who can influence leaders
and public opinion at large;170
5. Including spiritual leaders in those campaigns, especially
when religious and spiritual values have been used to fuel conflicts;171
6. Preparing the youth to recognize and defend the distinction
between humanity and inhumanity through educational programs.172 Reintegrate child soldiers into society;173
7. Learning from human rights174 and environmental175 activists
to promote fundamental humanitarian values in order that, in
the long run, humanitarian norms become a part of humanitarian consciousness;
8. Monitoring arms transfers, beginning with light weapons,176
and promoting innovative disarmament approaches, such as
‘‘weapons for food’’ or ‘‘weapons for development’’;
9. Exerting better targeted bilateral and multilateral diplomatic,
economic, and adequate military pressures against violators,
in accordance with the UN Charter and international humanitarian law;177
10. Fully including the respect of fundamental human values in
the framework of the maintenance and re-establishment of international security.178

140

HUMANITARIAN ETHICAL AND LEGAL STANDARDS

Re-activate the Network of Humanity
We need to re-activate—or to create, when needed—a network
of humanity carrying fundamental human values in all circumstances, and to maintain—or re-establish—the corresponding
mechanisms on the local, national, regional, and international
level.
The same fundamental values should be applicable in all situations of emergency179 (armed conflicts and other emergency situations), reconstruction, development, economical growth,180
peaceful settlement of conflicts, international, regional, and national legal cooperation. In all situations, the human person
should be at the center, taking into account the spiritual dimension of all human activities.
Rebuild Public Conscience
‘‘Either we live together as brothers, or we perish as
fools.’’
The Reverend Doctor Martin Luther King Jr.

‘‘Public conscience’’ was introduced in positive international law
by the Martens Clause at the Hague Peace Conference in 1899.
It was the result of a compromise reached at the Hague Conference to break a deadlock between great and small powers in Europe over the definition of combatants. In case of doubt,
international humanitarian rules should be interpreted in a manner consistent with standards of humanity and the demands of
public conscience.181
Humanitarian law is, at the same time, rooted in the history of
all traditions of humankind, in all parts of the world, and is also
very much part of our future, as one essential safeguard for our
survival as a species. In the words of Jean Pictet, one of the founding fathers of contemporary humanitarian law, respect for humanitarian law is ‘‘necessary to humankind’s survival.’’
In the words of Martin Luther King, Jr.: ‘‘The chain reaction
of evil—hate begetting hate, wars producing more wars—must

MICHEL VEUTHEY

141

be broken, or we shall be plunged into the dark abyss of annihilation.’’
As the spiritual dimension was at the origin of universal fundamental human values, we now need to bring back the spirit of
humanity into the letter of international humanitarian law.

7

Rules of Engagement: An
Examination of Relationships and
Expectations in the Delivery of
Humanitarian Assistance
H. Roy Williams
Introduction
The images of conflict and disaster are very much with us. We
seem to fast-forward from one conflict to the next, virtually without a breathing space between events. It is close to inevitable
that, sooner or later, there will be another humanitarian emergency in a place like Afghanistan, Kosovo, or Rwanda. Once
more, the press will be full of accounts of impending crisis and
unmet needs. Public officials will be pushing for action in an
attempt to outpace the growing public sentiment for dramatic
responses that it deems necessary.1 In part, our greater awareness
of these events is the result of an improved ability on the part of
the press to reach and report from just about anywhere. In effect,
the press—in the eyes of the public—frequently serves as a form
of advance scout for the relief providers.
What can we expect of the humanitarians who will be responding? Who is going to do what and how successful will their efforts
be? Will the response be managed in a coordinated manner? In
short, how are the expectations placed on the shoulders of the
relief community going to square with reality, and what is the
basis for these expectations in the first place? Glaring instances
of outright competition among relief providers are viewed with
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a mixture of surprise and frustration. What is the basis for the
competitive behavior? Should it be expected? As the groups involved exist only to provide humanitarian assistance, there are
expectations that cooperation in achieving this objective would
be routine. This, unfortunately, is not often the case.2,3,4
In order to begin dealing with these questions, it is important
to recognize that the community of relief providers is vast. It includes not only the thousands of nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) dedicated to providing assistance, but also International
Organizations (IOs), such as the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC), the World Food Program, and the militaries
from many countries. These groups function in different ways
and under differing mandates and degrees of scrutiny. They do,
however, meet in the same place: where the crisis unfolds. This
chapter will focus on NGOs, their roles and performance in
emergencies, and their interaction with the donors, IOs, the military, and the press.
It is also clear that in a crisis, issues concerning the political,
military, and humanitarian actors involved may overlap. NGOs
must often work with the military in order to accomplish their
objectives and obtain the on-the-ground security required.5 And
the military must respond to the needs of the political leaders
within their country of origin. These same political leaders will
also influence the funding decisions that are so critical to the
functioning of the NGO community.6 It is, therefore, less and less
possible to think of the resolution of the problems generated by
a humanitarian crisis as being solely a matter for independent
aid workers.

An Overview
NGOs carry a significant share of the burden of humanitarian
response. The willingness to assume this responsibility, in some
instances, represents the expression of a specific principle of action, as is the case with Médecins sans frontières (MSF). This organi-
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zation has long been concerned with questions related to the
neutrality of humanitarian action coupled with the right of humanitarian intervention.7 Other NGOs, such as CARE and the
International Rescue Committee (IRC), though interested in
these questions, also embody a long history of direct service. Still
others, typically smaller NGOs, while adhering to some of these
principles of action, may also represent the expression of the
need of local communities to respond directly to human suffering.
These smaller NGOs, for example, can be created at virtually
any time. This is often the case where the goal is to accomplish
particular, often short-term, objectives. Frequently, these smaller
NGOs come into being without much awareness on their part of
the collaborative arrangements under which larger NGOs attempt to operate. For example, there has been an extensive development of codes of conduct and standards of performance
to which the more established organizations publicly subscribe.
These distinctly different approaches can generate significant
problems when communicating in the field and at the headquarters level.
There is a danger, therefore, in acting on the assumption that
NGOs are more alike than they actually are. It also is important
to recognize that their behavior on the ground is often very
much related to the needs and expectations of others, including
donors. This point will be discussed later in this chapter. Indeed,
frequently, the funding that supports an organization will have a
decisive effect on how it performs, and even on how it sees itself.
Organizations that have little or no reliance on government
funding, for example, will tend to be more independent in their
performance and advocacy positions.8 Organizations such as
Oxfam and MSF, both with strong funding bases, have taken a
position on issues of neutrality that renders them less likely to
work directly with the military.
It is significant that groups working with NGOs, such as the
UN system and the military, frequently take for granted the existence of an essentially monolithic NGO world. The reality is that
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such a world exists in name only. Understanding the significance
of this is important to achieving effective and realistic operational and planning relationships.
The Individual and the Organization
To begin, it is abundantly clear that the highly motivated individual is at the heart of the work of NGOs. Being present at scenes
of human tragedy places enormous demands on body and spirit.
Facing up to being in close proximity to the ‘‘walking dead’’ of
the famines in Somalia and Ethiopia requires a special kind of
personal commitment. This is also reflected in the operational
language of the individual aid worker, which relies heavily on
terms such as beneficiaries and victims. Conversely, while the public
language of the organization includes these terms, its operational discourse makes wider use of terms such as making budget
and fundraising strategies.
Organizations, while wrestling with the same basic issues as the
individuals they employ, do not carry emotional burdens or the
level of motivation in the same way, yet their overall mission is
aimed at incorporating the same objectives. Organization headquarters routinely engage in dialogues with a wider constituency
than the ones concerning the individual staff member. This constituency typically includes donors, international organizations,
the military, and the press. In addition, the corporate sector also
may play a role.9 In the face of responding to such a wide constituency, the element of survival becomes an organization’s moving
force. In a sense, this aspect of the culture of organizations is at
odds with the behavior of its staff, whose objectives are more
often directed toward the individuals and groups at risk.10 It is
also worth noting that in many cases, staff is hired in the field or
at a location remote from headquarters. They frequently do not
have the opportunity to learn much about how the organizations
paying their salary actually operate. Yet, there is an automatic
presumption on the part of the public that the individual and
the organization necessarily have the same objectives in mind.
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Individuals in isolation can have only a limited effect on the
crisis with which they are confronted. This is generally understood. Only organizations can provide the necessary resources
and overall support. What ensues, however, is the appearance of
the contradiction within the very heart of the relief system, with
highly motivated individuals being co-opted by the organizations
that support their work, organizations operating under a very different set of imperatives.
The challenge for NGO leadership is managing both organizational concerns and individual motivations. Unlike the military,
for example, where loyalty to the group is essential and includes
the willingness to sacrifice all for its interests, the motivation of
the relief worker is assumed to be based on a personal undertaking of a humanitarian mission. It is certainly not expected that
this motivation will be subordinated to the needs of the organization. It is this motivation, however, on which the parent organization relies, and which the public takes for granted in its view of
the system of humanitarian response.
This contradiction is generally apparent to the staff. Individual
staff members often deal with this by separating their work on
the ground from what goes on at the headquarters office. It is
common to hear references to the gap between headquarters
and the field.11 What is usually referred to here is a difference in
perspective. Unfortunately, the significance of this gap in perspective is rarely examined, and depending on where they are
formed, staff impressions of the work of the organization will vary
widely. The powerful sense of mutual reinforcement experienced by field workers loses its force when organizational priorities begin to overtake those of the individual.
Does this mean that the NGO community needs to acknowledge this reality and operate more like contractors than as vehicles for the work of highly motivated volunteers? One might
argue that since NGOs have to compete in order to survive, this
posture would make a great deal of sense. If, however, they were
to follow the contractor model, this would necessarily change
how they present themselves to the public and donors. It would
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also change the public’s view of what humanitarian assistance is,
and responding to a humanitarian crisis would have more of the
aspect of a job to be done than the pull of emotional and moral
responsibility. It is difficult to see how the overall effect of this
would be positive. Certainly, the private donor would probably
find contributing to this kind of effort far less rewarding. It would
also change the fundamental relationship of leadership to staff.
The mandates and charters of NGOs, at present, speak primarily
to matters of principle and service. The contractor model is predicated upon efficiency. This represents a significant change in
emphasis, even with the increased focus on performance, which
will also be discussed below.

Triangle of Response: NGOs at the Center
It is apparent that NGOs are responsive to or influenced by a
variety of actors involved with humanitarian response. I have attempted to depict this interaction in the diagram titled, ‘‘The
Triangle of Response.’’ Individual staff members are, to varying
degrees, certainly aware of these influences. Their work and
sense of mission is inevitably affected. The impact on the individual increases with the level of decision-making responsibility.
In ‘‘The Triangle of Response,’’ an NGO is either influenced
by or influences donors, the public and the press, international
organizations, and the military. This influence is typically based
on the presence, or potential presence, of the NGO at the disaster site. It is necessary for these groups to have either an NGO
available to do the work on the ground or to speak to their sense
of the issue. What ensues is a seemingly contradictory and paradoxical set of relationships.
For example, NGOs influence decision-making and public
awareness through their often intensive advocacy efforts.12 It is
often the messages from the NGO community that make the difference in whether or not there is a humanitarian response of
any kind. In so doing, they are the voice of conscience for them-
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selves and the groups they represent. Sounding the alarm is one
aspect of their responsibility, but this does not relieve them of
reliance on outside support. The community, including donors,
is aroused, but the forces motivating donors virtually guarantee
the emergence of competition for the funds generated.
It is under these circumstances, however, that the considerable
variety within the NGO world has something of an offsetting effect. Those NGOs with stronger private funding bases, such as
MSF and Oxfam, can operate at a greater distance from the consequences of their own success in raising awareness. This does
not mean that they always are necessarily in the best position to
operate in a particular situation. They, too, must work within the
community in order to be effective.
Influence of the Donor
NGOs in general are not self-sustaining. They do not generate
profit from their work, so they must rely on funding support
from a variety of donors, including the public. In an ideal
world—from the point of view of the NGO—all such funding
would be unrestricted. Decisions could be made without reference to the specific direction of the donor.
The reality is different. Public giving, as an example, is tied to
the humanitarian nature of NGO work. But this means that the
public has to be made aware of the work of the organization and
of its special qualifications to perform as expected.13 Marketing
is required to get the NGOs’ message across, and the more prominent the newspaper ad and overall exposure, the better.
A complicating factor in handling donated funds is that while
givers are willing to pay for provision of direct service, they are
far less willing to pay for maintaining the structural capacity required to deliver this service. The recent example of the American Red Cross following the events of September 11, 2001,
illustrates the difficulties facing organizational leadership when
handling contributions. In this instance, significant funds were
initially set aside to be used for longer-term objectives, and the
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giving public was outraged with this unilateral interpretation of
their intentions.14
Organizations must, therefore, create a diverse pool of donors
paying for their different operational needs. This includes finding ways to generate funds not limited to direct support of programs. Accomplishing this involves extensive fundraising
campaigns, which, by necessity, create an environment of active
competition among NGOs for a limited number of potential givers. It is a competition that can easily spread and affect operations in the field.15
In addition, donors will often make funding decisions based
on achieving a particular result. The concerns of their constituencies, including, in some instances, the press as well as political
leadership, have to be addressed. Governmental donors described and reacted in different ways to the issue of shelter needs
in Kosovo following the NATO bombing. This led to very public
disagreements among the IOs and governments on the best way
to approach the perceived problem. NGOs, as the implementing
partners and recipients of their funding, were quickly drawn into
the dispute.16
In a sense, therefore, competition among the NGOs can often
be said to begin with the donor. This places the donor closer to
the role of customer than disinterested supporter, and here we
appreciate the notion of NGOs as contractors. Donors have their
own priorities and needs and frequently choose funding recipients based on these. In addition, there are only so many donors
in a position to provide the increasingly high level of funds required to deal with today’s emergencies, making it necessary for
NGOs to compete for available funds.
In short, donor expectations and public relations needs very
quickly contribute to generating competitive behavior on the
part of the NGO. These organizations often end up in the role
of being the public face of the donor. As such, their performance
in meeting donor expectations is closely scrutinized when considering the next contribution. This may be the case even when
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these expectations have little to do with the actual needs of the
beneficiaries.
By contrast, the public and others expect the humanitarian
actions of NGOs to be above the fray in all respects. As noted,
the ability to respond in this fashion is far more characteristic of
the individual than it is of the organization. To truly meet this
expectation, organizations would require more independence
than is typically available to them—that is, a source of unencumbered support.
Influence of the International Organizations
The United Nations family serves in a variety of capacities in the
humanitarian arena. It has the responsibility of providing overall
program direction as well as taking the lead in securing funds
from governments. UN organizations also serve as a source of
program funding for the NGOs working as implementing partners. NGOs have only a limited participation in the drafting and
presentation of the Consolidated Appeals to governments,
through which much of the area-specific funding is obtained.
These appeals also determine the overall programmatic direction of the humanitarian response. They provide little funding,
however, for other organizational requirements such as headquarters expenses. This brings about the need to make up the
shortfall elsewhere.
Often, the UN is the only, or the major, source of program
funding for a particular response. We saw this in the refugee
camps in Tanzania following the Rwandan genocide.17 Here, the
NGOs were strongly influenced by the criteria of having independent resources established by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Sooner or later, the requirement
of generating hard-to-obtain funds for program support affects
the overall budget of an NGO. For public relations reasons, it
often cannot afford not to be present at the site of a major crisis,
even though being there can also create deficit spending. This
approach to funding is another illustration of the lack of a coher-
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ent approach toward the real needs of NGOs on the part of the
donor community. NGOs react in an equally disjointed manner
in seeking financial support. This pattern of behavior contributes
to the often-criticized self-promoting behavior displayed by many
organizations.
Staff security is also another UN role, and will be discussed
in subsequent commentary on the military as not an exclusive
province of the United Nations. Here, the UN’s relationship to
NGOs is an incomplete and often ambiguous one, as the UN has
only a limited responsibility to non-UN staff. Typically, security
briefings will be organized by the UN, in some instances, in conjunction with the military. Security criteria will be established and
shared, providing, for example, degrees of security alert status.
Most of the time, this is done primarily for UN staff. The conflict
in Bosnia, however, provided an example where the UN, through
UNPROFOR, the United Nations Protection Force (in Yugoslavia), under a Chapter 7 mandate, took the lead in escorting NGO
convoys. The UNHCR also established a countrywide communication system that established a very proactive relationship to the
NGOs.18
It is clear, however, that NGOs have little influence on overall
UN decision-making despite being major actors on the ground.
While there have been improvements in this area, the relative
absence of NGO involvement is telling.
Influence of the Military*
The relationship of the military to the NGO community and its
role in humanitarian emergencies is undergoing a steady evolution. The military is increasingly aware of the roles that NGOs
play. The fact that the NGOs are more likely to be present before
the military arrives makes it necessary to have some understanding of their structures and mandates. Coupled with this has been
an acknowledgement of the specific strengths that NGOs possess,
*Editor’s Note: This topic is also covered, in great detail, in the International
Humanitarian Affairs Series companion volume Emergency Relief Operations.
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strengths that increasingly have relevance to the missions of the
military. There have been a series of exercises and briefings and
the development of official publications such as Joint Publication
3-07.6, which is devoted to better acquainting the military with
humanitarian organizations and their responsibilities.
As evidenced by the post-Taliban events in Afghanistan, there
is a growing willingness on the part of the military to directly
assume some of the traditional roles of NGOs, such as the support of small-scale community projects.19 Also, the use of military
aircraft to drop food/humanitarian daily rations in Afghanistan
while beginning an extensive bombing campaign has attracted a
great deal of attention and raised important questions on the
appropriateness of combatants assuming this role.20
Typically, military capacities have been thought of in terms of
lift capabilities, as in the large-scale provision of helicopter support following the extensive movement of Kurds to the mountains of Turkey during the closing stages of the Gulf War. We
have also seen significant material support provided by or moved
with the help of military units.
The broad question of security, and what is appropriate for a
community dedicated to humanitarian neutrality, has presented
serious difficulties for NGOs. There is little consensus within the
NGO community on the proper attitude toward military involvement. It is often argued that the only proper role for the military
is to provide logistical support, and that its participation in security-related issues should be essentially a passive one involving, for
example, the circulation of security-related information.
These positions continue to be discussed and acted upon, and
may well be in the process of becoming overtaken by post-September 11 events. We see in Afghanistan a much more proactive
approach to providing humanitarian assistance where, much to
the consternation of NGOs, a different model has emerged. We
now see the military actively involved in so-called ‘‘quick-impact
projects’’ designed to respond to immediate local needs.21 These
are being carried out without the involvement of the NGO community, which is typically associated with this kind of initiative.
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This expanded model is apparently based on a conclusion that
the NGOs, at the very least, need assistance in carrying out what
is more and more seen as a shared humanitarian mission. The
clear implication of this approach is that failing to resolve humanitarian needs can have political and military consequences,
and attending to these problems is no longer the exclusive province of the humanitarians; hence expansion of the military’s role
is inevitable given its acknowledged capacities.
Influence of the Press and the Public*
The impact of the press on the thinking and behavior of NGO
leadership has increased steadily over the past few years. This
has been anything but a one-way relationship. As the press has
achieved greater and greater access to disaster sites and areas
of conflict, its use of information, frequently gathered with the
assistance of NGO staff, has also increased. Technical progress in
the area of satellite communication has greatly expanded the
ability to report directly from the field. This combination of capacity to utilize and opportunity to obtain on-the-ground interviews with NGO personnel has enhanced the credibility of both
the interviewer and the interviewee. The two sides have arrived
at accommodations that serve both. The NGOs, in particular,
have been able to move their concerns to the front pages of
major newspapers. This puts enormous pressure on donors to
support NGO proposals to address the now very public crisis.
NGOs have quickly recognized the expanded public relations
options and opportunities for widening the audience for advocacy. States, in responding to the appeals and issues raised by the
NGOs, have the problem of trying to ensure that their responses
are not perceived by the public as, essentially, examples of political opportunism.
At the same time there is a debate within the NGO community
regarding the extent to which humanitarian work is or is not in*Editor’s Note: See also chapter 8, this volume.
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fluenced by the needs of political decision-makers.22 The difficulty for the parties on both sides of the question is apparent.
The NGOs often need the support of state donors to accomplish
their humanitarian objectives. The scale of what we have seen in
Rwanda and Kosovo, as examples, is such that private donors
would not have to capacity to meet the resource needs. On the
other side, states have few options apart from the NGOs in presenting their humanitarian face. It is noteworthy, in this regard,
that the military has been increasingly seen as one such option.
Some accommodation on the part of both sides in achieving
these respective objectives is required. Clearly, ‘‘humanitarian’’
work has acquired a new and different level of importance.
Again, however, these opportunities both highlight serious concerns and serve as the basis for further competition.
The public and the press often have a virtually symbiotic relationship. They both expect independent and selfless behavior
from the NGO world. The public, however, has a more direct
basis for such expectations: it is part of the actual framework of
the NGO world. The dollars of individuals support NGOs, and it
is from the ranks of the general populace that the NGO staff
comes. Community groups will organize and launch themselves
as actors during a crisis. We saw this in Bosnia, with trucks driven
by volunteers from Scotland arriving with few plans, but considerable determination to be of assistance. The public sees the community as partners in a mission to overcome the impediments of
bureaucracy and an isolationist approach within their own societies. For its part, reporters often see the public as the constituency demanding the heightened awareness that they are charged
with providing.
One consequence of this interaction is that the expectations
of the public and the press often define the goals and objectives
of the NGOs. Organizations are in the position of having to respond, or be seen as having failed their professed purpose. If the
press reports the threat of an imminent humanitarian crisis, it
becomes difficult for an NGO to stand apart and openly argue
that there is little reason for its involvement. Saying nothing risks
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criticism from its own constituency. It is here that we see the operative connections between donors, both public and private, the
press, and NGOs.
Acknowledging this welter of influences upon individual
NGOs is critical to understanding their behavior, and assessing
how realistic are the assumptions made about their performance.

NGO Consortia: A Way Out?
There is an impression that NGO consortia such as the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR), and InterAction
have, as part of their mandate, the responsibility and the capacity
to coordinate activities in the field—in effect to take the rough
edges off the relationships between NGO members and the other
members of the humanitarian community. It is a legitimate expectation, given the complexities of humanitarian operations,
and to a limited degree, this is sometimes realized. But this view
derives more from the needs and assumptions of donors and various cooperating groups, such as the military and international
organizations, than from the charters or capacities of these consortia.
In order for consortia to truly coordinate their members’ efforts, it must have the power to direct them. However, NGOs join
consortia for a range of different objectives, including the need
to be part of a recognized group, thereby gaining leverage in
pushing donors and governments to be more proactive in dealing with humanitarian issues. By comparison, international organizations and the military are generally more willing than are
NGOs to operate in a coordinated manner. Their internal dialogue seems more open to consensus as evidenced in the issuance of consolidated appeals during emergencies. Individual
NGOs, on the other hand, are frequently noted for postures of
isolation and insisting on being identified for their unique approach or level of accomplishment.
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Nonetheless, the burden of hope for achieving a more organized process is often placed on the shoulders of the consortia.
This follows from the assumption that joining a group implies
the surrendering of some degree of autonomy. In reality, the
charters and mandates of these umbrella structures do not specifically address the issue of coordination during the humanitarian response to a crisis. In addition, cooperative behavior in the
field in the absence of personal understandings is something of a
management issue. It requires specific prior agreements between
organizations and the ability to enforce them. Here we will review
some examples of major NGO consortia and support institutions.
The International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA)
ICVA’s objectives are threefold: to promote dialogue and information exchange among member NGOs, Geneva-based humanitarian agencies, and governments; to improve coordination23 and
standardization of humanitarian principles and practice among
its NGO network; and to facilitate NGO advocacy, including institutional and governmental capacity building. Thus, ICVA seeks
to act as ‘‘catalyst,’’ ‘‘facilitator,’’ and ‘‘broker’’ for interagency
networking, collaboration, and policy-making initiatives.24
ICVA has an international membership that includes many national NGOs, which makes direct political leverage more difficult
to achieve. ICVA looks to facilitate communication and information exchange between NGOs and international agencies and
has paid particular attention to including southern NGOs in its
membership.
InterAction
InterAction is the largest consortium of U.S. NGOs. Its mission is
‘‘to enhance the effectiveness and professional capacities of its
members engaged in international humanitarian efforts.’’ Representing over 160 NGOs, InterAction seeks to encourage ‘‘partnership, collaboration, and leadership among its members as
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they strive to achieve a world of self-reliance, justice, and
peace.’’25 Members undertake to adhere to the Private Voluntary
Organization Standards, which promote fiscal and programmatic
transparency and accountability. The standards are intended to
increase the institutional credibility of members to their donors
and the general public, without detriment to NGO autonomy
and individuality. It is this insistence on autonomy and individuality that militates against functional coordination.
Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR)
The Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response is a small
consortium with limited membership, formed out of a desire to
improve interagency cooperation. Much of SCHR’s activities
have been devoted to representing a group of NGOs before UN
decision-making bodies. It is composed of the Chief Executive
Officers from nine of the largest humanitarian agency networks
(CARE International, Caritas Internationalis, ICRC, IFRC, International Save the Children/Alliance, Lutheran World Federation, MSF, Oxfam International, and the World Council of
Churches), with one of these serving as Secretariat in Geneva.
SCHR has a permanent invitation to attend Inter-Agency Standing Committee meetings. It does not maintain a formal mandate
or charter, however. In addition to its ‘‘club’’ of CEOs, SCHR also
sponsors a policy group, which spearheaded the Sphere Project
in 1996 and continues to pursue other advocacy issues.26
VOICE
Since its inception in 1992, Voluntary Organizations in Cooperation in Emergencies has drawn its membership from over eighty
European NGOs. In addition to improving interagency linkages,
its mission is ‘‘to make an effective contribution to the framing
and monitoring of humanitarian policy’’ at the level of the European Union.27 Like ICVA, VOICE focuses activities on promoting
information exchange and advocacy through its network mem-
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bership. A major difference, however, lies in the VOICE emphasis on NGO issues as they relate to the EU programming and
funding. In addition to acting as a consultant on humanitarian
standards and efficacy of interventions, the VOICE charter mandates representing NGO concerns to the European Union and
facilitating NGO access to the EU Council and European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO). An example would be
their work in assisting NGO communication with ECHO during
the revision of the Framework Partnership Agreement.
In looking at some of the major consortia, we see some striking
similarities, as well as differences, in the expectations of the
membership. There is, however, an overlap of membership in
these consortia, suggesting that the reasons for joining transcend
the question of shared purpose or values.

NGO Support Institutions
NGOs rely on more than their own internal capacities to improve
the quality of service delivery. Additional interagency structures
are dedicated to the issues of best practices and accountability,
and we can observe a clear overlap in some of the objectives of
these groups. In part, this arguably is indicative of the range of
approaches and choice of emphasis within the NGO community;
it also reflects the preferences and concerns of donors. Individual performance, once little discussed, has become one of the
leading issues for the humanitarian community. The potential
effect on beneficiaries, individual relief workers, and their parent
organizations suggests that the realities of involvement in complex emergencies have moved well beyond the ritualized paying
of lip service to humanitarian rhetoric.
People in Aid
The People in Aid Code of Best Practice was first developed in
1996 as the product of an informal collaboration between British
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Table 7.1

Representative Mandates and Selected
Membership of NGO Consortia
SCHR
Mandates

InterAction

Represent NGO interests to IASC

Increase NGO fiscal and programmatic
accountability, particularly to donors
Encourage partnership within NGO
network while mantaining organizational
autonomy and individuality

Address humanitarian advocacy
issues through policy group

Promote broad-based advocacy
through standing committees

CEOs from international NGO networks

U.S. private voluntary organizations

No formal mandate or charter

Membership

Overlapping
NGOs

CARE International
Caritas Internationalis
Int'l Committee of the Red Cross
Int'l Federation of the Red Cross
Lutheran World Federation
Médecins sans Frontières International
Oxfam International
World Council of Churches

American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee
American Red Cross
Action Against Hunger USA
Adventist Development & Relief Agency Int'l
CARE U.S.A.
Catholic Relief Services
Church World Service
Concern America
Concern Worldwide
Doctors of the World U.S.A.
Doctors Without Borders U.S.A.
International Rescue Committee
Jesuit Refugee Services/U.S.A.
Mercy Corps International
Oxfam America
Save the Children U.S.A.
World Vision U.S.

A
A
A

161

H. ROY WILLIAMS

Table 7.1 (continued)

ICVA

VOICE

Improve information exchange between
NGOs, IHAs, and governments
Strengthen NGO network through
promotion of humanitarian principles
and field practice standards

Improve information flows and
humanitarian advocacy within NGO network

Foster advocacy skills among NGOs

Facilitate NGO interface with EU
and ECHO programming and funding
Consult on humanitarian practice
standards and represent NGO concerns
to EU and ECHO

Varied, but with particular emphasis on
including southern NGO membership

European NGO membership

ActionAid
Adventist Development & Relief Agency Int'l
American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee
ASF-Dansk Folkehjaelp
CARE International
CARE U.S.A.
Caritas Internationalis
Church World Service
Danish Refugee Council
Dutch Relief and Rehabilitation Agency
InterAction
Int'l Committee of the Red Cross
Int'l Federation of the Red Cross
International Rescue Committee
Jesuit Refugee Services International
Lutheran World Federation
Médecins sans Frontières International
Medecins du Monde
World Council of Churches

ActionAid
Action Contre le Faim
Adventist Development & Relief Agency Int'l
ASF-Dansk Folkehjaelp
CARE International
Caritas Belgium
Caritas France
Caritas Germany
Caritas Netherlands
Caritas Spain
Caritas Sweden
Comite Internacional de Rescate
Concern Worldwide
Danish Refugee Council
Dutch Relief and Rehabilitation Agency
Lutheran World Federation
Médecins du Monde International
Mercycorps Scotland
Oxfam Belgium
Oxfam U.K.
Save the Children Fund U.K.
World Vision Austria
World Vision Germany
World Vision Netherlands
World Vision Finland
World Vision Ireland
World Vision U.K.
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and Irish relief agencies. British relief workers, who had participated in the humanitarian intervention following the Rwandan
genocide, felt that ‘‘there must be as great a duty of care to employees as to potential project beneficiaries’’ on the part of aid
organizations.28 Unlike the Sphere Minimum Standards in Disaster Response, which recommend technical guidelines for service
in the field, or the IFCR Code of Conduct, which outlines NGO
behavior in accordance with humanitarian principles, the People
in Aid Code frames a standard of policy and management support to the volunteers and employees of humanitarian agencies.
The code’s seven principles, ranging from an institutional commitment to ‘‘best practices’’ to responsible budgeting of field
staff, are expressed in specific indicators that can be subject to
monitoring and evaluation. People in Aid asserts that its code,
unlike others, is applicable to both relief and development organizations.

Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in
Humanitarian Action (ALNAP)
ALNAP was established in 1997. It seeks to ‘‘encourage self-criticism and learning’’ in the improvement of humanitarian practices and accountability. To achieve these objectives, ALNAP has
categorized its activities as ‘‘network,’’ ‘‘programmatic,’’ and
‘‘interest group.’’ Included among its network activities is the
sharing of humanitarian reports, evaluations, and ‘‘lessons
learned.’’29 Programs include training in monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian action. Interest-group activities are presently allocated to case and consultation studies of complex
emergency programs. ALNAP currently assists forty-nine full
member organizations from the United Nations, bilateral and
multilateral donors, the Red Cross network, NGOs, and independent and academic consultants. Its leadership is composed of a
Steering Committee of Representatives from each sector
throughout its network.
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The Sphere Project
The Sphere Project30 was created by a humanitarian community
troubled by the 1994 events in Rwanda. The increased demand
for humanitarian relief was seen as exceeding the capacity of the
system to respond, making the quality of relief delivery suffer.
Following the 1996 report produced by the Joint Evaluation of
Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, members of the SCHR policy
group, with a letter of support from Kofi Annan, began a multilateral, NGO-driven process directed toward producing a humanitarian charter and technical standards in the management of
humanitarian assistance. The Humanitarian Charter outlines the
rights of persons affected by disasters, based on international humanitarian law, refugee law, and human rights conventions. A set
of Minimum Standards and key indicators are the triggers for
determining if technical needs are being met in the field.
The Sphere guidelines were intended to increase NGO operational transparency and accountability, both to donor organizations and to the beneficiaries of humanitarian interventions.
While the first phase of the Sphere Project was largely driven by
northern NGO consortia (SCHR and InterAction, with significant input from ICVA and VOICE), efforts were also made to
include southern consultants and perspectives in the technical
guidelines. The second phase of the project—dissemination and
implementation of the handbook—continued to practice diversified donor funding and interagency collaboration. Phase three
includes additional training objectives and agency incorporation
of standards, as well as an evaluation of the Sphere Project, which
is scheduled to be complete by 2003. The current edition of the
Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response references over 600 contributors, and a second edition is to be made available in September 2003.
Pulling it All Together
In looking at the crossover in membership in the preceding
chart, it is apparent that many of these structures offer similar
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skills and areas of technical assistance. In addition, their governing principles are often identical, or at least complementary. A
reasonable conclusion would be that there is an abundance of
support available to NGOs, with numerous opportunities for
cross training and exchange of experience. The reality is that
these opportunities are not routinely taken advantage of or made
available to staff.
The NGO community has had opportunities to strengthen its
performance by drawing on the variety of resources available
from the consortia. These, more often than not, have been a lost
opportunities. Yes, the tools are there, but the means of incorporating them into the routine behavior of the implementing agencies are apparently lacking. In addition, there is limited
awareness at the level of NGO decision-makers of the availability
of these resources. Their responsibility, as noted earlier, is to a
different level of organizational imperatives. There is also apparent skepticism as to the overall value of these tools when viewed
in the context of the often-overwhelming needs on the ground.
There is no question that much of the work of the humanitarian
community is indeed extremely time-sensitive. It is debatable,
however, if this is an absolute deterrent to finding ways to incorporate more of these resources and those of supporting structures into daily operations.
That is not to say that individual NGOs have not performed
admirably; however, assuming that the frequently large number
of NGOs responding to a crisis can be ‘‘coordinated’’ usually
proves disappointing. The mandates of these consortia can quite
reasonably raise expectations of a far more organized and professional response than has been evident during recent crises. On
the other hand, the donor community and others concerned
with these issues have been content to let the system organize
itself, while at the same time demanding that it behave in a more
‘‘coordinated’’ or ‘‘cooperative’’ manner.
Summary Observations
The expectations placed upon NGOs, and the humanitarian
community in general, are based upon assumptions of indepen-
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dence that are not supported by the realities of their relationships with donors, the international community, the military, and
the press. Each group, in differing ways, influences the performance of NGOs in the field. The mandates of these organizations
speak to a presumed independence that, we have asserted, exists
only in limited fashion.
Further, it follows that the widespread and unorganized
growth of the NGO community in the face of these influences
has substantially compromised its ability to carry out its mission
to alleviate suffering. Counterproductive competition and uncoordinated performance are inevitable consequences. We have
seen how this behavior plays into the hands of some of the
groups creating the crisis, as was seen in the camps in Zaire in
the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide. Donors and others have
contributed to this situation by making self-serving or equally uncoordinated funding decisions, sometimes based on overt political objectives. The actions of donors serve to reinforce NGO
behavior that is contrary to what is expected from humanitarian
entities.31 Yes, there are contributing factors, but it is the survival
imperative of the organization that is central to this outcome.
What is the answer? The organizations that make up the NGO
community are not likely to voluntarily go out of existence, thus
reducing the number of players and the need for competitive
behavior. Nor are they likely to surrender decision-making responsibility to the consortia of which they are members, in order
to reduce the effects of competition. Furthermore, the groups at
the various points in the Triangle of Response are also not in a
position to radically change their relationship to humanitarian
operations, with the possible exception of the military.
If NGOs were no longer considered nonprofit entities but contractors, and had to compete for monetary support, they would
soon, in Malthusian fashion, be reduced in number. There are
some who feel that this would produce a more productive and
better-performing workplace by reducing some of the consequences of having too many actors on the ground. The cost of
this approach, however, is high. The entire character of assis-
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tance would change, and with it the nature of public support.
There are many who feel that some organizations have already
begun to work as contractors, but it is certainly not the way the
community operates as a whole. I think it is evident that some of
the more laudable aspects of the community would be lost if the
relationship of NGOs to the public is drastically changed. There
is a connection to the generosity of the human spirit that is expressed in the spontaneous creation and dedicated volunteerism
of NGOs, and this is essential to maintain. Creating primarily
contractual relationships would not allow for its expression.
Alternatively, it is argued that there should be enforceable
mechanisms governing the performance of the humanitarian response community, managed by some form of centralized authority. After all, there already are codes and standards, with a
broad range of NGO signatories that generally discourage the
objectionable behavior cited. We see the value of the guidelines
developed by the Sphere Project and People in Aid, for example.
Is it not in the best interest of the donor community, and most
importantly of the beneficiaries, writ large to find ways to see
them more rigorously applied? This would not eliminate the
broader impact of politically motivated funding decisions, but it
would ameliorate their impact on the ground, motivating NGOs
to function in a more neutral and transparent manner.
Also, the consortia have more in common than they have in
opposition. The process of communicating this typically becomes
the topic of scattered meetings or less than systematic attempts
to share information and resources. Doing this in a proper manner takes the dedication of resources and careful planning. It
may well be in the interest of donors to display more willingness
to support this.
To go back to the beginning: the NGO community all too frequently presents a face that is confusing to its outside supporters
and may well force them to turn to other, less traditional actors
or approaches. The fundamental responsibility of NGOs is to
those they were created to assist. This is the impression shared
both outside and inside the system. It is essential that the commu-
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nity find ways to look at itself with the ‘‘terrible honesty’’ required when change is needed. The dialogue between the
political, military, and humanitarian elements involved with
emergency response is expanding. The full and open engagement of the humanitarian community is required, if the outcome
is to benefit those in need.

Final Thoughts
We have been addressing how NGOs work together and what are
some of the impediments facing greater cooperation—
cooperation that is more consistent with the expectations of outsiders, and produces a more effective response. Assuming that
the behavior of donors is as described here, there is little reason
to expect a marked change in their approach to funding decisions. Public giving of major proportions will, in all likelihood,
continue to be related to the media exposure of a particular crisis. Given this, it cannot be expected that NGOs will be able to
exert independence such that they can avoid operating within
their organizational constraints.
It has been taken for granted that the operative word for describing NGO efficiency is ‘‘coordination.’’ The reality of the
‘‘Triangle of Response’’ suggests that it is far more reasonable to
look for modalities of ‘‘cooperation;’’ modalities that don’t expect an unlikely outcome from the realities of working within a
frequently-competitive humanitarian funding environment.32
Maintaining effective cooperation is best performed by entities
without the program responsibilities that might otherwise draw
them into a competition for funds. The provision of a neutral
venue for planning and discussion of resource allocation would
greatly assist the emergence of joint undertakings at both the
headquarters and field level.
The NGO community has much to gain by looking seriously at
ways to overcome some of the inherent impediments to more
successful relief operations.

Part 4
In this final section, three highly respected experts discuss (a) the
relationship between humanitarian workers and the media; (b) the
critical need for, and some of the problems in, funding international
humanitarian programs; and (c) the oft-forgotten view of the recipient of aid.
The role of the media in a humanitarian crisis is enormous. The
written, spoken, and visual media, particularly in this era of instant
communication, bring distant disasters into our homes, and influence the response of governments as well as of individuals. Joshua
Friedman, a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist with vast experience in
international crises, presents the positive, and potentially negative,
results of media attention during disasters. He also offers his own
‘‘rule of the game’’ for humanitarian workers dealing with the
media.
During her tenure as head of Doctors Without Borders in the
U.S.A., Joelle Tanguy raised annual donations to that NGO by tenfold. She has had to deal with an urgent need for funds to sustain
essential programs while recognizing the inherent dangers for the
freedom and flexibility of independent organizations that receive
substantial aid from government sources. Her chapter closely examines current funding policies, practices, and pitfalls.
The views of local government and populations may not mirror
those presented by Western aid providers. Abdulrahim Abby Farah,
long-term UN Undersecretary General for African Affairs and a former Somali diplomat, details, in a moving chapter, the privileges of
indigenous people even in the midst of crisis.

8

Humanitarians and the Press
Joshua Friedman
Introduction
The question of media relations has been one of the mainstay
preoccupations of InterAction, which was founded nearly twenty
years ago to pull together the efforts of private voluntary organizations in the United States. InterAction convenes periodic fora
where journalists speak to humanitarian workers about how the
media works.
I have been on several of these panels. At an early one, a
woman from a small organization got up in the back of the room
with a question: Why didn’t the press report on all the good
works her group does? she asked testily, enumerating a number
of accomplishments that sounded fairly routine to me.
People in the news business know that news is about something
new, something out of the ordinary, something unique. But this
earnest humanitarian obviously didn’t know that. Short of
launching into a quick course on how the media works, I really
didn’t have an answer for her.
But that’s what this chapter is about. I finally have an opportunity to give an answer—a quick course on how the media works,
what constitutes news, how news judgments are made and how
journalists and humanitarians can interact productively. After
covering wars, humanitarian disasters, and international diplomacy for many years for Newsday, I have developed some ideas
about this.
Journalists and humanitarians have an intimate relationship—so close, in fact, that they often rub up against each other
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painfully, causing resentments on both sides. It’s almost a form
of sibling rivalry. They share some of the same problems. Especially in the last dozen years since the collapse of the Soviet
Union, the world has been awash in comprehensive humanitarian emergencies that threaten to overwhelm both.
In my course on International Reporting at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism, I encourage the students
to lean heavily on humanitarian organizations. In many cases,
this is the best way to get off the beaten path when doing a
story—for logistical and research help, to discover authentic
community leaders, and avoid official spokesmen. ‘‘Don’t reinvent the wheel,’’ I tell them ad nauseam.
Private voluntary and nongovernmental humanitarian organizations have already solved many of the problems the students will face when they become journalists overseas—
communications, transportation, lodging, health, and reliable
local contacts. They have already figured out local customs, politics, and disputes.
I warn my students that the pressure to get the story leads some
irresponsible journalists to play fast and loose with information
that could put humanitarians and the people they work with at
great risk, especially in anarchic, violent situations. Journalists
must understand how to report the story without endangering
them.
I caution students that some humanitarian groups are so
driven to get good publicity that they try to manipulate the press.
This rarely works, and then only in the short-term. Journalists are
proud to have built-in ‘‘BS’’ detectors. At the slightest whiff of
manipulation or exaggeration, they back off. In fact, journalists
are a very touchy group with an arcane code of ethics and voracious needs that must be satisfied immediately.
Journalists are taught that it is wrong to provide favorable publicity in exchange for favors. In humanitarian disasters this can
be very touchy. Sometimes the only way to get to a remote crisis
spot is to be taken there by a humanitarian organization. Along
the way, journalists might be given food or lodging. Good jour-
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nalists aggressively try to reimburse the organization for its costs
with money—never publicity.
There must be an understanding that there is no quid pro quo.
I tell my students to practice a quality that former New York Governor Hugh Carey boasted of when asked about an apparent
conflict of interest. He quipped that he had ‘‘monumental ingratitude.’’
I understand why humanitarian organizations feel they need
publicity. They face growing responsibilities, but feel public support and funding is shrinking. In the United States—at least until
the September 11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon—public interest in problems overseas has
dropped. As a result, U.S. political and financial support for the
United Nations has waned.
This is not the only bad news. Alarmed by long-term circulation decline and a more recent decline in advertising, the American press has also been losing interest in covering foreign
humanitarian disasters, diverting resources instead to celebrity
and personality features they think will attract readers and viewers. Just months after September 11, the bump in newspaper circulation the attacks caused began to evaporate and, with it, the
increased press interest in overseas stories that didn’t describe a
direct threat to American service personnel, or readers and viewers themselves.

How the Press Works
How a story gets into a newspaper or magazine, or onto television
or radio is probably a mystery to those not involved in the process. It’s a sort of an industrial process. The product moves along
an assembly line at an inexorable pace that cannot be interrupted. At daily newspapers, the editors must have information
in printable form down to the presses by a certain deadline to
get the publication printed and onto trucks in time to have it
delivered in the morning. Radio and television news staffs must

174

HUMANITARIANS AND THE PRESS

be ready to broadcast before the program is scheduled to go on
the air. Wire services must get stories to their clients well before
these deadlines. Hanging over all of them are the competing
fears of being scooped if the stories are too late, or going public
too quickly to prevent faulty reporting, which, at the worst case,
could prove to be very expensive.
As the information moves relentlessly down this assembly line,
journalists at the home office and out in the field adhere to rigid
protocols and schedules that should be understood by humanitarians who want to influence the news.
Every morning at a designated time, editors meet to consider
stories they might want to print or broadcast. The editors present
ideas to each other from variety of sources: proposals from reporters who have been in touch before the meeting; stories the
competition has already done; stories the editors have seen on
reports from wire services such as Associated Press or Reuters;
communications from public relations people sending press releases or calling by phone. Anything happening overseas is generally handled by the foreign editor who, at a large outfit, has a
staff, or, if it’s a small outfit, is juggling foreign news by himself
or herself, along with other areas.
What are the editors looking for in a story? In simple terms,
they’re looking for news—something out of the ordinary, something that causes the reader or viewer to think: ‘‘I didn’t know
that’’ and to want to relate this information to someone else.
But this is very general. It can be complicated because different
publications or broadcasters have different ideas about who they
want to reach. The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and the
Washington Post, for example, think they are writing for opinionmakers and decision-makers. They assume their readers already
have a certain level of knowledge. Smaller papers often look for
a more local angle, assuming readers will get the big picture from
the big papers. Wealthier regional papers like Newsday try to combine both approaches. Local television news operations look for
local news, leaving the big story to the networks.
After the meeting, assigning editors from the foreign desk get
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back to reporters to discuss what they will work on that day, that
week, or long-term. In mid-afternoon, there is another editorial
meeting to come up with a fairly rigid schedule of what stories
will appear in the next edition or program. Later in the afternoon, unless they are covering a major breaking story, the reporters must meet deadlines and send in their copy, or send in the
video or audio. The story gets processed by the editors, first on
the foreign desk and then at a more general desk, before being
sent to the printing press or made ready for broadcast. In the
case of a longer feature story, the process can take days, weeks,
or even months.
The time pressure on the editors is crushing. Not only do they
have to make their deadlines, but they also have to make sure
that the stories are both comprehensive and accurate. You can
imagine how much time they can devote to considering a press
release from a humanitarian group about the wonderful things it
is doing—very little to none.
Reporters start out their careers being assigned generally to all
sorts of stories. As they gain experience, they’re assigned to beats
with responsibility for geographic or substantive areas. Unfortunately for humanitarians, there isn’t really a ‘‘humanitarian
beat.’’ Those stories usually fall to foreign correspondents, who
work out of the aerospace and large capital cities, or a ‘‘fireman’’
like me, who are sent out with little or short notice to cover
breaking stories overseas. In the trade, this is called ‘‘parachuting
into a story,’’ and there’s always controversy whether the parachuting fireman will be able to provide nuance and background
because the story is so new to him.
It’s a kind of a truism among editors that reporters overseas
get paranoid about what is happening to their stories. First of
all, they are working under very difficult conditions, sometimes
dangerous, often without enough sleep. Secondly, there is some
truth to those fears. With recent technological advances, editors
have many alternative sources of information other than the reporter. They often see the same event live on CNN and can read
instant coverage of it from wire services and other media moving
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stories over the Web. Powerful institutions like the White House
or the Pentagon can try to influence the editors by briefing reporters covering them with information that could influence
their reaction. Sometimes editors will not take a humanitarian
crisis seriously until reporters based in Washington, D.C., report
back that the administration is taking it seriously. An example is
the long-neglected famine and anarchy in Somalia that suddenly
burst into the news in late 1992 when the Bush administration
finally decided it merited attention and sent troops to protect
humanitarians trying to deliver food aid.
So the reporter is scrambling around out in the field, trying to
advance the story beyond his or her competitors, frantically trying to gather accurate information before the deadline to send it
in. That’s why the worst thing humanitarian workers can do is to
try to manipulate the journalists or not tell the full story. This
just gets the journalists nervous, and he or she moves on quickly.
Journalists can be spooked easily by an approach that doesn’t
smell ethical to them. In the United States, journalists are supposed to be objective and not cover stories in which they have an
emotional investment. For this reason, many journalists will not
join or support organizations they might someday be covering.
Some journalists will not even register with a political party.
Another key factor in understanding the media is understanding the rules of interviewing—or rather, understanding it the way
the journalist does. Phrases like ‘‘off the record,’’ or ‘‘not for
attribution,’’ or ‘‘deep background’’ have specific meanings that
help both journalist and interviewee develop an upfront understanding about the ground rules of the interview. This prevents
later recriminations about whether journalists endangered local
or unsuspecting humanitarian workers by identifying them by
name. You should discuss very frankly with the journalist how
you want to be identified publicly. Diplomats and government
officials often insist, for example, that the journalists agree to
identify them only as ‘‘a government official’’ or ‘‘a Western diplomat.’’ It’s my own belief that journalists have an obligation to
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bring this up when they’re dealing with naı̈ve people who have
no experience with the press.
Accurate facts are the currency of journalism. You must tell the
truth. If there’s a fact that cannot be disclosed, the interviewee
should say so. To give the reporter some understanding of the
situation without having certain facts published, say, ‘‘it’s off the
record.’’ If a fact is disclosed but the source doesn’t want to be
associated with it, just say that it’s ‘‘not for attribution.’’ A ‘‘deep
background’’ source of the information understands that reporters will strictly protect his/her identity. But never lie. Once a
journalist is burned, he or she will never go near that source
again.

Kukes—Parachuting In
In the spring of 1999, I covered the kind of humanitarian crisis
that I’ve been talking about. For months, the Clinton administration had been threatening Slobodan Milosevic with military action if he did not stop mistreating ethnic Albanians who made up
the majority of the population of Kosovo, the former Yugoslavia
province just north of Albania. The standoff finally led to confrontation, and NATO began bombing Serbia to force Milosevic
to comply. Refugees began to flee into Albania and Macedonia
with horrific tales of Serbian atrocities.
I was at Newsday’s UN bureau in New York a few hours after the
NATO attack had started when I got a call from the foreign editor, telling me to get to Albania and start filing stories as soon as
I could. How I carried out this assignment is an illustration of the
interplay between journalist and humanitarians.
If this had been an assignment to go somewhere unfamiliar, I
would have found a PVO or NGO working there and asked for
the best travel route, the best places to stay, any health problems
I had to be aware of, the names of some reliable local contacts,
and a quick briefing on the situation there. This approach has
been really helpful to me in the past. When I covered the African
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famine, for example, the UN development program and UNICEF put me in touch with local representatives who were terrific.
I tell my students to do this by going to the Web sites of InterAction or ReliefWeb, a site of the UN Human Rights Coordinator,
to find which groups are working in the country or region they
want to visit.
This time, I didn’t have to do any of that. I’d been to Albania
several times in the previous few years. Usually, the trip was not
difficult—an overnight flight to Rome and then a quick plane
trip to Tirana. But I knew it wouldn’t be so easy this time. I wrote
a brief description for Newsday about how I managed to get myself set up:
‘‘Because NATO warplanes were flying every night over Kosovo, just north of Albania, all commercial flights into Tirana had
been canceled. I would have to take a ferry across the Adriatic to
Albania from the southern Italian city of Bari. But flights to Bari
were canceled as well. I pulled my stuff together and flew to
Rome, then to Naples, where I rented a car. Tired and jet-lagged,
I raced at about ninety miles per hour (Italian speed limits seem
relaxed) to Bari, just in time to catch the night ferry to Albania.
‘‘Finally, I could relax. My friend, Fron, an Albanian refugee
who had grown up in New York, was already in Tirana. He was
going to pick me up at the ferry and we were to drive up to the
Kosovo border together. (I try not to travel alone in situations
like this.) As the hydrofoil ferry raced across the Adriatic, we
passed warships carrying cruise missiles. Close to midnight, the
ferry pulled up to a dark dock. No Fron.
‘‘I hitched a ride to Tirana and called Fron. He thought I had
missed the ferry. I found a hotel room and got a few hours of
sleep. The next day, Fron found a driver (Orema, who had been
the driver for the last communist dictator) and a translator
(Artan, who was really a historian) for me. Remembering my experience covering refugees of the 1984 Ethiopia famine, I insisted we pack the trunk of Orema’s Mercedes with bottled water
and food, and we set off for Kukes, on the border with Kosovo.
‘‘The road to Kukes had been built by the Italians during
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World War II. It hadn’t changed much since then. The journey
of about 150 miles took nearly all day. Barely more than a narrow,
rutted track, the road crept across snow-covered mountains.
There were no barriers to the deep, sheer ravines just inches
from the pavement. Tractors, trucks, buses, and cars were carrying thousands of refugees in the other direction. We became increasingly alarmed at the refugees’ depressed and shocked
appearance. Memories of the Ethiopian famine flashed through
my sleepless, groggy mind.
‘‘I had one priority—find a bed and a place to eat in Kukes,
and start filing stories. That wasn’t so easy. Kukes was an isolated
frontier outpost. There were only a handful of hotel rooms. But
Fron managed to find the Adriana, a little pension (small hotel)
with seven rooms. We had arrived just ahead of the explosion of
journalists and international aid workers who rushed in a few
days later. By the time I left Kukes nearly two weeks later, journalists were sleeping on the Adriana’s floors.
‘‘What I wanted most at the Adriana was a room facing south.
Without a southern window, I could not reach Newsday with my
satellite telephone. Ten years ago, going somewhere like Kukes
meant being out of touch with the paper for days. The satellite
phone, about the size of a laptop, has changed reporting from
remote areas, making it possible to call from anywhere in the
world to anywhere in the world.
‘‘I put the satellite telephone on the window ledge. Using a
compass, I found one of four Inmarsat satellites that sit more
than 22,000 miles above the equator. A few seconds later, I was
talking to the desk in Melville, Long Island. Now I could start
working.
‘‘The days flew by. My only news of what was happening outside Kukes were the hourly BBC broadcasts from London I received on my little short-wave radio and occasional e-mails from
the office. With a modem speed of 9600 kbs, the satellite phone
hooked up to my laptop allowed me to receive e-mail, but not to
surf the Web.’’
Being able to send and receive e-mails of text and photographs
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and communicate by voice instantaneously is a recent technological change that affects the coverage of humanitarian stories.
There are still journalists alive, albeit very old, who worked under
conditions that seem prehistoric now.
Not that long ago, it took literally weeks for reporters to file
stories from the Third World. The famed World War II journalist,
William Shirer, recalls in The Nightmare Years, that it took him
three weeks to reach the Chicago Tribune with his exclusive account of the 1933 coronation of the king of Afghanistan. In his
wickedly hilarious book, Remote Peoples, Evelyn Waugh describes
how reporters covering Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie’s 1930
coronation could communicate from Addis Ababa to the outside
world only once a week. They had to file their stories describing
the coronation before it actually took place.
In the early 1980s, when I started covering news overseas, the
preferred way to send back a story was by punching a telex tape—
either from a central cable office or from a hotel, if they had a
telex. The story would clack and clatter out on a telex machine
back at the paper.
In 1983, I started filing stories with my primitive RadioShack
TR-80, an early laptop computer that journalists used at the time.
I had to tip hotel switchboard operators in war-torn Beirut and
Nairobi $50 each time I needed a rare direct overseas telephone
line over which I could send my story. Almost all calls still went
through a central exchange. It took hours to send a photograph.
I had to go to the local Associated Press office with my film, wait
until they developed it, select which photos to send back to the
office, which, in turn, took many hours more until the photos
were transmitted through London over the AP wire.
In rural areas, there was no communication at all. The only
way I could learn what was going on in the outside world was
to listen to BBC over my portable short-wave radio. Telephone
communication did not exist.
All this is now ancient history. There is literally no spot in the
world from which I cannot be instantly in touch with anyone in
the United States. Hotels in even the most remote areas fre-
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quently receive twenty-four-hour access to CNN via satellite dish.
The laptop-size satellite telephone I carry can be powered by batteries or through a vehicle’s cigarette lighter receptacle. I can
send and receive e-mail, and even send publication-quality photographs I’ve taken with my little point-and-shoot digital camera.
Television reporters recently gained the ability to send grainy versions of their stories from literally anywhere in the world over
modified and portable satellite telephones called videophones.
These new communications developments also open opportunities for humanitarian groups to make more information available to journalists.
My strategy for covering the Kukes story anticipated several
stages. In the first few days, it was just a question of recording
what I saw and sending it back. While I was doing this, I was
busy developing sources among the organizations working there,
trying to figure out who had the most accurate information. The
more I learned, the more I began to perceive several larger stories. The first of these was the scope of the refugee flight and
how well they were being cared for once they arrived in Albania.
The second was what was happening back in Kosovo. After all, I
had thousands of potential sources flooding across the border
every day. The third was to tell the big, geopolitical picture behind this disaster. This I would try to weave into the more immediate stories to give the reader a sense of perspective.
Good journalists try to write stories that are interesting and
offer perspective. You can’t just keep describing the superficial
scene you see everyday. You should start explaining it. But the
explanation has to be interesting.
To do this, journalists look for anecdotal material to tell an
engaging little story that serves as a vehicle for the larger story.
Broadcasters have an even greater need for this interesting material. It could be what happened to one particular person, or family, or community. It could be how one humanitarian worker is
struggling to cope. Or the visit of a high-ranking official, a visit
to a hospital, a temporary children’s center—you get the idea.
So this is what happened in Kukes.
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When I first got out there, I encountered just a few overwhelmed humanitarian workers trying to create some sense of
order. Within a few weeks, two full-blown communities had been
established—humanitarians and journalists. This explosive
growth is typical of major humanitarian disasters. Each community generally develops its own gathering places. In this case, they
were the same—the Bar America, a sidewalk cafe/restaurant
where exhausted workers and journalists could sit in the sun and
enjoy a beer and an omelet. Local fixers gravitated to the Bar
America, as well as disaster groupies who had made their way
from Western Europe.
Fixers are very important to journalists covering a humanitarian disaster. I’m not sure what NGOs or PVOs call them, but I’m
sure they have a term, because these people are essential. The
name sounds sinister, but good fixers are prized and recommended by one journalist to another. A fixer is someone who is
familiar with the local scene and players, but also understands
the journalist’s needs and speaks his language. A fixer sets up
interviews with hard-to-get officials, translates or finds a translator, drives or finds a driver and a car, and, most importantly,
knows when the situation has become too dangerous and how to
get out of it quickly.
In this case, I didn’t have a fixer because I had Fron, a respected figure in Albania, and Artan, a respected young historian. This was very important. A New York Times reporter showed
up with no one at all and had to make do with a semi-literate taxi
driver who seemed to misunderstand the situation. I teach my
students that this is an area where they can turn to the humanitarian community for help. Expatriate humanitarians have the
same needs for reliable local contacts.
Fron, himself, was writing stories for a Web site that published
stories about the Balkan conflict. He gave me tremendous entree. We were able to go places where the Kosovo Liberation
Army was hidden from the rest of the press. He and Artan kept
me supplied with historical insights. In turn, I brought them a
sense of perspective about the humanitarian story. I knew from
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previous experience that a couple of key people were submerged
in the growing army of do-gooders, and I had to find them. They
were the ones who knew what was really happening. This would
make the difference between superficial and nuanced reporting.
How to find them? I teach my students techniques I learned
doing rural community development in the Peace Corps, and
then adapted to journalism. In the Peace Corps, we learned that
to introduce change in a community, one had to learn who the
truly influential people were and to gain their trust. These people were not necessarily those with big titles and, to find them,
one had to understand the culture and how local communities
made decisions. A quick way to gain people’s confidence is to be
introduced by a Sherpa, or mentor, who understands and is
trusted by local people, but is a bit removed from the local scene.
In a disaster situation, this means getting people back at the
headquarters of humanitarian groups to vouch for you to their
local representatives. Again, I teach my students to get in touch
with these groups before they leave for the scene. After covering
a few disasters, you and your work become known to many organizations. Of course, all this depends on having produced accurate coverage in previous stories—and having understood the
sensitivities of humanitarian groups.
I was lucky in this case since we were among the first journalists
to arrive. This is why it’s important to move so fast to get to the
scene. Again, this is an area where humanitarian organizations
can be helpful to journalists.
It turned out that the key people in the quickly-growing humanitarian community were a young Swedish woman working for
a tiny German NGO, one of the only ones there before the refugee flight started; an Albanian UNHCR employee, who had been
assigned to Kukes earlier; and a former Belgian policeman, who
had worked in the area for the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe. Later on, investigators for Human
Rights Watch and the UN Tribunal for International War Crimes
helped in interpreting what was happening inside Kosovo from
interviews with scores of refugees.
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It was important to find these people, since those nominally in
charge were no help. In recent years, unremitting disasters and
fickle, seesawing international funding have eroded the cadre of
skilled personnel who can jump quickly into crises. UNHCR was
the lead international agency for the Kukes crisis, convening a
daily meeting of the growing group of humanitarians on the
scene. The UNHCR chief for Albania had been out of the country when the crisis started, so his recently-arrived legal deputy,
a Cambodian national, was in charge. He seemed incapable of
decision-making, and the daily meetings never got past gripes
sessions. Meanwhile, at the border a few miles away, thousands of
people were wallowing in their own filth. It seemed as if UNHCR
was reinventing the wheel. Sometimes the only people on the
border greeting refugees were journalists and people from
smaller humanitarian groups that had happened on the scene.
No one seemed to be telling the refugees where to go or what to
do. The situation was infuriating. A few months later in Kosovo,
UNHCR again seemed unprepared for the returning refugees.
This was a case beyond redemption by public relations. I discuss
these problems later in the chapter.
It took weeks for UNICEF’s technical staff to show up—but
their publicists arrived much quicker. One day I sat on the terrace of the Bar America with a UNICEF press person from Rome.
She had urged me to meet with an advance team that would help
me with a story on refugee children. After several hours, an SUV
pulled up with the team, which turned out to consist of a camera
crew and a UNICEF press person from New York. They had been
filming refugee children, drawing pictures of their traumatic
flight from Kosovo for a promotional documentary. Only weeks
later did professionals show up to work with the children.
In one of the early days of the crisis, I was gathering material
for my daily story back to Newsday, wandering among exhausted
and dehydrated refugees who had flopped on the nearest patch
of ground just a few meters into Albania. Amid the crowd, a small
team from Doctors of the World huddled over a man lying on a
stretcher.
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‘‘Is it bad?’’ I asked one white-coated team member.
‘‘Compound fracture of the ankle. He’ll be OK,’’ he replied
professionally.
‘‘Are you a physician?’’ I asked.
‘‘No. I’m the press information officer.’’
Given a decade of endless complex humanitarian emergencies, why is the quality of humanitarian work so uneven? This is a
question that bothers journalists covering disasters. Should they
write about the defects in hopes that reform will follow? Would
stories about humanitarian foul-ups overwhelm the more important, but less sexy, stories illustrating the underlying causes of
humanitarian disasters? Should they ignore potentially scandalous situations because such stories endanger political and financial support for humanitarian organizations?
When covering humanitarian disasters, I frequently wonder if
I am being fair. It’s tough to be a humanitarian these days. Both
humanitarians and journalists risk injury, death, or burnout every
time they go to a disaster site. People begin to lose their perspective and their tempers. Back home, both humanitarian officials
and editors face the inexorable pressures of costs, compassion
fatigue, and growing isolationism. For private humanitarian organizations, this takes the form of lower individual donations. For
UN humanitarian organizations, it takes the form of decreased
economic and political support, especially from the United
States. And for the media, it takes the form of risking advertising
revenue by alienating readers and viewers with serious news
about foreign humanitarian disasters.

Shared Dangers
In dealing with disaster, both press and humanitarian workers
face many of the same dangers, challenges, and logistical needs.
They have the same problems communicating and staying
healthy, especially in poor, undeveloped countries. They both

186

HUMANITARIANS AND THE PRESS

risk attack from armed gangs of young boys, some of them not
even teenagers, working for corrupt warlords with no respect for
human rights.
Between 1994 and 2001, 294 journalists were killed and 1,026
were jailed—most of them in developing countries, and the preponderance of them local journalists, according to the New Yorkbased Committee to Protect Journalists. The annual rate seemed
to be slowing down toward the end of the decade but there was
a sharp spike in 2001—37 journalists killed and 118 imprisoned.
From 1992 through most of 2001, 204 civilians working for the
United Nations were killed by ways other than natural causes or
vehicular accidents. By far the largest group was working on humanitarian assistance—nearly 100.
From 1994 through the middle of 2001, some 255 UN personnel, seventy-two locally recruited, had been taken hostage, according to the United Nations. As of the fall of 2001, some forty
were still arrested, detained, abducted, or ‘‘disappeared,’’ according to the UN staff union. The International Committee of
the Red Cross, whose workers rush into danger spots and face
mounting risk in the field, reports it has averaged 130 security
incidents annually since 1997. Nine ICRC workers were killed in
1996. Six were shot and hacked to death in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in April 2001.
Both journalists and humanitarian workers increasingly face
‘‘burnout,’’ as comprehensively described in Sharing the Front Line
and the Back Hills. International Protectors and Providers: Peacekeepers,
Humanitarian Aid Workers and the Media in the Midst of Crisis, published in 2002 by trauma specialist and therapist, Yael Danieli.
I contributed a small article describing how I have learned to
bounce back after covering humanitarian disasters. I had always
been a little embarrassed about not recovering from these disasters like a tough guy. So I was both shocked and relieved to read
in the Danieli book that journalists I admire had undergone the
same, or even more severe, post-trauma problems—and that humanitarian workers often suffered worse.
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Complex Humanitarian Emergencies
The explosion of complex humanitarian emergencies after the
collapse of the Soviet Union is the immediate reason for the increased risk of physical and emotional danger that journalists
and humanitarian workers face. I had been covering disasters for
years before I learned that humanitarian term of art. I heard it
first in a 1996 conversation with now-U.S. Agency for International Development Director Andrew Natsios, who was then the
head of World Vision.
These complex humanitarian emergencies are chaotic, even
anarchic, situations where health, sanitary, economic, and communications systems have collapsed, while heavily armed, paramilitary groups from different ethnic and religious backgrounds
try to destroy each other—with little regard for the Geneva Conventions of War. The struggles are epitomized by what happened
in Bosnia, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Military frontlines hardly exist. Disease, famine, and genocidal massacre ravage the civilian population.
Human rights violations are so rife that journalists and humanitarian workers are sometimes deliberately targeted to keep them
from reporting back what they have seen—hence the increase in
hostage taking, jailings, and killings.
During the Cold War, both superpowers had such control over
the rest of the world that there were only a handful of such disasters at any one time. But when the Soviet Union disappeared, the
number soared to more than thirty a year, severely taxing the
international humanitarian community.
The CIA started putting out an annual report projecting global
humanitarian emergencies for the coming year. According to the
current report, the total number of humanitarian emergencies in
August 2001 was twenty, down from twenty-five in January 2000.
The CIA’s National Intelligence Council, which compiles the
report, describes humanitarian emergencies as situations in
which at least 300,000 civilians require international humanitarian assistance to avoid serious malnutrition or death.
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The increased demand for international humanitarian aid pits
one disaster against another in a struggle over scarce relief resources. Since 1992, wealthy countries have furnished little more
than two-thirds of the emergency assistance asked for in UN Consolidated Appeals, the international mechanism that raises
money to cope with complex humanitarian emergencies, according to the CIA report.
‘‘Funding by donors of specific humanitarian emergencies
tends to be heavily influenced by strategic concerns, media attention (my italics), and geographic proximity,’’ the report says.

Ethiopia
The hunger for press coverage leaped during the Ethiopian famine of 1984, perhaps the first fully televised complex humanitarian emergency. For the first time, viewers actually watched people
dying of hunger on television. Galvanized by this morbid sight,
the U.S. public poured many millions of dollars on NGOs they
associated with aiding the starving Ethiopian people. Some
NGOs took in huge amounts and set a new standard for using
the press to raise money.
The first American TV network to air the dying people was
NBC. Kenyan photographer Mohammed Amin had shot the pictures of widespread dying among thousands of starving people
who had fled to an ad hoc refugee camp on a desolate plain in
Korem, Ethiopia.
Amin had been hired by World Vision, a California-based,
evangelically-oriented private humanitarian group that was working in Ethiopia. World Vision’s preferred method of fundraising
was to purchase half-hour blocks of late-night or very early-morning time on local television stations, where they showed films of
their staff working with starving people. What Amin brought
back far exceeded their normal fare. They made the film accessible to the press. After it appeared on BBC, NBC happened to be
the first network to discover it.
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Scooped by NBC, the rest of the American press rushed toward
Ethiopia. It just happened that Newsday was already working in
Africa on a famine story. We had applied months before for Ethiopian visas. As a result, we were the first American newspaper on
the ground, just a day or two after Amin’s film was for seen in the
U.S. As leader of the Newsday team, I had a unique opportunity to
watch the feeding frenzy of press and humanitarian organizations. It was gruesome.
I came away from that experience with the disheartening feeling that fundraising and performance were not necessarily correlated. I’m sure I’m not the only journalist who had that feeling.
It left me with a healthy skepticism about the claims of some
humanitarian organizations, and admiration for others.
World Vision was the most effective group at fundraising and
getting press attention. They had the system down to a science.
On my return from Ethiopia in 1985, I visited their headquarters
in Monrovia, California, and encountered a huge room—bigger
than a basketball arena—where hundreds of people wearing telephone headsets were soliciting donations and following up on
responses to the late-night television programs.
Their public relations staff was huge. Having heard months
before I departed for Africa that I planned to write about humanitarian problems, a World Vision press representative had begun
to call me with offers of help. I realized that she had actually
been assigned to me, a sort of case officer. Her attention increased as my departure date approached. A few days before I
left, she sent me a Federal Express package containing a pith
helmet. I still haven’t used it, although I think that, soaked beforehand, it will keep me cool some summer day in upstate New
York.
Once in Ethiopia, I continued to be approached by World Vision press representatives, who obviously had been alerted to my
presence and role by my case officer. They offered all kinds of
help, including trips to Korem in one of the two airplanes they
had, each emblazoned with the huge World Vision logo. At this
time, thousands of unfortunates in Korem were sick and starving
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to death. They desperately needed food and medicine, which
should have filled the planes instead of reporters.
I managed to get to Korem without them. But as literally hundreds of journalists from around the world poured into Addis
Ababa, some others did take them up. When I got home, I saw
that the World Vision plane, with its large logo, was in the background in many TV stories.
I don’t want to single out World Vision for criticism. People I
respect say it has raised its standards and effectiveness dramatically. But at that time, World Vision was by no means the most
active or efficient humanitarian group in Korem. That category
belonged to Doctors Without Borders, then an exclusively
French group; British chapters of Oxfam and Save the Children;
and, if I recall correctly, Irish Concern.
And while World Vision was the single largest beneficiary of
voluntary contributions to private American humanitarian organizations during the Ethiopian famine, it was by no means the
most effective throughout the rest of the country. Its fundraising
seemed to be the tail wagging the dog. Its programs lagged far
behind.
Another group that surprised me was Save the Children
U.S.A., one of several national branches of a loosely affiliated
organization also located in Great Britain and in Scandinavian
countries. Few people outside of the humanitarian community
realize that these are different organizations. Moved by TV pictures of Save the Children Fund U.K. workers helping starving
people, many concerned Americans sent money to Save the Children U.S.A.
Millions of dollars rained on its Westport, Connecticut, headquarters. One would think that they would have passed the
money along to their British counterparts in Ethiopia. But no,
Save the Children U.S.A. kept the money and started up a small
program in Ethiopia to justify their action. In contrast, Oxfam
America, a very principled organization in my view, forwarded
the contributions it received to Oxfam U.K., which was working
in Ethiopia.
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Rise of NGOs
The proliferation of NGOs seeking media attention is due not
only to the burst of complex humanitarian emergencies. Starting
in the early 1990s, the UN began to allow increased participation
by NGOs at large, decennial global meetings on such issues as
environment, women’s rights, and population control. The first
example of this was the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, which produced
Agenda 21 and the idea that rich countries of the north should
compensate poorer countries in the south for the extra cost of
developing industrially in a more environmentally sensitive way.
Traditionally, these global UN meetings were exclusively for
member nations and official representatives. But Western environmental NGOs had become strong enough politically, especially with the rise of Green Parties in the parliaments of Europe,
that they were given access to the proceedings—and a role in
influencing the outcome. These groups, in turn, sponsored the
participation of fledgling environmental groups from the Third
World. Political reformers and revolutionaries throughout the
Third World took the opportunity to get involved. The NGO
Forum at Rio became a sounding board for all sorts of other
grievances. This process continued to grow with the world population summit held later in Cairo and a worldwide meeting on
women’s rights in Beijing. At each gathering, the NGOs from the
rich countries showed NGOs from poorer countries how to attract the press.

Follow the Money
To understand the culture of humanitarian organizations with
which he or she is dealing, journalists should apply the old adage
of investigative reporters—follow the money. Understanding
where a group’s support comes from explains its publicity needs.
By no means am I arguing that a journalist should deliberately
help groups raise money through publicity. But I am saying that
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it is important to understand their needs to avoid being manipulated and to work harmoniously with them. The journalist’s obligation is to convey a true picture of what is happening in a
disaster situation. If a humanitarian group can help, so much the
better. And if the story brings attention to their legitimately good
works, even better. But generally, they should be viewed as facilitator rather than the point of the story. The story should focus
on people in trouble, their needs, and how well they are being
met.
There’s a great difference between the publicity needs of nongovernmental humanitarian groups in the United States and in
Western Europe—and, within Europe, between those in predominantly Catholic countries and those in Protestant countries.
This stems from who controls the dispensation and destination
of humanitarian aid. In Europe, the bulk of humanitarian aid is
provided by either governments or the church. In Europe’s parliamentary systems, a large permanent bureaucracy develops and
implements humanitarian policy, which survives political
changes of government. In the United States, the public has a
greater role in influencing humanitarian aid—either through
Congress or through direct giving.
Traditionally, as pointed out by Alexis de Toqueville, Americans love to set up privately-funded voluntary organizations for
many purposes, not only humanitarian activities. These organizations are often called nonprofit groups in the U.S. If they do
humanitarian work, they are called private voluntary organizations, or PVOs. In Europe, the same types of groups are called
nongovernmental organizations, or NGOs, a reflection of the
greater role government funding plays in supporting them.
The upshot is that European NGO publicity needs pale in comparison to PVO needs in the United States, where the connection
between publicity and fundraising is intimate and insatiable. In
fact, the opportunity for private fundraising is so great that European-based humanitarian organizations—Amnesty International,
Doctors Without Borders, and Reporters Without Borders, for

JOSHUA FRIEDMAN

193

example—are setting up U.S. counterparts with the same names
to raise funds.
It was during a press freedom mission to Turkey that I saw vividly how European parliamentary funding of NGOs affects their
behavior. The mission consisted of delegations from New Yorkbased Committee to Protect Journalists and Reporters Without
Borders, a French-based NGO, at that time financed primarily by
the European Union. In contrast, CPJ refuses to accept government money, depending mainly on large American journalism
companies and foundations for its support.
At the time, Turkey was the world champion of jailing and punishing journalists. The Turkish government had just changed and
its new prime minister, apparently under orders from the military, was, at least temporarily, adopting a much more conciliatory
approach to journalists. Many were being released from jail and
the government was talking about easing its notorious anti-press
laws. It was clearly a time to try negotiation and discussion rather
than our usual stance of confrontation with Turkish government
leaders.
We had far greater access to the country’s top officials than I
had experienced on previous CPJ missions to Turkey. When we
sat down with Turkish President Suleyman Demeril, CPJ delegation leader Terry Anderson presented our position matter-offactly but politely. Then the leader of Reporters Without Borders
had his turn. In a strident voice, he waggled his finger at President Demeril, self righteously lecturing him on human rights. It
was very counterproductive. I left the meeting angry at him. But,
in retrospect, I realized what he was up to.
In Europe, Turkey’s application for membership in the European Union is a controversial issue that arouses passionate arguments over its human rights policies, on one hand, and its
allegations of European intolerance toward Muslims, on the
other. Large Moslem Turkish immigrant communities in Western
Europe, especially in Germany, rub up uncomfortably against the
Christian majority. Demonstrating Kurdish immigrants frequently dramatize Turkish human rights violations. Complaining
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about Turkish human rights standards is a high priority for many
members of the European Parliament, chief patron of Reporters
Without Borders. In the United States, on the other hand, the
Turkey issue is far less familiar and arouses little of the same emotion. Any conciliatory approach we made to President Demirel
would have little effect on our private funders.
In Catholic countries of Europe, there is a greater tradition
of giving humanitarian aid through the church, which buffers
nongovernmental humanitarian agencies like Caritas from having to mount publicity campaigns to affect parochial political attitudes in each country. Their client is the more compassionate,
less fickle Vatican in Rome. The Lutheran countries of Scandinavia have a very strong tradition of compassionate religious humanitarian agencies. In Great Britain, there are more secular
NGOs, thus making them more dependent on popular opinion.
But the five largest secular agencies, such as Oxfam, Save the
Children, and the Red Cross, have a joint annual appeal that has
developed a strong constituency, reducing the need to shock the
public with pictures of starving children.

Pressures Mount for U.S. Publicity
Since the 1980s, several coincidental developments have added
to the mania for U.S. press coverage of humanitarian activities:
diminishing American government support for multilateral humanitarian aid (and the United Nations in general), and a growing emphasis on private humanitarian activity, starting with the
Reagan and the first Bush administrations; the rise in humanitarian disasters as mentioned above; and the fantastic fundraising
successes of groups like World Vision.
During the cold war, the U.S. system for dealing with overseas
hunger emergencies was to distribute food aid multilaterally
through the UN World Food Program or distribute it bilaterally
through one of a handful of large, established American humanitarian PVOs like CARE. This was done under Public Law 480,
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which tapped into the enormous stock of surplus food the government maintained.
What I saw in Ethiopia was this system in transition. In Ethiopia, the lead agency hired by the U.S. to distribute the bulk of
this food was Catholic Relief Services. CRS, the American equivalent of Caritas, didn’t really have to worry about publicity since
its funds came from the church and it had a long history of distributing aid for the U.S. government. Its publicity apparatus during the 1984 Ethiopian famine was minimal.
But some in the Reagan administration felt that traditional
agencies like CRS or CARE were too liberal. They attempted, not
too successfully, to funnel PL480 food aid through more politically conservative, evangelical Christian groups like World Vision.
This was especially true in Central America.
At the same time, the United Nations system came under pressure. The Reagan administration had begun to cut back on financial support to force the UN to reform itself. Its humanitarian
institutions could no longer automatically count on the United
States for support.
Then the food surpluses in rich countries began to evaporate.
First in the United States, in the Reagan administration, and
more recently in Western Europe, agricultural subsidies became
dirty words. The huge grain surplus in the U.S. and the ‘‘butter
mountain’’ in Western Europe began to shrink. Wealthy countries would have to dip into taxpayer money to buy food to be
given out to poor countries.
The impact of this became very clear at the decennial World
Food Summit in Rome in November 1996, put on by the UN
Food and Agriculture Organization. It introduced the international equivalent of the U.S. Welfare Reform Act that the Clinton
administration and a newly Republican Congress had just enacted for the poor of the United States.
U.S. welfare reform gave American welfare recipients five years
to get jobs and get off the government dole. The formal declaration endorsed at the Rome Summit pledged to cut the world’s
then 840 million hungry in half by 2010, a far more modest goal
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than the pledge to feed all the world’s hungry enunciated at the
previous World Food Summit in 1974. Lobbied for by the United
States, this reduced goal reflected a decision to avoid large food
aid commitments in the future.
The result of the declaration was that poor countries would
have to either grow enough food for their own people or trade
some other commodity—such as timber or minerals—to raise
money to buy food. Even for starving people in poor countries,
food was becoming a commodity. Ironically, even attempts to
subsidize agricultural production in poor countries were being
discouraged by market economy reforms that the Reagan administration had started pushing as a condition of International
Monetary Fund loans.
Officials of food-producing countries made no attempt to disguise their dilemma in news conferences, speeches, and background papers: government farm subsidies were on the way out
(although now partially revived by the second Bush administration and a Democratic Senate); food surpluses in rich countries
were shrinking; and taxpayers in the U.S. and Western Europe
were no longer willing to buy food for poor countries. At the
same time the world demand for imported food, especially in
poor countries, was soaring.
U.S. food aid told the story. It had dropped from 17.3 million
tons in 1992 to 14 million tons in 1999 while needs grew. And
looming over all this, another 2.6 billion people would need to
be fed by 2025, experts predicted.
The upshot of this has been a growing appetite for public relations activities by UN humanitarian organizations. Large semiautonomous agencies in the United Nations system—such as UNICEF, the WFP, and UNHCR—are hoping public relations will
increase American public pressure on Congress and the White
House to fund their particular mandates.
The Press Cuts Back
But this desire for more coverage of humanitarian issues comes
at a time when the American press is spending less to cover the
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rest of the world. Whether or not they are reporting fully on humanitarian problems is least on the minds of beleaguered media
executives. The daily newspaper industry is stymied by plummeting readership. The three major television networks are losing
market share to cable television. Cable News Network’s recent
monopoly over twenty-four-hour news is being eroded by Rupert
Murdoch’s Fox Network. The entire media industry is cutting
back spending because of a drop in advertising.
The first victim of all these factors has been expensive foreign
news coverage. The general consensus in the media industry is
that American readers and viewers are not interested in news
about the rest of the world—unless there is a threat to the lives
of American soldiers or to viewers and their families themselves.
This would account for the temporary spike of interest in foreign
news since the September 11 terrorist attacks.
Studies several years ago showed that as soon as a foreign news
story came on the screen during the CBS Evening News with Dan
Rather, viewers would start switching to other channels, according to Tom Bettag, then Rather’s executive producer and now
executive producer of ABC’s Nightline.
Because the level of viewer market share determines advertising rates, TV executives pay close attention to these types of studies. Until September 11, spending and time budgeted for foreign
news had been dropping for several years. The three big networks had closed most of their foreign bureaus and diverted resources to covering celebrity and personality news. The concept
of important foreign news became a story like the death of Princess Diana.
Television cable news industry went through the same changes.
CNN, which had formerly covered humanitarian issues quite extensively, changed format dramatically, cutting back on foreign
coverage and introducing talk show formats and celebrity profiles.
Large regional newspapers, which had considered it an obligation to cover important foreign news with their own personnel,
began to pull back. With the exception of a few large newspapers
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like The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles Times and
the Washington Post, there was little original reporting overseas
prior to September 11. The reason was not only financial, although ads were dropping because of the national economic
slowdown. There was also the feeling that since newspaper readership was aging and shrinking, something drastic had to be
done to attract younger readers. Sifting through demographic
studies like tea leaves, many newspaper executives began to eliminate the longer, in-depth stories they felt alienated readers, and
began to increase ‘‘news you can use’’ features about lifestyles,
shopping, and entertainment.
Accelerating these changes has been the growing concentration of ownership of print and electronic media into the hands of
a few large public corporations and a reduction in family-owned
media.
Family-owned companies are accountable only to themselves.
If they have a strong tradition of social responsibility, they can
ignore ups and downs in the economy and continue to spend
money on important stories that may not attract many readers.
But even if they wanted to cover poor people in other countries,
large publicly-owned newspaper companies must pay attention to
Wall Street pressure to boost circulation and, thus, ad revenue.
This means, for example, stories on Princess Diana rather than
floods in Bangladesh.
Because most of the nation’s large newspaper companies are
publicly owned, they compete on the stock market with other
companies for investors. Newspapers belong to the consumer cyclical sector, which they share with radio and television stations
that can earn 30 percent to 40 percent in annual operating revenue. Thus, newspaper companies feel they must earn well over
20 percent in annual operating revenue to satisfy Wall Street analysts. Average daily newspaper operating revenues in the economically depressed year of 2001, for example, averaged about 18
percent and were considered disastrous.
The impact of this concentration of public ownership is dramatic. CNN, for example, used to be controlled by Ted Turner,
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who wanted to make money but was also devoted to using his
network to promote world peace and prosperity. Turner sold
control of CNN to Time Warner, more subject to pressures of its
stockholders, but still a media company. Time Warner cut back
some of Turner’s emphasis on foreign news coverage. But the
pace quickened when the company was gobbled up by AOL, a
product of the tech stock bubble.
In the newspaper business, a few giant media companies—
Knight Ridder, Gannett, and Tribune—have been gobbling up
their competitors. Foreign news is suffering. Knight Ridder’s Philadelphia Inquirer, for example, has gone from being a perennial
Pulitzer Prize winner, known for its in-depth foreign coverage, to
an aggressively local newspaper. Tribune, which recently bought
the Times Mirror Company, is expected to start consolidating the
extensive foreign reporting resources of the individual newspapers it has just bought, like the Los Angeles Times, the Baltimore
Sun, and Newsday, which had won three Pulitzer Prizes in International Reporting in the last decade and a half. These three are
among the few American newspapers that have been devoting
time and space to covering humanitarian issues.
Even before Tribune starts homogenizing its company’s foreign coverage, I doubt very much whether Newsday would now
make available to any of its reporters the time and money that
was at my disposal when I covered in the 1984 African famine.

9

The Sinews of Humanitarian
Assistance: Funding Policies,
Practices, and Pitfalls
Joelle Tanguy
‘‘Money and not morality is the principle of commerce and
commercial nations,’’ wrote Thomas Jefferson to John Langdon.
In humanitarian assistance, our readers should easily agree that
morality, not money, ought to be the backing principle. Today’s
reality lies somewhere in between. Humanitarian operations provide life-saving assistance to millions, but are mostly funded
through mechanisms of limited congruence to humanitarian objectives, tainted by political and economic influences, prejudiced
by public perceptions driven by commercialized media, and interfering with effective accountability—itself a concept yet to be
clearly defined.
Will humanitarian organizations successfully maneuver the
complexity of their financial environment? Will we see the ‘‘politics of compassion’’ further deviate from the principles of humanitarian action? What redesign of the system is looming
ahead? What is at stake for the hundreds of millions of people
facing conflict and disaster and the more than 35 million displaced from their home?
To contemplate the questions that will define humanitarian
assistance in the next decade, we must start by exploring the policies, practices, and pitfalls of today’s system, as illustrated in the
most recent developments.
Our starting point ought to be a definition of humanitarian
action: the alleviation of human suffering through care and assis-
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tance by independent and impartial agents. Admittedly, nowadays, ‘‘humanitarian assistance’’ lines in the budgets of donor
countries and NGOs have swollen progressively to include a
larger scope of activities involving transitional development, even
peace-building and conflict resolution work, carried out by various institutions and networks—even the military—in the latest
phenomenon of ‘‘humanitarian interventions.’’
If the sinews of war are ‘‘men, money, materials, maintenance,
and morale,’’1 those are, too, the sinews of humanitarian assistance, money bearing no small part in the equation. We will explore here how humanitarian action is funded today, the trends
affecting these financial matters, and how they translate into operational and ethical issues. We will review the fundraising mechanism of nongovernmental organizations and international
agencies involved in emergency operations, consider the evolving role of the media in the process of mobilizing public support,
and explore the debates over the accountability of humanitarian
organizations.

Governments Lead Global Humanitarian Funding
Overview
The bulk of emergency assistance funds come from governments
and were greatly expanded in the last decades. To describe the
trajectory in broad terms, let us say that annual humanitarian
funding remained below U.S.$500 million in the 1970s, springing up in the mid-1980s with the Ethiopian and Sudanese crises,
remaining around $1 billion until the end of the cold war, rising
abruptly to between $4 billion and $5.5 billion with the Kurdistan, Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda crises of the early 1990s, and
leveling off for a few years to between $3.5 billion and $4.5 billion
annually before rising again with the Kosovo and, more recently,
the Afghanistan crises. (See Figure 9.1.)
While this increase sounds like a positive development for the
millions of people affected by instability since the end of the cold
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Figure 9.1 Total Humanitarian Assistance 1989–1998 (in millions of
U.S. dollars)
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Source: OECD DAC statistics table 1 and 2a; WFP Annexes to Annual Report and IASC
Global Humanitarian Assistance 2000 report table A1.

war, it should be put in perspective with the increase in per-capita
wealth in donor countries, which rose from U.S.$21,000 to
$28,000 per year in the 1990s. Within that same period, only
some U.S.$5 per capita per year was allocated by donor countries
to humanitarian assistance. (See Figure 9.2.)
Governments’ funding for humanitarian assistance is both
multilateral and bilateral. Multilateral assistance is channeled by
the United Nations and the European Commission, while bilateral assistance may be allocated government to government or
through NGOs. While in the late 1980s, the UN enjoyed a 40
percent to 50 percent share of humanitarian assistance, it had
dropped by the late 1990s to 25 percent, while bilateral aid and
EC shares expanded respectively to up to 60 percent and 20 percent.2
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Figure 9.2 Humanitarian Assistance Per Capita
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Throughout the 1990s, the United States was the leading donor
to UN Consolidated Appeals in aggregate terms, providing, on
average, a third of emergency assistance funds while four donors,
including Japan and the European Commission, provided the
next third. (See figure 9.3.) A large part of the U.S. contribution
has been in food aid, which actually dominates the sectors of
emergency assistance, capturing 60 percent of government donors’ contributions to UN emergency appeals in 2001. (See Figure 9.4.)
In addition to funding from the thirty states that are members
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), contributions from non-OECD countries have
also risen over the years. While still a small portion of the total,
these illustrate the ‘‘burden sharing’’ emphasized by parallel efforts to strengthen regional organizations such as the Organiza-
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Figure 9.3 Top Ten Donors to UN Humanitarian Consolidated
Appeals, 2001
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Source: ReliefWeb, consolidated appeal financial tracking system, 2001.

tion of African Unity (OAU). A rarely visible part of the
humanitarian assistance equation has been the tremendous support of host countries neighboring the countries in crisis. They
bear the largest burden in proportion to their resources, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa where the GNP is the lowest and the
burden of refugees the highest. The increasingly restrictive asylum policies of OECD countries have further compounded the
situation.
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are also backing humanitarian assistance with private funds collected from their own
civil societies: general public contributions as well as foundations
and corporate gifts. The United Nations financial tracking shows
them ranging 10 to 15 percent of total donations to Consolidated
Appeals in recent years,3 but this figure pertains only to UN appeals, and the overall impact of private support may be thus underestimated. Many in the NGO community, and even in UN
agencies4, are now working hard at their emancipation from gov-
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Figure 9.4 Donor Contributions to UN Appeals by Sector, 2001
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ernment foreign aid policies and at the cultivation of private, that
is to say, nongovernmental, support.
Private backing of aid still lags significantly behind the volumes
of government funding and the bulk of NGOs’ relief operations
remain dependent on government funds for emergency assistance. In fact, the channeling of government funds through
NGOs expanded dramatically in the 1990s, with many governments expensing more than a quarter of their budgets in this
manner. This dependency is a key feature of the relief community today.
Complex Funding Mechanisms and Resource Flows
While the flowchart in Figure 9.5 appears complex enough to illustrate the resource flows in the humanitarian aid system, it is only
a two dimensional design of a multidimensional system. In each
category of actors such as ‘‘donor agencies’’ or ‘‘international
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nongovernmental agencies,’’ there are scores of independent institutions coordinating their funding and operational decisions
rather poorly.
For example, in a single emergency situation, half a dozen independent UN agencies may be operating and competitively raising funds, including UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, even WHO and

Figure 9.5 Resource Flows in the International Relief System
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UNDP. As UN agencies are rarely delivering services directly to
the population, they will grant funds to NGOs for relevant projects. Yet the same NGOs compete for the same government
funds granted directly. These NGOs, which may number in the
tens or even hundreds, are meanwhile competing with each
other for both government donors’ attention and media interest.
The ‘‘relief circus’’5 of Mogadishu, Goma, and Sarajevo, where
hundreds of new NGOs appeared within a single month—often
unprepared and untrained, and sometimes confused on their
mission and role—while major NGOs competed aggressively for
media and donor attention, are the most flagrant illustrations of
how the complex system can go awry.
The picture ends up radically simplified in humanitarian crises
enjoying little media coverage.6 There, fewer players are at play,
since budgetary constraints are forbidding, except for the rare
few who have access to un-earmarked funds that can be deployed
on the basis of humanitarian needs alone. When budgets are
tight and players few, cooperation is often simplified and amplified in front of dire need—sometimes only a few hundred miles
away from a ‘‘relief circus.’’
How does the system fare? As Shepard Forman concludes,
‘‘without systematic and transparent needs and impact assessments, it is difficult to determine whether existing levels of
aggregate expenditure are, in fact, adequate. Unfortunately, government funding tends to arrive following the onslaught of a crisis, when political support has peaked, rather than in its incipient
stages when comprehensive need assessments should be carried
out. Moreover, national interest criteria usually guide donor government decisions and seriously compromise the equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance across crises, rendering it
insufficient in many cases. In any event, there is a strong sense of
resource constraint among the community of aid providers.’’7
The complexity of the funding mechanisms for humanitarian
missions is daunting and impacts not only resources but also coordination and accountability practices.
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Major Recent Trends
In the last decades, several developments dramatically altered the
financial and operational environment of humanitarian assistance, in particular: the dwindling of development assistance
budgets and their partial redirection toward emergency assistance; the proliferation of NGOs involved in humanitarian assistance along with the rapid growth of a few large international
NGO networks; and the dependence on governments funding
that still characterizes most relief agencies.
Dwindling Foreign and Development Aid
Official Development Assistance (ODA) budgets include both
development and emergency assistance (and a number of other
instruments), and are often managed by the same governmental
institutions. ODA has dropped to its lowest levels in half a century. In 1999, only four of the twenty-two countries in the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD8 actually met or
exceeded the target of 0.7 percent of GNP for their level of foreign aid (Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and Sweden). The
last of these twenty-two donor countries was the United States,
which, although a leading donor and second only to Japan in
total dollar value, is only contributing a mere 0.10 percent of
GNP (ten times less than the Danes). Overall, ODA has also
dropped as a percentage of donor government expenditures
from an average of 0.8 percent in the early 1990s to 0.6 percent
in the late 1990s.
Donors budgets were characterized in the 1990s by simultaneous drops in military and foreign aid spending, but while the
military costs declined by 6 percent, foreign aid declined at the
accelerated pace of 23 percent between 1992 and 1997.9
From Multilateral Development to Bilateral Humanitarian Assistance
During the same period, donor countries each allocated anywhere between 1 percent and 25 percent of their foreign aid bud-
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Figure 9.6 Aid From All OECD-DAC Donors as a Percentage of GNP

Source: OECD, 2001.

get to humanitarian assistance, but, on average, bilateral
humanitarian assistance rose progressively to an average of 12
percent of bilateral ODA in 1999. Meanwhile, as we noted earlier,
the share of humanitarian assistance channeled through the
United Nations dropped by half within ten years while the shares
of bilateral aid and European Community (EC) support expanded. By the late 1990s, bilateral donors controlled over 60
percent of humanitarian assistance.10
In each OECD capital, even when foreign aid budget discussions become intense, they rarely appear to threaten the bulk of
humanitarian assistance that enjoys steady bi-partisan support. In
Foreign Affairs, David Rieff cites a bitter U.S. State Department
Official in Rwanda: ‘‘There’s money for weapons, and money for
starving refugees, and that’s about it.’’11
The immediate consequence of the converging trends—
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Figure 9.7 Bilateral Humanitarian Assistance as a Share of Bilateral ODA

Source: OECD.

decreased ODA, decreased development aid, increased humanitarian assistance budgets—have been a re-composition of the
field of humanitarian assistance with new actors, often originally
development agencies who bring the development perspective to
emergency assistance. At Oxfam, the share of emergency-related
programs rose steadily to 40 percent of its U.K.£115 million in
2001. Save the Children and World Vision now operate more
often in crises situations. Even human-rights organizations, such
as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty, became more operational
in the field and started tackling matters of refugee rights.
While this phenomenon enriched the debates and enabled
new approaches to old humanitarian problems, it also brought
tremendous confusion in the exercise of coordination and in the
definition of humanitarian assistance itself.
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With new players and new pressures came new concepts—
some helpful, some not—such as ‘‘complex emergencies,’’ ‘‘relief to development continuum,’’ ‘‘nation building,’’ ‘‘conflict
prevention,’’ even ‘‘humanitarian military intervention.’’ The
pressure of the human rights movement on the new and conceptually fragile community of relief workers led to heated debates
often started without a solid grounding in humanitarian law, resulting in interesting yet often-dangerous turns in the positioning
of ‘‘humanitarian actors’’ vis-à-vis their governments, military,
local authorities, communities, etc. . . .
The shift in the field of humanitarian assistance may be as significant as that of the 1970s that brought a whole new generation
of ‘‘sans-frontiers’’ organizations alongside—and in tension
with—the Red Cross movement. This new shift is one whose final
trajectory is not known yet: will the new ‘‘community of humanitarian actors’’ find its bearings in the post 9/11 world? The recent debates demonstrate the healthy space for soulsearching—yet the pressures may mount in the anti-terrorism
war and ‘‘humanitarian’’ NGOs will need more than ever to
know what humanitarianism stands for in order to stand for it.
A Breeding Ground of New NGOs
The 1990s were marked not only by the encounter and transformation of development aid and humanitarian assistance, but also
by the proliferation of NGOs and the transformation of their collective power through civil society.
Even the United Nations acknowledged and institutionalized
the phenomenon by the mid-1990s. In his 1998 report, the Secretary-General highlighted that from the forty-one NGOs granted
consultative status by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1948, and 377 in 1968, the number of NGOs in consultative status had expanded to over 1,350. While 200 NGOs were
associated with the Department of Public Information in 1968;
there were now 1,550.
Back in OECD capitals, the same phenomenon can be ob-
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served. The number of aid agencies registered with USAID, the
U.S. development agency, has tripled in twelve years since 1982.
InterAction, an alliance of U.S.-based ‘‘international and humanitarian NGOs,’’ both secular and religious, counts more than 160
members operating in over 100 countries. Ministry Watch, an online database serving potential donors to Christian ministries,
lists forty-eight U.S. Christian organizations registered as carrying
out relief and development work, including World Vision, Mercy
Corps, and Samaritan’s Purse. The situation is mirrored in Brussels, London, Paris, etc. . . .
Meanwhile, local NGOs in recipient countries have multiplied
as well. The pace of their development varies tremendously from
country to country, given the variety of political and economic
contexts. Yet, many such groups are now partnering with international NGOs and UN agencies.
New Titans of Emergency Assistance
A July 2000 study commissioned by DFID, the British Department
for Foreign International Development, on the role of NGOs and
other charity flows concludes that some of the world’s largest NGOs
now have incomes larger than several bilateral donors, are active in
more countries, and are certainly as influential in their ability to command public and political attention.12
While the study referred to development assistance, the same
could be inferred of relief work of certain NGOs, whose budgets have
risen over the last two decades. The lines between the two categories—humanitarian and development—have become rather blurred
anyway. Initially a development organization, religious in its organizing principle, U.S.-born World Vision ventured into emergency assistance aggressively in the 1990s, and became a major player with an
annual budget around the half-billion U.S. dollar mark! The large
post-World Wars agencies such CARE, Oxfam, Save the Children
U.K., and Catholic Relief Services similarly increased their emergency
assistance activities in the 1990s and became small giants, with budgets of U.S.$200 million to U.S.$300 million. The Médecins sans frontières network, the largest of the 1970s generation of humanitarian
NGOs, reached $320 million in 2000.
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Compared to the titans of the U.S. nonprofit world, these organizations may not seem all that mighty. After all, CARE is ranking only
eightieth among the top 400 U.S. charities, and Catholic Relief Services is ninety-fifth. Even World Vision, in its seventeenth position, is
dwarfed by the likes of the Salvation Army and American Red Cross13
whose budgets, $2.7 billion and $2.4 billion respectively in 2000,
are more than five times World Vision’s.14
Of course, all are dwarfed by corporate entities operating in many
of the countries in crisis, such as those in the oil and extraction businesses. ExxonMobil, for example, is a U.S.$232 billion company. Yet
its corporate philanthropy remains limited: its 1997 worldwide contributions were about $55 million, some $42 million in the United
States and $13 million in other countries.
Let us not forget, however, that when compared with government
donors, World Vision, with its half-billion dollar budget, is tailing Belgium’s annual ODA budget of $753 million in 1999, and is ahead of
Austria, Finland, and five other OECD countries. And the pack of
other international NGOs challenged or passed Portugal, Greece, Ireland, New Zealand, and Luxembourg, whose annual ODA budgets
range from $275 to $115 million.

While this ought to help foster the further development of civil
society, it also encounters some serious limiting factors in emergency and especially conflict situations. Given the time pressure,
sustainable capacity building is rarely engaged, and the relationship ends up often being a contractual arrangement in the delivery of goods and services. Furthermore, security and political
issues come into play, and may compromise many local actors—
the pressures on local NGO leaders being tremendous in times
of crisis. The conflict also rarely affords them the luxury of neutrality and impartiality required of humanitarian operators, as
was epitomized in Rwanda during the genocide, and even in the
refugee camps. Somalia also witnessed the manipulation of humanitarian resources by a mushrooming army of warlord-owned
local NGOs. . . .
A trend ‘‘from service delivery to leverage’’ may be in motion
with the rise of civil society organizations worldwide. It will be
slower at the heart of conflicts since, unsurprisingly, there is little
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‘‘civil society’’ left at the heart of uncivil civil wars. But the emergence of many new NGOs on the frontlines is a new trend to
reckon with—and build upon—while new ‘‘titans’’ emerge from
the rapid expansion of major international NGO networks. (See
box above.)
Independent NGOs?
The true limiting factor of these international NGOs’ ability to
actually command public and political attention for the exclusive
benefit of their beneficiaries is the reality of their dependence to
their institutional donors. A rare few are exceptions to the rule,
but overall relief operators have been held hostage, willing or
unwilling, to government funding.
Figure 9.8 A Measure of Independence? U.S. Nonprofit Agencies
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International networks have varying policies and practices.
Save the Children Fund U.K. (SCF U.K.) has been faring slightly
better than its U.S. partner, with 41 percent of its U.K.£115 million budget funded by governmental and multilateral agencies15
whereas 49 percent of SCF U.S.A. budget is contributed by private donors. The Oxfam network is well supported by private donors, but Oxfam America’s choice of 100 percent private funds
is not shared by Oxfam U.K., whose cash and commodities support from government and multilateral agencies amounted to 30
percent of its income in 2001.
The political culture and history of U.S. and European organizations differ widely, especially in the relationship between civil
society and government foreign policies. To describe it in very
broad terms, while European NGOs often inherited from the decolonization era their suspicion of governments, traditional U.S.
development agencies have never been in confrontation with the
U.S. government which, even in the cold war, was seen as pushing
forth a certain human rights ideal.
There is no line in the sand defining the ratio of private funds
that would ensure operational and political independence of
organizations. Some even argue that such heavy reliance on institutional funding is an asset—inexpensive fundraising and independence from the short attention span of the general
public—with side effects requiring only to be properly managed.
It is therefore empirical evidence rather than scientific data
that helps NGO executive teams and boards maneuver in this
environment. That is, assuming there is maneuvering space for
the humanitarian action: as humanitarian assistance becomes
central to the foreign policy agenda, and with the rise of military
interventions, this maneuvering space is shrinking.
In this context, one of the troublesome features of the disaster
relief NGO community in the U.S. has been its general tendency
to ignore the tension that lies between humanitarian, political,
and military. Even as the Kosovo intervention unfolded, its own
coordination team, the InterAction Disaster Response Committee, was dependent on the U.S. government’s Office of Foreign
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Disaster Assistance (OFDA) for the funding of its core activities,
and had granted it the right to vet the appointment of its chief
staff member.16 In addition, InterAction senior staff has often
been appointed from or to positions in the U.S. government, and
in recent years, a number of its activities involved close collaboration with the military without a clear sense of mission. It worked
extensively on the security of humanitarian workers, a preoccupation of many agencies, without ever decisively recognizing the
threat emerging from humanitarian NGOs being seen in the
field as the foot soldiers of military intervention. Set up in the
mid-1980s as facilitator for NGOs to coordinate and help influence U.S. policy and debate on international issues, InterAction
is now sometimes seen as the NGO liaison tool for the U.S. administration to orchestrate the support of NGOs.
Also of concern is the increased conditionality of some donor
contributions: tying funds to purchases from an identified
source—such as OFDA’s insistence on U.S. sourcing of pharmaceuticals—or to political objectives—such as the German’s government insistence on Bosnian repatriation in the late 1990s,
despite NGO concerns for security conditions.17
All these developments are concurrent to tremendous changes
in the environment of humanitarian assistance, especially in its
relationship to peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, human rights
and conflict prevention agendas. In the field, the fragmentation
of armed movements, and the increasingly blurred distinctions
between state and non-state, private and public, political and
business initiatives, are leading to a confusion of roles and increased manipulation and misuse of aid. Yet aid organizations,
although lamenting the ‘‘humanitarian alibi,’’ are lined up to
receive more government funding.18
A Contrasted View of Independence
Two ‘‘titans’’ of emergency assistance, World Vision and MSF, both
have high private funding ratios, yet exercise their independence in
rather contrasted ways:
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Médecins sans frontières (MSF) was no exception to the trend of
government dependence of humanitarian operators a decade ago:
in the early 1990s, as many multilateral funds shifted under bilateral
control, it was faced with the abrupt consolidation of its UN and
European Union funding into Brussels’s hands. The organization reacted immediately, and in 1992 went on to explore institutional
donor diversification—new relationships with DIFID, USAID, SIDA,
and AUSAID, for example—and to expand national and international
private donor bases, with a focus on smaller donors rather than large
philanthropic organizations. The institutional funding diversification
was achieved within a year by its Paris-based organization, and the
focus on building private donor bases paid off over time with the
international network now enjoying a private funding ratio of 80 percent, raising some $260 million from 2.5 million private and individual donors worldwide.19 This conscious effort to remain fiercely
independent of political powers is a logical consequence of the exclusively humanitarian focus and the culture of the organization, as
well as the cultural cradle of the May 1968 generation of French
intellectuals who influenced its development.
World Vision, on the other hand, defines itself as the world’s
largest Christian international relief and development agency and
was founded in the 1950s. It enjoys a rare position among U.S. relief
and development organization: not only is it the largest of the U.S.
relief operators, but 79 percent of its income comes from private
sources, a significant difference with organizations such as CARE (29
percent) and Catholic Relief Services (31 percent).20 Yet, rather than
taking distances from political powers, World Vision has developed
close ties with Washington, D.C., as demonstrated by the staffing
shuffle over the years between the two institutions. For example,
USAID’s current Administrator is a former vice president of World
Vision U.S., and had previously led the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance (OFDA).

The International Red Cross: Growing Pains and Renewal
The Geneva-based International Committee of the Red Cross is
the very institution legally entrusted since the late nineteenth
century with the humanitarian responsibility to protect and assist
the victims of armed conflicts and internal disturbances on a
strictly neutral and impartial basis.
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The National Societies of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement contribute to the ICRC budget and may, in some instances, also intervene with their own operations, with the support of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Federation, also based
in Geneva. In crises situations, the ICRC becomes responsible for
coordinating all external aid from Movement members to victims
inside the country in crisis, whereas the Federation may coordinate the Movement’s response to relief needs of refugees in
neighboring countries.
The ICRC budget in 2001 was barely a billion dollars, including some $850 million to cover the costs of field operations. For
its financing, the ICRC mostly relies on voluntary contributions
from the governments representing States Party to the Geneva
Conventions and multilateral institutions such as ECHO, from
the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and from
private sources, the Swiss public in particular. While the Red
Figure 9.9 ICRC Contributions Received in 2000

Source: ICRC.
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Cross and Red Crescent Societies and a few other private sources
provide almost 20 percent of the budget, the mainstay is backed
by public sources, primarily governments.
The Federation is a separate institution, and its budget, independent of both ICRC and national societies, was CHF323 million in 2000, or some U.S.$200 million, half of it dependent on
government funding.
The bulk (80 percent) of cash financing for the ICRC’s field
operations comes from some twenty governments and supranational donors such as the European Commission (ECHO). Governments’ tendency toward earmarking their contribution for
specific crises or services is a constraint of much concern to the
ICRC.
The ICRC has been appealing to donors for more flexibility,
as was the case in 2000 when it publicly announced a record
funding shortfall, and again in late 2001 when Afghan operations
ended up largely more funded than the 79 percent average in
ICRC emergency appeals worldwide. It called for ‘‘donor flexibility on two levels. Firstly, should it become necessary, so as to
allow earmarked contributions for Afghanistan to be brought forward to the 2002 budget for the Afghan conflict. This would secure a smooth continuation of operations and financial coverage
of this operation for the first few weeks of 2002. Secondly, so that
donor funding for Afghanistan is not detrimental to the important funding needs for humanitarian operations elsewhere in the
world.’’
This recent development illustrates again how national interests and other factors unrelated to humanitarian needs play into
the funding of assistance. The ICRC is legally bound to respond
to all humanitarian crises, yet none of its government donors
have the same obligation to provide adequate funding on an impartial basis to its operations, and, again, a major knot in the
relief system finds itself at the mercy of public perceptions and
political bias.
Fortunately, the strong humanitarian culture and independent
management of the organization have so far helped preserve at
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least the perception of—and possibly the reality of—the ICRC
independence from political agendas. Rather than funding problems, security incidents, brought about in part by its obligation
to operate whatever the situation, appear to have been the main
handicapping factors in the agency’s performance in recent
crises.
United Nations: Gaining Momentum or Loosing Ground?
The 1990s also saw the UN budget significantly expanded—by
30 percent in the decade—but with the concurrent move from
multilateral to bilateral funding, discussed above, the United Nations no longer enjoys the same financial leadership role, and
the UN appeals went irregularly funded, from 75 percent to 80
percent in the Rwanda and Kosovo crises years to below 60 percent in leaner years. See figure 9.10.
Among the challenges is the voluntary nature of the member
states contributions that fund international emergencies operations—as opposed to the regular contributions to the UN, which
are assessed on a scale approved by the General Assembly. Overall, funding remains crisis-driven, compelled by media pressure
on the donor government through its general public, and frequently not allocated in proportion to the needs: some mediafeatured crises are heavily funded while others linger on underfunded.
In the early 1990s, the United Nations sought to improve its
fundraising coordination mechanisms and put in place the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP), a new tool for joint resources
mobilization, under the oversight of what is now known as the
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
(OCHA), with a view to address the inefficiencies and pitfalls of
UN agencies competing for funds.
Criticism that the effort yielded nothing else than a consolidated ‘‘shopping list’’ of independently designed and poorly coordinated projects of UN agencies and partners, led to further
pressure for the CAP to develop into a strategic planning instrument, a tool to develop a common humanitarian strategy in a
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Figure 9.10 Funding Rates for UN Consolidated Appeals (CAP)
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given country or region in response to a complex emergency.
The CAP supposedly ‘‘enables the United Nations system and its
partners to set clear goals and define priorities in a humanitarian
operation.’’
The resources collected by the Consolidated Appeal are allocated to the various agencies of the United Nations System, with
the World Food Program (WFP) and the High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) getting the lion’s share, with a respective 50
percent and 30 percent on average in the late 1990s. (See Figure
9.11.) It is also important to note that while, in 1988, almost
three-fourths of WFP expenditures were for developmental activities, by 1998, the ratio had been inversed and more than 78 percent of its expenditures went to relief activities.
The CAP was one of several initiatives in the 1990s demonstrating a tendency toward integrated global responses under UN
coordination. Much stress has been placed on the necessity of
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Figure 9.11 Consolidated Appeals Distribution by Agency,
1994–1998 Average
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better coordination between humanitarian agencies, but also on
the design of integrated frameworks for humanitarian ‘‘diplomacy’’ linking humanitarian, political, and military (peacekeeping) strategies.
However, these beg the question of what befalls to the core
principles of impartiality and independence of humanitarian operators enshrined in the Geneva Conventions, when these operators happen to be funded by political entities juggling political
and military priorities along with, and sometimes ahead of, humanitarian ones. The matter gets worse when these agencies are
further tightly directed by strategic plans of ‘‘humanitarian diplomacy,’’ whose bottom line may not be exclusively humanitarian.
The response to UN Coordinated Appeals has been irregular.
While the central role of the United Nations was reaffirmed and
expanded in the last decade, budgets have not always followed or
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monies pledges been delivered, and UN agencies’ senior officials
have often found themselves begging for support, juggling unforeseen budgetary swings, and attempting to explore alternate
resource mobilization paths: reaching out to corporations and
the general public.21
The Case of UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency
UNHCR heavily depends on voluntary contributions by governments. Only about 2 percent of the agency’s annual budget is covered by regular contributions from the UN system. More than 90
percent of the UNHCR funds come from ten countries, with the
United States accounting for 35 percent of donations.
With the 1990s proliferation of emergencies and its increased
involvement inside conflict-torn states, the UNHCR expanded dramatically. Its staff doubled and its budget expanded from half a billion U.S. dollars in 1990 to $1.3 billion in 1996. Confronted with
budget shortfalls, it has shrunk in recent years with cutbacks imposed by donor nations. Because the budget is approved each year
by the fifty-seven UN members that make up its executive committee but many governments are failing to deliver the pledged funds,
it experienced a $100 million funding shortfall in 2000. And despite
further cuts, it was still facing a $126 million shortfall in late 2001,
before the Afghanistan appeal for which, within a month, the international community pledged $400 million to the United Nations.
Control of humanitarian aid shifted from the UN system to bilateral and EC by the late 1980s with significant consequences in the
field. One of the many outcomes was the weakened protection for
refugees. UNHCR holds a double mandate of assistance and protection for refugees. As many governments ceased to channel their assistance through the UN and directly contracted their national or
international NGOs to provide it, the UNHCR found itself with little
ammunition to negotiate protection matters with reluctant host governments. Assistance was acquired through bilateral means, and the
protection agenda spearheaded by the multilateral organization was
often ignored, as the threat of removing assistance was no longer
present.
Contributions to UNHCR from nongovernment sources have risen
threefold over the past few years, from about $10 million in 1997 to
$35 million in 1999. The Italian, American, and Japanese public
heavily supported UNHCR in the Kosovo and other crises, featuring
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respectively at the twelfth, seventeenth, and nineteenth rank among
the top twenty sources of funds of the agency worldwide.
In this fiftieth anniversary year of the Refugee Convention, as the
Afghanistan situation unraveled, the refugee agency remained
greatly dependant on government support for the fulfillment of its
protection and assistance mandate toward 15 million refugees
worldwide and millions of internally displaced.

Shared Concerns of Professionalism, Strategy, and Accountability
Along with the rise in budgets and political influence have come
obligations for emergency operators who are now also being
asked to be more professional, more strategic, and more accountable.
The call for more professionalism came, in particular, after the
formal evaluation of the Rwanda refugee crisis, where performance of many relief operators turned out to be appalling: ‘‘NGOs
played a vital role in the response, undertaking most of the delivery of assistance to beneficiaries. While many NGOs performed
impressively, providing a high quality of care and services, a number performed in an unprofessional and irresponsible manner
that resulted not only in duplication and wasted resources, but
may also have contributed to an unnecessary loss of life. The
need for NGOs to improve their performance is now widely recognized.’’22
When mortality and morbidity rates can escalate within days,
the results of individual agencies have been linked to their access
to rapid response funds, facilities, and human resources. With
the wide swings in funding, developing—and sustaining over the
years—an adequate infrastructure and the necessary competence
for effective rapid deployment have been pressing issues for UN
agencies as well as NGOs.
Yet governments have long been reluctant to pay for the required indirect headquarters costs. They have tended to fund operations where and when media and public pressure have
mounted, rather than in the early stages when and where human-
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itarian assistance ought to be prepared and planned.23 And for
many NGOs, the funding of their headquarters and emergency
preparedness infrastructure have been left to depend on private
funds from the general public, de-facto affecting the true ratio of
funds raised allocated to programs in the field and/or minimizing the effort.
Will the call for increased professionalism lead to the further
development of a cadre of international civil servants to deliver
aid? This would imply breaking away from the original traditions
of voluntarism and solidarity. How would this affect humanitarian action at large?
The calls for more sophisticated analysis and strategic vision in
assessing humanitarian space and deploying assistance are
mounting with each crisis and failure. As aid can be taxed, hijacked, looted, or racketeered and humanitarian assistance can
fuel war economies, relief workers are also being asked to avoid
‘‘doing harm while doing good.’’ More and more, they need to
carefully strategize their positioning and consider the local partners to join, the type of program to design, the control to exercise, and the level of aid to channel.
Finally, the call for accountability has led to numerous initiatives in recent years, as reviewed below, and will be a critical issue
in the coming years for the relief agencies to develop a broader
base of support.

The General Public and Humanitarian Crises
Public opinion is central to policy—at least when it is properly
engaged. Since most ‘‘humanitarian crises’’ are fundamentally
political crises with humanitarian consequences, the true potential impact on the situation often lies in foreign policy decisions
by governments and multilateral institutions, far beyond the
funding of humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian agencies are
often caught between governments seeking an alibi for their po-
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litical inaction (Bosnia, Rwanda) or linking humanitarian assistance to political or military aims (Afghanistan).
The increased global connectivity, through satellite news-feeds
and the Internet, has not yet paid off in increased awareness and
involvement by the general public, which would benefit both foreign policy decisions and the popular financial backing of humanitarian assistance. Even the much-debated CNN effect, the
media pressure to which policy decisions may be applicable,24 is
fundamentally more about short term humanitarian response
than effective awareness and engagement. Today, this awareness
is dependent on media entities tending to focus on human tragedy rather than its political roots, and limiting coverage because
of shortsighted commercial pressures.
Yet it is not impossible to think that a dramatic change is at
hand that may enroll effectively many more private and individual donors to support humanitarian assistance, strengthen the
backbone of private relief work anchored in civil society, loosen
the straightjacket of government funding, and thus radically
transform the field within less than a decade.
A Formidable Potential for Humanitarian Funding
A third of households in Britain donate to charities; 70 percent
of Americans do; and nearly 22 million Canadians, or 91 percent
of the population over age fifteen, made donations in 2000.
However, out of the $203.45 billion collected by nonprofit organizations in 2000 in the United States, for example, only 1.3
percent went to organizations involved in international affairs,
less than half to environmental causes, ten times less than to education causes, while religion collected the lion’s share with over
a third of all donations.25 One can read these statistics either with
a sense of despair or as the demonstration that much potential
remains untapped by humanitarian causes were they to reach the
hearts and minds of donors more effectively.
Should another decade-long philanthropic expansion materialize, as in the 1990s, with a rise in annual and planned giving as
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well as corporate giving and an increases use of foundations as
vehicles for personal giving, it would hold the promise of emancipation for relief and emergency assistance.
Even in a weak economy the trend for more international
funding is in motion: each major disaster with a high media profile brings new private donors to the relief and development
community, especially NGOs geared up for fundraising. Many of
these donors will continue giving for overseas assistance: as the
crises subside, NGO income settles back at much higher levels
than before.
What will this emancipation take and where will it take us?
While coordination issues skyrocket, both the emancipation of
humanitarian assistance from political influence and its expanded potential to respond exclusively on the basis of need—
and need alone—would yield tremendous beneficial outcomes.
The final destination will depend on what ethics will be the backbone of humanitarian action as it flexes its financial muscle, and
what model of accountability ends up being adopted by the community.
To be worthy of extended support from civil society donors,
relief operators will have to build further credibility and help
clean up what is sometimes coined ‘‘the business of foreign aid.’’
It will require them not only to clarify their role in relation to
interfering political and other agendas but also to reflect on the
ethics of their work most congruent with their mission. Among
the challenges, of course, feature the ethics of fundraising.
Hunger-Porn, Drug-Dumping, and the Ethics of Fundraising
In most OECD countries, numerous instruments are in place for
charities’ fundraising that are often supported by fiscal rules
awarding tax-deductibility. Charities receive donations from the
public in the form straightforward or annual gifts, payroll giving
or planned giving, including trusts and bequests. They also get
funded through trusts and foundations gifts, through lottery
funding (in several European countries such as the Netherlands
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and the U.K.), through contributions from civil society movements such as churches or trade unions, through municipalities
funding, and through matching gifts and straight contributions,
in cash or in-kind, from corporate entities.
Separate from the instruments are the marketing campaigns
that underpin them and the techniques used (advertising and
public service announcements, direct mail and telemarketing,
Web marketing, capital campaigns, etc.).
For example, corporate gifts may involve a cause-related marketing campaign associating the private and charitable brands.
Planned giving may be solicited as part of a capital campaign
aiming to raise funds for a specific endowment. Annual giving
may be solicited in the form of membership to an organization,
membership to an exclusive donor group of the organization,
child or program sponsorship, etc.
Much of the debates on fundraising practices and ethics do
not concern exclusively humanitarian assistance, but apply to
agencies involved in both relief and development. Both merge in
the public’s mind and all can be discredited by the practice of a
few.
The 1980s brought a series of tensions and scandals, such as
the Forbes investigation in 1986 of child-sponsorship fundraising
for development programs. The debates on ‘‘hunger pornography’’ went to the heart of the relief community dealing with famine, yet they were initially prompted by ads of organizations
funding development projects. The ‘‘drug-dumping’’ and other
scandals of dumping planeloads of highly questionable commodities at the heart of a crisis are more recent developments, inextricably tied to relief work in humanitarian crises.
Let’s explore the issues and how relief organizations are addressing them.
Child-sponsorship. Child-sponsorship is a major marketing tool for
development agencies, including those involved in relief. The
single biggest growth area for non-emergency activities by NGOs
is child-sponsorship. From the early 1980s to the mid-1990s, the
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group of child support agencies that includes World Vision, Plan,
and Christian Children Fund grew by almost 40 percent per year.
In Australia, child-sponsorship accounts for at least 50 percent of
all private Australian donations to NGOs. Save the Children
U.S.A. estimates that if donations to church-based organizations
are subtracted, 70 percent of all remaining private donations are
based on child-sponsorship.26
Beyond the appeal of children, it is the personal responsibility
and person-to-person solidarity aspect of the marketing technique that makes it so powerful: it fundamentally echoes the
basic humanitarian impulse that is nothing else than a person-toperson gesture of solidarity and responsibility.
While the marketing concept seems to imply that assistance is
provided on the basis of an individual child, the operational
practice has not always matched this public expectation, and
most of the contentious debates have been over child-sponsorship. Because it so powerful, some agencies were tempted to use
it as a marketing tool divorced from the true reality of their field
operations, and turned it into an abusive marketing scheme.
The InterAction PVO standards27 carefully lay out fifteen
points to guide the use of child-sponsorship marketing tools and
operational plans, from the obvious yet historically problematic
‘‘members shall be truthful in marketing and advertising’’ to
more specific recommendations on policies, resource allocation,
and accountability matters.
In-Kind Material Assistance. Less known to the general public, but
tremendously contentious in the relief community, is the practice of material assistance through gifts-in-kind obtained from
tax-deductible corporate contributions of stock and inventory of
various commodities.
AmeriCares, often called (and self-described as) ‘‘the humanitarian arm of corporate America,’’ argues that ‘‘by donating
products to AmeriCares, companies save massive destruction
costs, warehousing expenses, and headaches associated with returns, while they gain tax benefits, good public relations, and
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brand-name recognition in emerging markets’’28 and the Wall
Street Journal, for example, has been very supportive of the organization’s initiatives in its columns.
Again, while the concept sounds attractive, the practice has led
to donor-driven and gifts-driven operational practices with tremendous downsides for the populations served. Shipping by
AmeriCares of 10,000 cases of Gatorade to the Rwanda-Zaire border for cholera patients, seventeen tons of Pop Tarts to Bosnia,
and 12,000 Maidenform bras to the Japanese earthquake victims29 may not have met the consensual objective of ensuring that
donations are ‘‘appropriate, based on assessment of local needs,
and sensitive to the local culture or situation.’’ Several agencies
involved in non-cash donations from corporate inventories have
been extensively criticized by UN, NGO, and local government
authorities alike, for their inappropriate gifts leading to negative
impacts, even toxic effects, as well as costly clean-ups, but also for
Table 9.1 U.S. Charities Raising the Bulk of their Resources from
Gifts-in-Kind

Source: Chronicle of Philanthropy.
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the development of dependencies and the undermining of local,
sustainable solutions, as witnessed by this author.
The New England Journal of Medicine found that 50 percent to 60
percent of some 30,000 metric tons of drugs and medical materials donated to Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and 1996
were inappropriate or otherwise unusable. It noted that most donations were pharmaceuticals with little remaining shelf-life,
leading the investigators to suggest that the donors may have
been ‘‘dumping’’ the medications to avoid disposal costs of approximately U.S.$2,000 per ton. Among items donated were supplies from World War II, plaster tapes from 1961, and medication
for leprosy, a disease not found in the former Yugoslavia.30 Medical teams in Kosovo found hair re-growth lotion shipped from
the U.S. among the relief items distributed to medical clinics. The
Lancet reported in January 1998 a request by two congressmen to
the Internal Revenue Service to investigate whether pharmaceutical companies should be able to claim tax deductions for ‘‘humanitarian’’ donations to war-torn Bosnia and Herzegovina of
medications that turned out to be useless.31 Many such inappropriate donations in the Balkans, Central Africa, and other crisis
locations, were traced back to donations in-kind by unscrupulous
agencies.
Interestingly, organizations working on this model—tapping
the tax-deduction potential of corporate charitable gestures—
are seen as novel and creative alternatives to government-funded
humanitarian action and appear to be very efficient thanks to
low fundraising costs and overhead. Their public relation efforts
underline this point: ‘‘Receiving virtually no government funds,
AmeriCares has managed to deliver more than $1.2 billion in
donated medicines around the world in its thirteen years of operation. Because aid is in the form of donated medicines, a dollar
donation is leveraged into $44 of aid. AmeriCares, like the bestrun companies, is lean and mean with an overhead of only 0.74
percent, a fact that led Money magazine to call it the number one
best charity in America in December of 1993.’’32
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To avoid further scandals about planeloads of highly questionable supplies and diversion of tax dollars to such activities, the
community of relief actors attempted to self-regulate and articulated guidelines. Among them feature prominently the Interagency Gifts-in-Kinds Standards, the WHO guidelines on the Use
of Essential Drugs, and InterAction’s PVO guidelines on material
assistance.
It is indeed important to support new initiatives from civil society that provide alternatives to the government-controlled system
of the past decades. But they must also be scrutinized to ensure
that such initiatives ultimately serve people in crises according to
their needs and in respect of their dignity.
The Portrayal of Need. Much of the reporting of humanitarian crises has been focused on emotion and short on analysis, and many
relief agencies have played along happily. With their help rather
than their resistance, much of the field reports sound the same
because each is nothing but another version of the same fullyscripted morality play33 —with plain and helpless victims, true heroes (foreign humanitarian workers), and plenty of human tragedy, but no analysis to go. As long as we fail to ground each crisis
in its own history, and to depict accurately the combined human,
political, economic, and other dimensions of the conflict, we will
fail to go beyond short-term public sympathy at the most or,
worse, compassion fatigue. Susan Moeller points out that ‘‘the
public is given short shrift. They never really learn enough about
a crisis to care about it.’’ The habit of relief agencies to trade
only in emotional fundraising appeals is also fueling problem.
Further damaging is the resulting distortion of perceptions of
Africa and the developing world. To the Western World, Africa is
portrayed as a continent of passive victims and barbaric fighters
involved in constant ‘‘tribal warfare.’’ (The Balkans, on the other
hand, did not have ‘‘tribal warfare’’ but ‘‘ethnic strife,’’ a distinction Peter Shiras astutely points out.34)
In 1992, the Somalia crisis provided another example of such
bias and shortcuts, as reports Susan Moeller: ‘‘The stories de-
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picted the victims of the famine as bereft of family, alone in their
struggle for survival,’’ and, ‘‘as a result, the impression was created of a man-and-God-forsaken people.’’35
The graphic images of starving, hollow-eyed children, helpless
and feeble, menaced by vultures, have been used and abused repeatedly by several agencies, in a phenomenon coined angrily by
relief workers as ‘‘hunger porn.’’36 In an awkward effort to selfregulate this creeping phenomenon, relief agencies tried to explicitly define standards that have been blatantly ignored: ‘‘An
organization’s communications shall respect the dignity, values,
history, religion, and culture of the people served by the programs. . . . They shall neither minimize nor overstate the human
and material needs of those whom it assists. . . . There shall be no
material missions, or exaggeration of facts, no use of misleading
photographs, nor any other communication which would tend to
create a false impression or misunderstanding.’’37
Much of the difficulty with the portrayal of need is as much
the byproduct of the ethnocentricity of the ‘‘translators’’ as that
of the sound-bite culture of modern media that requires crises
to be summarized for public consumption in just a few seconds
between two commercials.
Symbiotic but Chaotic Relationship to the Media. Toward a New Era?
Historically, the media has had a critical role in mobilizing public
response to humanitarian crises. Since satellite news-feeds started
to bring distant realities into everyone’s living room in (almost)
real time, relief work has repeatedly captured the public imagination, demonstrating the link between awareness and funding.
Journalists have relied on relief groups for access to and logistics in remote crisis sites, they have used Western relief workers
to provide the emotional link to their home audience, they have
relied extensively on the analysis and data of these groups—
occasionally with some disenchantment. As the pressures of realtime coverage increased, the media came more and more to rely
on sound bites from humanitarian workers.
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Often described as a symbiotic relationship, it is also a chaotic
one. ‘‘News media have all too often come to assume that humanitarian organizations are either partisan adversaries or commercial opportunists or both.’’38 Meanwhile, relief workers have
occasionally lost respect for the bulk of the journalist crowds’
showing in the humanitarian circus for their lack of anticipatory
coverage, brief attention span, and focus on human tragedy
rather than political analysis. Yet these criticisms could just as
well apply to many relief organizations themselves.
Dearth of In-depth and Critical Reporting. To capture public interest
over the long term, both media outlets and relief groups will require some adjustments to their approach. Recent events might
have brought international issues more to the forefront, but the
qualitative transformation needed has yet to happen: ethnocentricity, scripted morality plays, short attention span, and lack of
confidence or creativity still constrain foreign news coverage before it even rears its head to be chopped by commercially-driven
editorial decisions shifting the focus to soft news.
Paradoxically, despite technological progress in this last ‘‘decade of the dish,’’39 media coverage of international issues had
been spotty and even more fickle than government assistance.
The American media in particular, but not exclusively, have
grown increasingly narrow in their approach to the rest of the
world. Garrick Utley points out that the passing of the cold war
left American network television in a quandary over how to report international news. ‘‘Without stories from abroad that could
be presented as part of an overall threat to American security,’’
he argues, ‘‘newscasts suffered a severe loss in an increasingly
competitive medium that thrives—perhaps depends—on drama
and conflict to attract and hold an audience’s attention.’’40
For example, little attention was given in the 1990s to Afghanistan, despite it being the number one source of refugees worldwide and the scene of a protracted civil war and repeated
famines. Within a three-week period in the fall of 2001, Afghanistan coverage time on U.S. TV networks matched the entire extent of coverage of the previous decade.
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Similarly, a few months before the Kosovo intervention, as Kosovar villages were pounded by Serbian artillery and people
started to hide in the forests, a major American magazine argued
there was ‘‘no longer a U.S. angle’’ to the story and canceled its
reporter and photographer’s visit to Kosovo when the American
relief worker they had planned to feature went back home to the
U.S. before the magazine could finalize the logistics of the trip.
How could there be ‘‘no U.S. angle’’ to a story that would be a
major theater of operations involving the U.S. and world militaries barely a few months later?
With the same short-sightedness, in May 1993, when the handover from the U.S. to the UN was carried out, most of the journalists in Somalia failed to listen to the rare few relief workers
who were telling a different story from the one scripted in Washington and New York. The writing was on the wall; the upcoming
violent confrontation was foreseen; they were preparing for it.
Yet only sanitized news would make the cut, blindfolding us from
a reality that would ultimately lead to utter failure in Somalia and
paralysis in Rwanda. The fault was not the media’s only: many
relief agencies and government representatives acted as mouthpieces of the dominant discourse. The lack of political analysis
was a shared and disastrous handicap.
With the pace of reporting imposed by new technology, journalists no longer enjoy the necessary time for careful analysis of
the information submitted to them. This is placing a tremendous
burden on relief organizations—a challenge that must be picked
up even if it means that relief agencies must be more careful and
professional in their approach. Their credibility is at stake.41
Collective Irresponsibility? One of the side effects of the dearth of indepth and critical reporting is that little critical feedback reaches
humanitarian workers and agencies who are almost always positively portrayed. Is it guilt about the little chance the crisis has to
make front page that leads journalists to absolve the mistakes and
failures of relief teams ‘‘who at least do try hard’’? Even the manipulation of media—and humanitarian workers—by belliger-
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ents has been forgiven—or forgotten—on the Rwanda-Zaire
border, most likely because the pressures of reporting were so
tight that they required complicity with those who facilitated access to the scene.
In the coming years, as the media digests its Rwanda, Kosovo,
and Afghanistan experiences, we ought to see a radical change
occur. Information technology, broadcast media, and the Internet have a key role to play in both the portrayal of and even
the actual humanitarian reality on the ground. For example, information needs of refugees are now being analyzed, and the
role of broadcast, the Internet and local media in orchestrating
violence is being highlighted in the Rwandan and Bosnian war
crimes courts. In the future, media may well have a different role
to play in the implementation of humanitarian assistance, and
being more central on the ground may come to change attitude
and culture.
Media outlets and reporters will in any case remain the key
links between relief workers and their potential supporters in
donor countries. Both must change their approach and reflect
on their responsibilities to tackle the ‘‘disaster fatigue’’ of their
editors and the general public. Should it happen, we might see a
tidal-wave of public support for humanitarian work whose mission would be more scrutinized, yet all the more strong and worthy of financial contributions from individuals and civil society
groups.
Big Problems, Small Print42
As many minutes of U.S. media coverage were devoted to Afghanistan in the entire decade of the 1990s as in a period of three weeks
in the fall of 2001— Andrew Tyndall/ Harper’s.43
Newspapers and TV news executives reduced the space and time
devoted to foreign coverage by 70 percent to 80 percent during
the past twenty years—David Shaw,44 and 50 percent over the past
decade according—Andrew Tyndall.45
Time devoted to foreign news on network TV dropped from 45
percent in the 1970s to 13.5 percent by 1995. Evening news broad-
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casts at ABC, CBS, and NBC devoted 35 percent of their time to
international news in the 1970s but dropped it to 23 percent in
1995, and went on dropping further—Claude Moisy.46
U.S. TV networks have dropped international news coverage from
2,000 minutes in 1998 to 1,100 to 1,200 minutes in 2000—Andrew
Tyndall.47
In all of 1991, when events unfolded and the country collapsed,
coverage of Somalia events got three minutes of evening TV network
news. In the first half of 1992, when the famine exploded, Somalia
got eleven minutes in six months—Tyndall.48 By the summertime,
when media started to pay attention, the famine was well under way
and had taken the lives of tens of thousands already. The peak of the
coverage appeared in 1993, accompanying (or instigating?) American military disengagement from Somalia.
‘‘The much touted globalization of news is more myth than reality,’’ and U.S. media are not the only culprits: ‘‘West European TV
stations and quality papers remain more internationally minded than
U.S. media but pay scant attention to developments in Asia and Latin
America’’—London-based International Institute of Communications.

Conclusion: Accountability and the
‘‘Business of Foreign Aid’’
In 1996, a scathing criticism of relief and development agencies
in the Times read as follows:
‘‘In the last century, merchant adventurers stirred the media
to badger politicians over national pride. Gunboats and troop
carriers were duly sent. The merchant adventurers of modern
Africa are the aid agencies. . . . They are the biggest power brokers on the continent. They can move large quantities of money
and supplies. They influence the outcome of wars. They occupy
territory, wreck fragile market economies, encourage rural depopulation, and are obsessed with self publicity.’’49
If this becomes the public image of humanitarian assistance
operators, the potential for relief work of expanded awareness
and support by civil society at large, rather than government institutions, may never be tapped.
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Yet much of what has led to the fiercest criticism lie in ambiguous political positioning, fragile ethics, and complex accountability lines—all issues that are now being widely debated in the relief
community thanks to the outrage and warnings of a few of its
members and observers. The community is now actively involved
in soul-searching, exploring self-regulation and models of accountability. This augurs well for its potential to transform and
mature gracefully.
Explorations with Self-regulation
A code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief was launched in
1994 and signed by more than 120 agencies. Some think that
accreditation and/or legislation may be the next steps. But most
of the discussions have been focused since on self-regulations initiatives.
After disenchanted assessments of the 1994 million-dollar-aday assistance operation on the Rwanda-Zaire border, the impulse was given for a Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response, a quantitative benchmarking system
known as the Sphere Project developed by—and in intensive consultations with—relief agencies. Peer-review processes and social
audits could use these benchmarks.
A further development, the Humanitarian Accountability Project, began by suggesting the establishment of a Humanitarian
Ombudsman to deal with complaints regarding the adequacy of
aid provided.
In tension with—and in response to—the above initiatives, a
French-led initiative called the NGO Platform for a Different
Quality Approach to Humanitarian Action—in short the Quality
Platform—argued that technical standards cannot be dissociated
from context and policy, and suggested instead an approach emphasizing political and context analysis, local participation, careful program design, learning from evaluations, and the use of
proxy indicators to measure commitment to evaluation, learning,
and public scrutiny.
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Issues of quality and accountability have clearly occupied the
relief community in the last few years, and the debates have also
helped surface the questions of what constitutes humanitarian
responsibility and where it ends.
An Elusive Model of Accountability
Given the multiplicity of stakeholders, there are still gaping holes
in the accountability models discussed by humanitarian agencies
who are struggling with such issues as:
How can solidarity, the key impulse of humanitarian assistance,
be measured and benchmarked? Is quality a negotiated process?
A generic benchmarkable concept? A fundamentally diverse and
context-dependant notion? Who are relief agencies ultimately accountable to? Their board of directors? Their donors who provide the means? The principles? Of course, but overseen by
whom? The recipients of their aid? Of course, but represented
by whom? Is what’s needed what’s valued and valuable? Who
ought to make such decisions? How? Can there be quantifiable
service delivery indicators or should we develop principle compliance indicators? Should we use a social science model and focus
on outcome and attribution? Or a program integrity model that
focuses on the process and demonstrates the resources were allocated as planned? Are standards prone to abuse?
The chart in figure 9.5, illustrating the complex flows of resources in the system, also hints at the complexity of accountability in this field, when the true constituents have little power (even
when one accepts the legitimacy of the local authorities and governments involved) compared to the donors, who, as major governments, not only fund assistance but influence the political
environment of the crisis with their diplomatic and sometimes
military strategies.
Given the recent efforts to improve quality and accountability,
we may be witnessing at least the development of an accountability culture, if not yet an accountability structure or system.
Should the next step involve more transparency, more willing-

240

THE SINEWS OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

ness to expose the failures and facilitate collective learning, we
may be already far ahead on the path of better matching the
credibility of these relief organization to the size of their financial
might and moral responsibility.
Political Responsibility of Relief Actors
Each crisis brings its learning curve—however imperfect. Bosnia
challenged the political and human rights underpinnings of relief work and questioned its willingness to act as a fig leaf for
political apathy. The Somalia experience sent a chill through the
spine of the most eager interventionists and questioned the relationship between media, military, and relief teams. The learning
curve from the Rwandan genocide was questionable but for the
obvious fact that humanitarian assistance does not stop a genocide. With the Rwandan refugee debacle on the Zaire border,
came questions about aid fueling wars, but also a call for minimum standards of accountability. The Kosovo chaotic response
fundamentally questioned the relationship between relief agencies and their sponsors when those are belligerents, and the systemic failure of the system to protect internally displaced
persons.
Truly, the toughest nut to crack may be that of the political
responsibility of humanitarian actors. While relief groups might
be able to learn to ‘‘do well while doing good’’ by steering accountability discussions in the proper direction, they will still
have to learn to ‘‘be wise while doing good.’’ Indeed, the responsibility of humanitarian operators is separate from political responsibility; the emancipation from government funding that we
see possible in the decades to come is not insignificant, to say the
least, in helping relief teams define those boundaries and the
best way to leverage humanitarian action for the people it means
to serve.

10

From the Other Side of the Fence:
The Problems Behind the Solution
Abdulrahim Abby Farah
Introduction
This chapter will identify some of the reasons that compelled
African states to seek international assistance to meet the humanitarian needs of their populations that may have fallen victim to
natural or man-made disasters. It will try to present the impressions of those who have been forced by circumstances to seek
assistance—impressions not always brought to the attention of
humanitarian missions. The chapter takes as its starting point the
early 1960s, when dramatic political changes on the African continent ended the presence of the colonial powers and installed
in their place an assembly of fifty-two sovereign independent
states. It will attempt to show that some of the emergency situations that the newly independent states have had to deal with
were not entirely of their own making, particularly situations
whose roots go back into colonial times. However, since the
1960s, few African leaders can escape responsibility for any manmade types of disaster that occurred during their stewardship
and that derived directly from their official policies, decisions, or
acts. The roles played by the donor community and international
humanitarian agencies will be briefly discussed, within the framework of their responses to appeals and their operations in the
field.
Toward the latter part of the chapter, I have summarized a
discussion, in a way a postmortem, that took place recently with
a group of friends and acquaintances in Berbera (Somaliland)
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on the impact of war on their lives, and general remarks that they
made on emergency relief operations that have been carried out
in their region, and on the current role of relief agencies in their
country. I believe that their experiences will facilitate an understanding of the reactions of the ordinary citizen to events not of
their making and against which they have no defense. Moreover,
the range of humanitarian problems that the country has experienced is a microcosm of the political ills that have afflicted the
rest of the continent: interstate war, civil conflict, the mass internal displacement of entire communities, the flight of over half a
million of the country’s inhabitants to neighboring countries for
asylum, the inflow of a similar number from neighboring areas,
incompetent governance, the destruction of the national economy, the impoverishment of the population, and, finally, conflict
between tribes for territorial supremacy and control.
In my lifetime I have been involved in several roles associated
with disaster, in particular situations created by war and drought.
Although my personal experience as a refugee was relatively
short and much less distressing than the unfortunate victims we
come across in camps, it was nonetheless an experience that has
enabled me to better understand the despair and feelings of
abandonment that they suffer. War caused my displacement
within my country, it rendered me homeless, and it forced me to
flee and seek asylum in a neighboring country as a war refugee.
Thankfully, there has been a positive side to my experiences.
Early in my career, I was entrusted with the management and
administration of a camp of several thousand drought and famine victims, as well as with relief and ‘‘back to work’’ projects in
the rural areas of my country. As a United Nations Under-Secretary General, a major part of my responsibilities concerned Africa. I have seen the devastating consequences of drought, civil
war, and floods in various African countries as well as my own,
and have participated in discussions with donor countries and
agencies for an appropriate response. I left the United Nations
twelve years ago, but it seems that the humanitarian problems in
Africa have not only worsened, but have spread.
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First OAU Summit Conference
The Charter establishing the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) was signed in Addis Ababa on May 25, 1963, by thirty-two
heads of state and government. It was a historic occasion, bringing together, for the first time, the independent states of Africa.
I was a member of the Somali delegation that took part in that
meeting. It was unforgettable in many ways: it succeeded in forging a bond that would strengthen and consolidate Africa’s newfound unity; it reversed a trend that would have divided the continent into political groupings; it provided states with the legal
instrumentalities to break down social, economic, and political
barriers that had formerly kept them apart from neighboring
states; it enabled African states to act collectively in other international forums on matters of common interest; and it allowed all
African problems to be resolved within an African environment.
The leaders did not forget the remaining African territories
under colonialism. They pledged their help unconditionally.
The leaders were confident about the course of future events,
although some urged continued vigilance against possible attempts by others to undermine their newly-won independence.
As one leader reportedly declared, ‘‘give me the political kingdom and all else will follow.’’ Such was the confidence and the
euphoria in those heady days.
I have seen few conferences comparable to that of the Addis
Ababa conference: in the various conference rooms where the
delegates debated, the atmosphere was filled with hope, optimism, and resolve about the future. Several states recognized the
intractability of some of the problems that they had inherited
from the colonial powers—problems that concerned their security, the living standards of their peoples, the weak and underdeveloped state of their economies—but, as some explained, they
had come to Addis Ababa for one over-riding purpose: to establish a continental organization for all of Africa. The impression
that I gained from various leaders that met with our delegation
was that the problems facing each country, although complex,

244

FROM THE OTHER SIDE OF THE FENCE

were not beyond resolution and needed time. New horizons, new
opportunities, and new challenges had been opened for Africans! No African could have imagined that lurking in the future
there could be a downside to independence!
As the ceremonies and celebrations marking independence receded into the background, the new governments began turning
their attention not only to the domestic front but also to the outside world, where they hoped to find solutions to many of their
major economic and social problems. African states recognized
that their economies lagged far behind others, and that they
would need the involvement and support of the developed states
and financial institutions. Accordingly, they joined the United
Nations and other allied organizations and agencies, cultivated
contacts and subsequently entered into agreements with various
states and financial organizations, and opened their doors to the
outside world to allow others to gain a better understanding of
African realities and aspirations.

Social and Economic Underdevelopment
In the course of their official discussions abroad, it became
readily apparent to the African states that the weak and underdeveloped economies they had inherited from the colonial powers
placed them at considerable disadvantage with others in the
highly competitive global market. Official delegations spent
much of their time seeking grants, loans, investments, and development assistance. From the start, African states found themselves in a struggle with the social and economic problems that
plagued their countries.
During the heyday of their campaigns for independence, they
had set their sights on the political crown, thinking that with independence all else would follow. They were sadly mistaken. As
the states subsequently found, many of their post-independence
problems stemmed from the underdeveloped state of their economies—neither able to respond to the expectations of their peo-
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ples, nor incapable of serving as a launching pad for their
economic development, and too weak to sustain any exceptional
strains placed on the economy by disaster or external economic
forces. In reality, the economy became the Achilles heel of Africa.
In the scramble for external development aid, African governments found that if their countries possessed economic resources
or the potential, they had little difficulty in attracting foreign investments; on the other hand, states with few exploitable resources or marginal potential were left to their own devices.
Unfortunately, the latter group were largely composed of states
that were the poorest of the poor, unable to meet the basic needs
of their own populations, politically precarious, and vulnerable
to any kind of destabilizing force—natural or man-made.
As one African leader later observed, the African continent
had the sad privilege of holding a whole array of negative records—the greatest concentration of refugees and displaced persons; one-half of the land-locked countries of the world; twothirds of the least developed nations; the lowest literacy rate; the
lowest level of development, with 70 percent of the population
near or below the threshold of poverty; the highest rate of infant
and child mortality; the highest incidence of HIV/AIDS; and a
continent with endemic and unremitting drought and desertification.
In recent years there has been a change of attitude toward Africa. Because of the frequency of appeals for aid coming from the
continent, some developed nations, together with international
financial institutions, have begun taking a closer look at the continent’s development needs and, on a bilateral basis, have taken
steps to lighten its burden. Some of the poorer states have been
released from the debts they have incurred, others have been
granted an extended time for repayment, and there has been an
encouraging trend toward strengthening the economic capacity
of many developing states through capital investment and facilitating the access of their products to world markets.
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Non-Intervention in Internal Affairs
In the course of a visit to Geneva some years ago, I was sitting in
a hotel lounge waiting for a bus to take me to the airport en
route to Africa, when I was greeted by a friend whom I had not
seen for years. We sat together for a while, exchanging news
about each other’s activities, and while discussing recent events
that had taken place in Africa, he asked, ‘‘What really is happening in Africa? All we hear about is fighting, refugees, and constant appeals for help—surely there must be a better alternative?
If a government cannot govern a country properly, why cannot
some organization, say the United Nations or the Organization
of African Unity, simply go there and put things right? After all,
we have an humanitarian obligation toward the poor civilians
whose lives are constantly threatened.’’
I explained briefly that relations between international entities
simply do not work that way, and went to on to describe the scope
and limitations of each organization. We ended up on two conflicting concerns—the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a state and the humanitarian obligation to assist
people in conditions of extreme distress and suffering. However,
his questions occupied my mind for the greater part of my flight
to Africa. I could not agree more with him that an acceptable
alternative must be found that would bring a permanent halt to
the insane violence that has virtually destroyed several countries
in east, central, and west Africa, and left a few, like Somalia, as
‘‘failed states.’’
It was true, as my friend had said, that the scope and intensity
of suffering, as well as the appeals for help, had increased in recent years to the point where people had begun to ask what prevented the international community from addressing the roots
of these problems rather than responding to their consequences.
International law does not allow any kind of intervention in the
internal affairs of a state unless by invitation. The legal basis is
contained in Article 2 (7) of the United Nations Charter, which
stipulates: ‘‘nothing in the present Charter shall authorize the
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United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.’’
Newly independent Africa was even more blunt about safeguarding sovereignty over its internal affairs. In the Charter
establishing the Organization of African Unity, among the principles that bound all members to respect was one that affirmed
‘‘non-interference in the internal affairs of states.’’ Another principle called for ‘‘respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent
existence.’’
Compare these legal provisions with what a former SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations had to say on the matter in relation to our humanitarian obligations: ‘‘The time of absolute and
exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was never
matched by reality. It is the task of leaders of states to understand
this and to find a balance between the needs of good internal
governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world.’’
This is a sobering statement. Disasters that originate from the
folly of man are known for the violence and brutality they produce, the host of refugees and internally displaced people they
create, the devastation and chaos they cause, and the simmering
fires of hate and mistrust they leave behind. Some causes have
their roots deep into history, others can be traced to the colonial
period, but the majority is the product of modern times.
Today’s revolutionary advances in the field of communications
have prompted someone to describe the world as a global village—so small that it is no longer possible to be unaware of developments and happenings in other parts of the world, however
distant, and not be affected in some way or other by their consequences. Modern communication has made it possible for the
plight of disaster-stricken victims to be brought to the attention
of people everywhere.
Despite such advances, some governments at war with their
own people have made attempts to shield some disasters from
international view, as a form of political punishment against the
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stricken areas. A famine situation occurred in Ethiopia in 1973–
1974 where, if it were not for the initiative and daring of a foreign
television team, the world would not have known anything about
the terrible human disaster that was unfolding there, nor would
the world have had the time to rush aid to save the lives of the
remaining victims of the drought.
Unfortunately, there have been occasions when, despite the
publicity given by the media, the slow response of the donor community allowed disaster situations to take thousands of lives that
could have been saved, and destroy the livelihood of entire communities when such tragedies might have been prevented. Practically all of the disasters that have occurred in Africa in recent
times have required resources beyond the capacities of the countries concerned, leaving them no alternative but to appeal for
help to the international community.

Political Instability and Disaster
The bane of African states has been their inability to provide
their people with stable, competent, just, and democratic governance. These inadequacies were reflected in the increasingly adverse reactions of the population to official policies and
measures, which they felt to be unfair or unacceptable. Expectations began to give way to disillusionment and disaffection. The
promises of better living conditions did not materialize. Economies remained as they were when the colonial power departed,
infrastructure and social services were still at an embryonic stage,
urban populations increased as people left the rural areas in
search of work. Added to these woes, although publicly concealed, was a growing rift between the civilian leaders and those
of the military. While it was acknowledged that the ‘‘old’’ guard
politicians had led their countries to independence, the military
were convinced that they were better educated and equipped to
carry on the challenge for nationhood.
Paradoxically, the new national army in each country was the
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creation of the newly elected government. To many governments, military power was a symbol of strength and also the
means by which the laws of the land could be enforced, internal
order maintained, and borders protected. More money was spent
on equipping and maintaining the military force then than on
most of the other services. It was truly a case of governments creating monsters they could not control.
The first indication of possible problems from this source
came toward the end of 1960 with the attempted coup against
the Emperor of Ethiopia by a unit from his own palace guards.
In the following years, many civilian regimes fell to the military
as the power struggle intensified and spread throughout all regions of the continent, for example, in Ghana, Nigeria, Ethiopia,
Uganda, Libya, and Algeria. In justification of their actions, the
military invariably leveled charges of mismanagement, corruption, misappropriation, inefficiency, nepotism, and tribalism
against the ousted civilian government.
The military regimes fared no better. Many of the same
charges that they had leveled against the politicians were hurled
back at them, not only by civilians, but also by ambitious or disgruntled groups within the military! Africa has had nearly forty
years of such internal struggles and, apart from a few states, has
very little to show for it except that rulers no longer label themselves ‘‘Life President,’’ although few are prepared to abide by
the results of the ballot box or the constitutions that curbed their
power and limited their terms. In keeping with the times, some
military rulers have exchanged their military uniforms for civilian
dress to increase their political acceptability.

Man-Made Disasters
The more sinister type of disasters are those that are the makings
of man himself—the man-made disasters: interstate conflict, as
between Tanzania and Uganda, Ethiopia and Somalia; civil war,
as in Angola, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and Mozambique; intertribal
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or interethnic strife, as in Burundi and Rwanda; and similar situations where communities within a state are ruthlessly oppressed
and forced to flee for their safety. All have become an acute
source of concern for the international community. Not only
have they increased in frequency, but the brutality and utter disregard for human life exhibited in many of these unfortunate
situations has been appalling.
The Problem of Border Disputes
Another source that has produced the potential for conflict is
the legacy of unresolved border or territorial disputes within Africa that were created and left behind by the colonial powers.
Although more than twenty five border disputes remained unresolved in 1964—like an explosive device that might detonate
without warning—the Organization of African Unity, meeting in
Cairo that year, felt it would be in the interests of all if such disputes were shelved temporarily to allow adequate time for the
process of mediation or bilateral negotiations to take place. Accordingly, the OAU declared that until such time as a peaceful
resolution of a problem was reached, all the concerned states
should respect the colonial-drawn borders they inherited on independence. In spite of the OAU declaration, several of these
disputes have developed into open warfare, the latest being the
Ethiopia/Eritrea border conflict of 1998. Now, some are asking
when and where will the next border explosion take place.
The struggle for power has also taken on another, more ominous dimension—a struggle between the regime in power and
sections of the civilian population, as in Sudan, Somalia, and Angola. Contemporary Africa is replete with situations where the
leader has lost the support of his people, yet refuses to step down
graciously. The rest of the scenario is easy to imagine. The leader
defies the constitution, assumes dictatorial powers, and leaves his
people with no option but to resist. In most situations, the outcome is a long, drawn-out civil war, entailing widespread casualties among the unarmed civilian population, the displacement of
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masses of people, and unimaginable misery and suffering. Some
leaders have even gone to the extent of promoting or encouraging conflict within tribes for their own ends.
The refugee situation has also its tremendous downside. It has
been known that a few states, at odds with their neighbors, have
recruited the services of, or allowed, refugees to carry out hostile
activities against their country of origin despite international
rules prohibiting such conduct. Quite obviously, such practices
will certainly perpetuate problems between the states concerned.

Natural Disasters
In addition to these types of man-made disasters, independent
Africa has had to contend with the vagaries of nature. Prolonged
drought, large-scale famine, and disastrous floods have been the
most persistent causes of natural disaster to afflict the continent.
The states concerned have been sometimes helpless to do anything about them—possessing neither the resources, nor the
technical knowledge to handle them when they occur.
Paradoxically, natural disasters seem to happen more frequently in countries that are already impoverished, and whose
fragile economies can collapse easily under intense pressure
from such sources. The pastoral people of the Sahara in West
Africa, the nomads of the Horn of Africa, the Bushmen and others of southern Africa, are constantly on the move in search of
pasturage and water for their flocks of sheep and goats or herds
of cattle and camels. Should the rains fail, and the animals die,
the means for their existence is lost—causing suffering and
death. Then, there are the subsistence farmers and their families
inhabiting the same regions, whose livelihood is as precarious as
that of the pastoral people, having no alternative but to eke an
existence from the few crops that their over-farmed land can
grow, relying entirely on their labor and the hospitality of nature.
And, when the drought occurs, the specter of disaster spreads its
deadly mantle over the land, destroying crops and farm animals,
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and depriving the farmer and his family of their only source of
sustenance.
Drought has been described as a creeping form of disaster—it
takes time for signs of its approach to manifest themselves. As
has been demonstrated in the past, the success in minimizing its
destructive consequences is often determined by the measures
taken before or during its onslaught. Was the government aware
of its approach? Had early warning systems been set in place?
Were the warning signs heeded, or were they simply ignored?
Was the aid response adequate and in time? These are but a few
of the questions that will occupy the minds of those who care and
want to help.
Africans have also had to contend with other forms of natural
disaster, primarily the sudden type such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and heavy storms that have led to devastating floods in low
lying regions, such as in Mozambique, giving little or no time for
people to escape to safety. In the disaster-prone countries of Africa, the question is not whether the affected state has the capacity in terms of resources and experience to manage the situation
alone, but whether international aid can be delivered there in
time and in sufficient amounts to contain and respond effectively
to the tragedy that threatens.

Three Typical Case Histories and the Lessons Learned
The Sahelian Drought of 1973
Since the great Sahelian drought of 1973, an expansive network
of early warning systems has been set up by the international
community to monitor any unusual changes in weather patterns
that could alert states, as well as other interested agencies, of the
makings of a possible disaster situation. Fortunately, in some situations the early warning systems have produced the desired effect: the affected states concerned, as well as the international
community, were able to initiate preventative measures and set
in motion their relief operations. Unfortunately, this has not

ABDULRAHIM ABBY FARAH

253

been the experience of a number of states where, despite repeated warnings, the international community was slow to respond, and when they did respond, the aid arrived too late or
was too little. Even more tragic have been situations in which
distressed populations have appealed for food and have had their
appeals ignored by their own governments as a political punishment.
What lessons can be learned from these situations? Let us examine briefly the Sahelian disaster mentioned above because it
happened to be Africa’s first major natural disaster since the continent achieved independence. It took the form of a relentless
pervasive drought that gnawed for five years at the heart and
body of six West African states bordering the southern edge of
the Sahara desert. When it ended in 1973, the drought had
caused an appalling loss of life, and the displacement of more
than two million pastoral people who, because of the destruction
of their livestock, were forced by circumstance to seek shelter in
hastily improvised refugee camps so that they might survive. In
one of the major studies conducted on the causes and consequences of the disaster, it was concluded that relief for the affected countries was due to ‘‘failure to heed early warnings, to
plan in advance, and to monitor and coordinate rescue efforts.’’
(1)
The Ethiopian Droughts of 1973–1974 and 1984–1985
On the heels of the Sahelian disaster came the Ethiopian famine
of 1973–1974 that devastated two of its provinces, causing unnecessary loss of life and resulting in grave charges being leveled at
the government for having denied aid and concealed information on the intensity of the famine, and yet allowing the export
of large quantities of wheat so that proceeds could be used for
other purposes. Fortunately, a foreign television team visited the
provinces and, through the release of its film, brought international attention to the disaster. This case demonstrates the important role played by the media in breaking the pattern of
silence, thus enabling aid to reach the stricken population.
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Eleven years later, an even greater tragedy struck Ethiopia, arising again from drought and famine in its northern regions. On
that occasion, the government, as well as representatives of various agencies of the United Nations, maintained that early warning reports and appeals had been sent to all potential donors,
but that they were either ignored or accorded insufficient credence. Cold war considerations were claimed by some to be the
reason for the poor response. Others charged that the government had been guilty of using food aid as a political weapon
against rebellious communities. Instead of giving food to the
stricken areas, it was alleged, the authorities had sold the country’s grain reserves to procure arms. A complicating dimension
to the situation was added when the government decided to
transport and resettle thousands of famine victims to other areas
far from their traditional habitat—a policy, many charged, reminiscent of Soviet deportations to Siberia!
The Somalia Drought of 1974–1975
Somalia was also confronted with a similar problem concerning
the future of tens of thousands of pastoral people, living in the
northern regions of the country, who had become displaced after
drought had decimated their livestock and left them helpless.
Faced with the problem of maintaining and feeding such large
numbers in camps for an indefinite period, the Somalia government decided to establish settlements for them in the southern
regions, some seven hundred miles distance from their normal
habitat. Huge Soviet transport planes were employed to help in
the transfer, and for what they could not carry, road transport
was used.
It was a hurriedly organized operation, but by the time it was
over, large numbers had been relocated in camps in various agricultural areas and along the coast. The plan was to provide the
pastoralists with an alternative type of livelihood by employing
them on large collective farms and fishing cooperatives, and train
them to become eventually either agriculturalists or fishermen.
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It is said that one can take a horse to water, but that it cannot be
forced to drink. In a way this is what happened in the case of the
displaced pastoralists. Above all, they could not accept that they
should abandon their lives as pastoralists, and in a matter of
months they became restless by having to work in a highly controlled environment, in an occupation that they detested, and
live in surroundings to which they could not adjust.
It did not take long before the pastoralists began making plans
to return to the familiar environment of the arid plains and pastures, and to the only way of life that they had known. Many of
them sought work as laborers in nearby countries to earn enough
money to replace the livestock they had lost, but the majority
made their way back home as soon as they heard that the drought
had ended, the weather had normalized, and life was again full
of hope and opportunities for those who returned. Today, a few
families remain in the settlement areas, the only living evidence
of a plan that just could not work, and even that evidence is being
steadily erased by time.

African Refugees: Sharing the Burden
In Africa, natural calamities such as drought and man-made disasters have been responsible not only for the displacement of
entire communities within the borders of their own country, but
also for the movement across international borders.
While there are many things that the rest of the world can
teach Africa, in one area Africa has few peers—the compassion it
shows to war or famine-stricken people seeking the safety of their
territories. It is not a shipload, trainload, or even busload of refugees that I have in mind. At times, it has not been unusual to see
a poor African state accept the inflow of tens of thousands of
people fleeing the perils of war and of hunger. Even though their
economies could hardly cope with the basic needs of their own
populations, I have yet to hear that an African state has closed its
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borders to prevent the inflow. Instead they have generously
shared the little that they have with the less fortunate.
Naturally, in the case of large numbers of refugees, their presence imposes a considerable burden on the fragile economies of
recipient states. In recent years, African states appealed to the
international community to help in sharing the burden, stating
frankly that the impact on their economies, services, and infrastructures is far too great for them to handle alone. There has
been a growing acknowledgement that allowance for the refugee
presence should be made by donors when preparing their bilateral aid programs, or included in their contributions to agencies
like the UN High Commission for Refugees.

Humanitarian Assistance: Improving Its Effectiveness
In addition to its chronic economic problems, all of Africa’s regions have had to contend with a series of disasters—natural as
well as man-made. Each situation has caused widespread misery,
heavy loss of life, displacement of populations, and the destruction of a way of life for thousands of its inhabitants. The tragic
truth about disaster in developing countries, particularly in the
least developed areas, is that the affected states seldom possess
sufficient resources or capacity to initiate preventative action during the early stages to contain or mitigate its consequences.
Coordination in Diversity
Humanitarian emergencies, as the term implies, means, in essence, a situation that accords priority above all else to the saving
of lives and the alleviation of suffering. However, relief operations do not proceed always as smoothly as the parties involved
had hoped, not only for reasons of commitment, but often from
varying standards of operational experience and readiness. It is
inherent in the nature of an international emergency operation
that relief teams will be composed of teams of diverse cultural
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origins, training, and experiences. In takes considerable leadership and patience to bring together a large international team,
coordinate their contributions, and meld their activities with the
various branches of the host country. It would be prudent, too,
for international relief workers, who are sent to work in a least
developed state for the first time, to acquire beforehand an understanding of the social and economic problems that beset such
states, and the fragility of their infrastructure and governance.
International teams arriving to help in a disaster seem to have no
knowledge of the country’s fragile infrastructures and governance, and the burden that is placed on the government’s capacity to handle the large shipments of relief supplies that
accompany them. Equally irritating is the ‘‘we know best’’ attitude some display whenever suggestions are made.
Inadequate Response to Appeals
Many African states believe that international donors could improve the effectiveness of their humanitarian assistance if they
would be more appreciative and more responsive to their appeals
for disaster relief in times of emergency. They cannot help feeling anxious when carefully drafted appeals, often prepared with
the assistance of an impartial international agency, receive an inadequate and sometimes tardy response. The impression is often
given that the international community is not convinced about
the true situation behind the appeal, or has little confidence in
the appeal itself. Worse still, some donors show no interest in
helping particular countries for one reason or the other. There
have been several major disasters where it would have been possible to save thousands of lives if humanitarian aid had arrived in
time and in sufficient quantities.
Fundraising–Accountability and Transparency
Again there is the question of fundraising. The media has reported many cases where humanitarian organizations have raised
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funds for a major disaster situation, but instead of the funds
going to the stricken country, they have been spent largely at the
headquarters of the donor organizations or used on other field
projects, with only a small percentage reaching the recipient
country. In the African view such a practice is entirely unacceptable. It is only fair that the recipient state should know the
amount of funds that have been raised in its name, and should
be consulted on how the funds should be spent. Moreover, as in
the case of the recipient state, there should also be accountability
on the part of the donors, particularly in regard to funds that
have been raised in the name of the recipient state.

Networking or Nepotism
Lastly, there is the question of strengthening local capacities.
Local graduates and professionals strongly resent being passed
over or even ignored by donor states and humanitarian organizations when recruiting staff for key posts in their field missions
and filling them with recruits from overseas. The local people
attribute this policy to international networking—an arrangement whereby an organization tended to recruit expatriate colleagues and acquaintances to fill positions in the field that could
easily be performed by locally qualified persons. The usual justification is that the candidate is known to the organization and
that his/her services are immediately available. Little or no
thought is given to the important question of helping to build
local capacities. It often happens that once an emergency has
passed, the expatriate personnel return to their headquarters or
move on to another theatre where disaster assistance is needed.
When they go, the organization concerned should, at least, leave
behind a cadre of experienced local personnel with the requisite
training to carry out relief work in any future emergencies. Moreover, the experience gained by local personnel would constitute
a permanent asset for the country.
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The Recovery Phase
Of course, the end of the emergency does not necessarily mean
an end to the problems that it has caused. Lives may have been
saved, suffering minimized, and the humanitarian situation contained. Still, the affected state has to cope with the recovery
phase of rehabilitating the affected communities, restoring services, providing alternative means of livelihood, strengthening infrastructure, and making life in the affected areas livable and
capable of sustaining the population living there. The needs are
overwhelming, offering relief and development-related organizations unlimited opportunities to help complete the humanitarian
work they had started. As the World Bank has said, the recovery
phase can take several years to complete, and instead of going
one step further with their aid, donors rush to other regions once
the drama of the emergency is over.

Somaliland—A Microcosm of Disaster Situations
The information that follows is my recollection of visits that I
made to Somaliland in 1983, at a time when the military regime
was in power, and again in 1993 and 2000, after its fall. The government and the people had begun the challenging process of
restoring law and order, disarming the numerous tribal militia
that were a leftover from the civil war, jump-starting the economy, and re-establishing the few social services that it could afford. The population, in turn, was occupied salvaging property,
rebuilding homes, cultivating their farmlands, setting up small
businesses, looking for work, and desperately seeking news about
the whereabouts of missing family members.
It was during one of those intolerably hot steamy evenings for
which Berbera is renowned that I decided to invite a few friends
over at the hotel where I was staying for tea and talk. I deliberately mixed the group so that with their diverse backgrounds, I
could get a fairly good perspective of what had happened, what
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was happening, what should happen to improve the lot of the
people who had been uprooted by the civil war. I hoped that
during our informal discussions on the ills that confronted our
country, they would mention how the civil war had affected the
lives of their communities, and any thoughts they may have on
the delivery and the effectiveness of the international aid community.
It took place in the garden area of the house where I was staying. The group included two elders, a merchant, two officials,
representatives of two local nongovernmental agencies, and a
young Somali graduate.
I gave the floor to the young graduate, who had recently completed his studies in Britain, having gone there first as a fourteenyear-old refugee with his mother and other members of his family. From an earlier talk with him, I knew that he was all pepped
up, critical of local conditions, and anxious to air his views on
almost everything that had to do with Africa and, in particular,
his own country. His name was Hassan, and he said something to
this effect:
‘‘Why is it that whenever I read anything about Africa in today’s newspapers it invariably relates to some critical situation:
an impending natural disaster, civil strife, tribal war, interstate
conflict, undemocratic government, poverty and underdevelopment, refugees and internally displaced people, environmental
degradation, and the alarming spread of HIV/AIDS? Why can’t
Africans do something about these problems? Aren’t these problems of our own making, or can we reasonably place the blame
somewhere else? And, if the problems are within our capacity to
solve, why aren’t we doing something instead of appealing constantly for international aid and expecting others to do what we
should be doing ourselves? I feel that this problem has been created by your generation (indicating the two elders), and it is time
that we younger people took charge of our own destiny.’’
As Hassan spoke, I looked in the direction of some older
friends to gauge their reactions. It was not the first time that we
had heard dissenting voices from the younger generation placing
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blame for all the woes that had befallen their communities on
the elders for incompetent leadership, limited knowledge, tribal
bias, poor judgment, and a refusal to move with the times.
Who Is to Blame?
One of the elders replied that it was easy for the young generation to place all blame on the shoulders of the older generation
for the sins of the past and the wrongs of the present. An understanding of the past throws more light on the solutions to present
problems. As a case in point, he mentioned Somaliland’s longstanding territorial dispute with Ethiopia—a dispute that the former colonial power created when it arbitrarily negotiated a
boundary agreement with Ethiopia without consulting or seeking
the approval of the people or their representatives. The agreement robbed the population of their rightful ownership over
large tracts of land, making Somali citizens living there aliens in
their own land. Despite numerous appeals for redress to the colonial power and to the United Nations, Britain handed over the
unresolved problem to the incoming Somali government. The
dispute resulted in frequent border incidents and, in 1964 and
1978, to open war—wars that led to the tragic upheavals of tens
of thousands of Somalis.
Fratricidal Strife: The Worst of all Wars
Another elder observed that perhaps the most tragic of all war
situations was when clans or communities, in a fratricidal struggle, waged war against each other, at times for territorial supremacy or control over watering centers or in satisfaction of a blood
feud. In such cases, hostilities could be brought to a halt, and
sometimes resolved, particularly if the parties concerned
respected the application of customary law and there was wise
leadership. But wars that pitted the state against particular communities were the most difficult to resolve as civilian communities, in normal circumstances, are exceedingly vulnerable and
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not equipped to defend themselves against any onslaught by the
state. Tragically, this scenario was played out in Somaliland when,
in 1988, several major cities and nearby settlements were leveled
by aerial and land bombardments of the ousted military regime,
resulting in the machine gunning of civilians as they tried to escape by foot to the Ethiopian border, some sixty to eighty miles
away.
The elder, seemingly affected by the graphic picture he had
recalled, disclosed the fact that both he and his family were
among those who made the long trek, and who were forced by
circumstance to spend the next three years in one of the refugee
camps. In all, he said, a quarter of a million inhabitants sought
asylum in Ethiopia; more than 40,000 perished in the bombardment and while fleeing for safety. What added to the people’s
suffering, the elder concluded, was the feeling that the plight of
the population had not only been ignored by the international
community, but that no protests had been publicly lodged with
the ousted regime for its indiscriminate use of arms against the
defenseless population.
Underdevelopment
A heated discussion took place on the question of economic reliance and of the capacity of Somaliland to provide better living
standards for its people. One of the officials said that it was a
question of legacy—the legacy of underdevelopment left by the
colonial power, Britain—and during the years of independence,
the deliberate neglect of Somaliland’s economy by the military
regime. He felt that Somaliland’s experience in this respect was
also shared to some extent by African states elsewhere. To illustrate his point, he referred to conditions existing in Somaliland
at the time of independence.
After eighty-five years under British colonial rule, the colonial
power had trained only one doctor and two engineers. The
higher echelons of the administration were still in the hands of
expatriates, including the police and military forces and all tech-
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nical departments. The national budget still required a substantial grant to enable the country to balance its books, and, apart
from its livestock industry that had been the mainstay of the
economy since time immemorial, the potential of its long coastline for fishing had not been touched, and the agricultural sector
was left underdeveloped, necessitating reliance on imported
foodstuff. Generally speaking, the condition of Somaliland’s social and economic infrastructure at the time of independence
could be described as rudimentary in nature and totally inadequate as a springboard for development. In ending his observations, he smilingly said that the economy that was handed over
to the Somaliland government in 1960, although underdeveloped, was far stronger, and in a much better condition, than the
economy that was left to the people by the military regime after
forty years of independence!
The Impact of War and Politics
At this stage, one of the officials, an experienced administrative
officer, spoke at length on some of the matters raised by the graduate. He said that he appreciated the concerns that had been
expressed, but that those who lived outside the country seemed
to lose touch with some of its realities. Often, in measuring and
comparing Somaliland’s failures and achievements, the expatriate Somali seemed to use as a yardstick conditions of life in their
adopted country coupled with whatever information they may
have gathered in their academic studies. Such comparisons were
invalid because of contrasting differences in history, culture, and
in development. Independence, he said, had brought hopes that
the elected government would bring an end to all of their woes.
The citizens had been led to expect increased opportunities for
employment, creation of new industries, an expanded network
of schools and hospitals, the end of tribalism, and, above all,
peace. No longer, people thought, would they need to depend
on the old traditional system where the clan was responsible for
the welfare of its members. Unfortunately, and without knowing
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it, the country was not prepared for such a revolutionary change
in the social and political systems, nor were the new leaders experienced or capable of dealing with the rising tide of expectations
they themselves had stimulated.
What followed was a weakening of the traditional structure of
society, a failure on the part of the elected representatives to govern efficiently, and a military dictatorship of twenty years that
brought the entire country to its knees. Oppressed by their own
government, robbed of their livelihood, and displaced by war,
the condition of the population was such that had it not been for
the intervention of the international community with offers of
aid, medicines, and shelter, only God knows what would have
been their ultimate fate. Somaliland today no longer resembles
the Somaliland of pre-independence days, when the overwhelming majority had a stake in the pastoral economy capable of providing them with support in times of need.
Today, urban centers are crowded by refugees and former pastoralists displaced by war and by famine; the former urban dwellers, who included the merchants, the professionals, the
technicians, and the educated classes, fled the country following
the bombardment of their towns, creating a vacuum with the loss
of their experience, training, and expertise. The present government does not have the resources to rehabilitate the economy or
continue services that had been enjoyed in better days. It has
directed its efforts mainly toward the restoration and maintenance of peace and security, to the disarming of tribal militia, to
the establishment of adequate governance, including a parliament, a judiciary, and a countrywide administrative system. In the
social field, its resources have allowed the reopening of schools
and hospitals, although well below the level that it intends to
provide when additional resources become available.
International NGOs—As They Are Sometimes Seen by Others
Throughout our discussions, the local NGO representatives, who
were relatively young, listened carefully to what had been said
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and wanted us to know something about their work and the problems they were encountering. One of them disclosed that he previously worked for one of the international agencies before
joining his present local organization. At the outset, he was very
complimentary in remarks on the activities of some of the international agencies—governmental and nongovernmental—that
were financially supporting several emergency relief programs
and a few rehabilitation projects. However, he said, the needs of
the country were so great that the aid being received from those
international agencies, however welcome, was like a drop in the
ocean. What has been the response to the many appeals for aid
that have been launched? Was it true that more than 75 percent
of funds collected by some agencies go to sustain luxury budgets
at the headquarters of the agency, and that less than 20 percent
actually reaches the field?
His impressions of some of his expatriate colleagues were
mixed. He respected a few not only for the sincerity and commitment they brought to their work, but also for their overall knowledge and persistent interest in educating themselves on the
customs and culture of the people. There were others, he said,
who were inexperienced and displayed no enthusiasm for the
work they were assigned; they treated relief work more as a job
than as a vocation and seemed insecure when dealing with local
officers of equal or better academic qualifications.
Blunt Criticism
Another former NGO worker was more blunt in his criticism. He
said that since donor states and international governmental agencies had cut down on the provision of direct aid to African states
and were channeling a substantial proportion through international nongovernmental organizations to handle, the importance
of the latter had so grown that some of their representatives acted
more like colonial governors rather than the representative of humanitarian agencies people had known. The speaker stated that
while he was aware of the reasons why some donors had lost faith
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in the integrity and the ability of several governments to utilize
their aid for the purposes agreed, by making the international
nongovernmental organization a conduit for such aid, it had elevated the latter to a pseudo-colonialist position. The effect was
that some organizations had become arrogant in their relations
with host governments, and there was a trend for them to dictate
their own agendas and establish their own priorities.
He then proceeded to address his remarks to staff matters and
to the need for better coordination between the NGO community and the government, as well as between the NGOs themselves. He remarked that while the amount of aid was small
relative to the needs of the country, he and others were shocked
by the extravagant manner in which some field representatives
of international agencies spent money on their own comfort
while being stingy about the few dollars that were given to the
local staff. He cited what he considered to be inordinate sums of
money spent on air travel, on mission, or on vacation.
Related to the contribution of international nongovernmental
agencies, he agreed with his colleague that the country needed
the help that international agencies were giving, particularly
health, education and training programs, and programs associated with the rehabilitation and development of the agricultural
sector, water and marketing development, and the prevention of
environmental degradation. He confirmed that local NGOs were
assisting in the execution of these programs, however, the funding that was made available was in the form of seed money, and
totally insufficient to have any real impact in the short and medium term.
Equally disconcerting was the frequency of changeover in expatriate staff, as if one or two tours was more than anyone could
handle. If the changeover was motivated by a desire to fill the
departing expatriate’s post with a local professional, the situation
would be acceptable, but often inexperienced expatriate staff fill
the post vacated. Meanwhile, the local professional is kept in his
or her national post regardless of experience or professional
qualifications. Occasions do arise when the performance of local
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staff may merit promotion to an international position—but
these are infrequent and few.
In concluding his statement, the former NGO worker said that
the term ‘‘voluntary work’’ had lost its meaning during the military regime, and it has been difficult to rekindle that spirit. Previously, people in the rural areas would offer their services
voluntarily for such small village projects as the construction of
feeder roads, hospital improvements, the sinking of wells, and
similar types of projects. The ousted military regime made such
service compulsory—and volunteers were treated even worse
than indentured labor, a sure way of alienating communities that
wanted to help in their own time and on their terms. At that
point, our tea and talk ended.
Concluding Reflections
O living man! What revelations
Await you in this world?
The wretchedness that today is mine
May be your fate tomorrow.
(from a Somali poem composed by
an elder made destitute by famine)

A new trend has begun to manifest itself in places like Somaliland, as well as in other parts of Africa—a trend where the young,
educated generation are questioning the performance of past
and present leaders, and voicing their dissatisfaction with the
current situation in their respective countries. In Somaliland,
they are being spurred in their demand by the thousands of
young men and women from their country who now live in the
developed world where governance is stable, standards of living
high, and where there is a scrupulous respect not only for the
rule of law but for the human rights of all. They all want an end
to corrupt and inefficient governance, to unjust policies that
force populations to flee their land and pit brother against
brother in a fratricidal war in which everyone is a loser. They
want peace, justice, and the development of their country so that
all can benefit from its blessings.
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www.un.org/ha
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United Nations Development Programme: http://www.undp.org
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Bilateral Organizations
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www.dfid.gov.uk
Canadian International Development Agency: http://www.
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Center for Disease Control and Prevention: http://www.cdc.gov
Japan International Cooperation Agency: http://www.jica.go.jp/
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International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC): http://www
.icrc.org
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Amnesty International: http://www.amnesty.org
Catholic Relief Services: http://www.catholicrelief.org
Center for International Health and Cooperation: http://www
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Doctors Without Borders: http://www.dwb.org
Human Rights Watch: http://www.hrw.org
InterAction: http://www.interaction.org
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Oxfam: http://www.oxfam.org
World Vision: http://www.worldvision.org

International Courts
The International Court of Justice: http://www.icj-cij.org
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia:
http://www.un.org/icty
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: http://www.ictr.org
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5. See Semichon, La paix et la trêve de Dieu (Paris, 1869); Huberti,
Gottes und Landfrieden (Ansbach, 1892), The Catholic Encyclopedia, vol.
10. http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/; See also http://www.hillsdale.edu/

280

CHAPTER NOTES AND REFERENCES

dept/History/Documents/War/Med/1063-peace.htm and http://www.bartleby
.com/65/tr/truceGod.html
6. New Testament Matt. 7:7–12; but also Muhammad 13e Hadiths
de Nawawi; Mahavira: Yogashastra 2, 20; Bouddha Sutta Pitaka, Udanavagga 5, 18; Confucius; Analecta 15, 23; Mahabaharata 5: 15, 17; Talmud bab, Shabbat 31a; Baha’u’llah: Kitab-i-aqdas 148; Isocrate:
Nicoclès 61. Calendrier inter religieux 2001–2002 (Geneva: Enbiro
Lausanne & Plate-Forme inter religieuse, 2000).
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92. ICRC Commentary 3, p. 18 (Article 1). See: Luigi Condorelli and
Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, ‘‘Quelques remarques à propos de
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APPENDIXES
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
On December 10, 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted and proclaimed the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the full text of which appears in the following
pages. Following this historic act, the Assembly called upon all
Member countries to publicize the text of the Declaration and
‘‘to cause it to be disseminated, displayed, read, and expounded
principally in schools and other educational institutions, without
distinction based on the political status of countries or territories.’’
Preamble
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the
foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the world;
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of
mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall
enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and
want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people;
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled, to have
recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law;
Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly
relations between nations;
Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of December 10, 1948
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Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the
dignity and worth of the human person, and in the equal rights
of men and women, and have determined to promote social
progress and better standards of life in larger freedom;
Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve,
in cooperation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms;
Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full realization of this
pledge;
Now, therefore, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims this
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to
the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping
this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and
education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and
by progressive measures, national and international, to secure
their universal and effective recognition and observance, both
among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the
peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.
Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and
rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should
act toward one another in a spirit of brotherhood.
Article 2. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set
forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as
race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political,
jurisdictional, or international status of the country or territory
to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust,
non-self-governing, or under any other limitation of sovereignty.
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Article 3. Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of
person.
Article 4. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and
the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.
Article 5. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.
Article 6. Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a
person before the law.
Article 7. All are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to
equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this
Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.
Article 8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the
competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental
rights granted him by the constitution or by law.
Article 9. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention,
or exile.
Article 10. Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge
against him.
Article 11. 1. Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right
to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in
a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for
his defense.
2. No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account
of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence,
under national or international law, at the time when it was com-
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mitted. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that
was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.
Article 12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with
his privacy, family, home, or correspondence, nor to attacks
upon his honor and reputation. Everyone has the right to the
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.
Article 13. 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and
residence within the borders of each state.
2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his
own, and to return to his country.
Article 14. 1. Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other
countries asylum from persecution.
2. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions
genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary
to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
Article 15. 1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor
denied the right to change his nationality.
Article 16. 1. Men and women of full age, without any limitation
due to race, nationality, or religion, have the right to marry and
to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.
2. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full
consent of the intending spouses.
3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of
society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.
Article 17. 1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well
as in association with others.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.
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Article 18. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; this right includes freedom to change his
religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or
belief in teaching, practice, worship, and observance.
Article 19. Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without
interference and to seek, receive, and impart information and
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.
Article 20. 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
2. No one may be compelled to belong to an association.
Article 21. 1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in
his country.
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of
government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall
be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.
Article 22. Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social
security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and
international cooperation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social, and
cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.
Article 23. 1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of
employment, to just and favorable conditions of work, and to
protection against unemployment.
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2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal
pay for equal work.
3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favorable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other
means of social protection.
4. Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for
the protection of his interests.
Article 24. Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including
reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays
with pay.
Article 25. 1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family,
including food, clothing, housing, and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age, or other lack
of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and
assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall
enjoy the same social protection.
Article 26. 1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall
be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available, and higher
education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.
2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the
human personality and to the strengthening of respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance, and friendship among all nations, racial
or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United
Nations for the maintenance of peace.
3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education
that shall be given to their children.
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Article 27. 1. Everyone has the right freely to participate in the
cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts, and to share in
scientific advancement and its benefits.
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary, or artistic
production of which he is the author.
Article 28. Everyone is entitled to a social and international order
in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can
be fully realized.
Article 29. 1. Everyone has duties to the community in which
alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.
2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall
be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely
for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the
rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order, and the general welfare in a
democratic society.
3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
Article 30. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group, or person any right to engage in any
activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of
the rights and freedoms set forth herein.

Common Article 3, 1949 Geneva Conventions
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,
each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum,
the following provisions:
1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and
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those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or
any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely,
without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion
or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited
at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the abovementioned persons:
a. violence to life and person, in particular murder of all
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture;
b. taking of hostages;
c. outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment;
d. the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
2. The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties
to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring
into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the
other provisions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the
legal status of the Parties to the conflict.

THE CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL
HEALTH AND COOPERATION AND THE
INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS
The Center for International Health and Cooperation
(CIHC) was founded by a small group who believed that health
and other humanitarian endeavors sometimes provide the only
common ground for initiating dialogue, understanding, and cooperation among people and nations shattered by war, civil conflicts, and ethnic violence. The Center has sponsored symposia
and published books that reflect this philosophy, including: Silent
Witnesses; A Framework for Survival: Health, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Assistance in Conflicts and Disasters; A Directory of Somali
Professionals; Clearing the Fields: Solutions to the Land Mine Crisis;
Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping Wars Before They Start; and Tropical
Medicine: A Clinical Text; as well as this book and other volumes in
the Fordham University Press International Humanitarian Affairs
series.
The Center and its Directors have been deeply involved in trying to alleviate the wounds of war in Somalia and the former
Yugoslavia. A CIHC amputee center in northern Somalia was developed as a model for a simple, rapid, inexpensive program that
could be replicated in other war zones. In the former Yugoslavia,
the CIHC was active in prisoner and hostage release, in legal assistance for human and political rights violations, and facilitated
discussions between combatants. The Center directs the International Diploma in Humanitarian Assistance (IDHA) in partnership with Fordham University in New York, the University of
Geneva in Switzerland, and the Royal College of Surgeons in Ire-

338

THE CIHC AND THE IIHA

land. The CIHC cooperates with other centers in offering specialized training courses for humanitarian negotiators and
international human rights lawyers. The Center has offered staff
support in recent years in crisis management in East Timor,
Aceh, Kosovo, Palestine, Albania, and other trouble spots.
The Center has been afforded full consultative status at the
United Nations. In the United States, it is a fully approved public
charity.
The CIHC is closely linked with Fordham University’s Institute
of International Humanitarian Affairs (IIHA). The Directors of
the CIHC serve as the Advisory Board of the Institute. The President of the CIHC is the University Professor and Director of the
Institute, and two of the CIHC officers, Larry Hollingworth and
Michel Veuthey, are adjunct professors of Fordham. The Institute
offers courses in various aspects of international humanitarian
affairs and sponsors symposia on cutting edge topics in this field.
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